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Abstract 
 
This thesis is situated at the crossroads between philosophy, political theory, 
and art. It proceeds from an enquiry into various philosophical discourses on 
‘the real’ – in particular the Lacanian conceptualization of the real as 
impossible and the Guattari-Deleuze formulation of the real as artificial. It 
examines what these discourses engender in political theory and in the fields 
of art and activism. It looks at their investment in constructing ‘a people’ and 
seeks to understand this as an enterprise that involves images and their 
configuration. From this angle, the project is interested in exploring the 
discussion on ‘democracy and art’ and engages in advocating a shift in 
current positions on their relation. After critiquing Chantal Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism, it is suggested that provoking such a shift might be achieved by 
outlining a model similar to the way that Mouffe develops a model or 
‘democratic design’. 
 
Mouffe’s model is structured on Lacan’s ‘impossible real’. Accordingly, this 
dissertation points towards a design for pluralism based on ‘a real’ grounded 
in Wilfrid Sellars’ conceptualization of a stereoscopic fusion between what he 
termed the manifest and scientific images of man-in-the-world. The project 
suggests that images can be sites in which such models or ‘designs’ are put 
into conceptual shape. Sellars’ characterization of science as being rational, 
not because it has foundation, but rather because it is a self-correcting 
venture that can put any claim into jeopardy, is drawn on as the basis for the 
‘construction of a people’ established on the Sellarsian real. Furthermore, the 
project engages with the work of a number of post-Sellarsian thinkers to lay 
the grounds for an argument for ‘reasoning’ as a distinct position that can be 
taken up in the context of the structural reality of democracy and its relation 
to art. The term post-agonistics (or postagonistics) indicates this shift to 
reasoning and how it might contribute to the expanded field of art.  
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Introduction 
 
From Participation, Implication, and Occupation to Reasoning 
 
  
In order to impede the closure of the democratic space, it is vital to abandon 
any reference to the possibility of a consensus that, because it would be 
grounded on justice or on rationality, could not be destabilized. To believe in 
the possibility of such a consensus, even when it is conceived as an ‘infinite 
task’, is to postulate that harmony and reconciliation should be the goal of a 
democratic society. In other words, it is to transform the pluralist democratic 
ideal into a ‘self-refuting ideal’, since the very moment of its realization would 
coincide with its destruction. As conditions of possibility for the existence of a 
pluralist democracy, conflicts and antagonisms constitute at the same time 
the condition of impossibility of its final achievement. (Mouffe, 1996: 11, all 
emphases added) 
 
In considering the emphasized words in the above paragraph, the reader 
may already be able to decode the main tenets behind Mouffe’s design for a 
pluralist and politically realist democratic model. But what does it mean to 
tailor a blueprint for a pluralist outlook proceeding from trepidations about the 
closure of democracy, strong restrictions on consensus, and the curtailing of 
rationality while giving primacy to the democratic ideal? How does this affect 
our understanding of pluralism and what are its possible consequences? Part 
of this thesis’s trajectory concerns providing adequate answers to these 
questions. This trajectory also involves sharpening the contrasts between the 
project of agonism and contesting political theories and philosophies by 
putting them into conversation with each other on the questions of 
abstraction and the real. 
 
Taking this into consideration, it is clear that Mouffian agonism successfully 
mobilizes a specific image or conception of community. She achieves this by 
proposing a formula or a list of protocols – contrasted against competing 
theorizations – which clearly demarcate a ‘democratic design’ that highlights 
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what should and should not be taken up in order to induce changes to 
already existing liberal democracy. Principally, I find Mouffe’s approach 
useful in its straightforwardness and its endeavour to lay out a kind of master 
plan for a pluralist politics that would rejuvenate democratic systems. But my 
appreciation of this approach has more to do with its formal and methodical 
qualities than with its major premise (the incommensurability of identities) or 
its major goal (the radicalization of democracy), aspects which I call into 
question and explore in different segments of the study at hand. 
 
The concept of agonism has a long history in philosophy and political theory 
but no doubt Mouffe’s articulation (as differentiated from Nietzsche’s, 
Arendt’s, and more recently Bonnie Honig’s and William Connolly’s) has had 
by far the most impact on the field of art and its intersection with political 
activism. This is why I mostly focus my attention on Mouffe’s agonistic 
pluralism – and what is distinctive about it – rather than traverse the entire 
literature on agonism. I explore possible reasons for this predominance in 
Chapter 1 and suggest that it may be accounted for by understanding the 
theoretical genealogy of Mouffian agonistics. The process of tracing the roots 
of Mouffe’s particular articulation leads to exposing the intersections between 
her concept and that of the postmodern sublime (as established by Lyotard), 
and to the suggestion that Mouffian agonism is a kind of political enactment 
and rearticulation of this iteration of the sublime within the framework and 
institutional contextualization of liberal democracy. 
  
This brings us to the broader area of research that this project contributes to: 
the confluence of democracy, pluralism, and art. Rather than approaching 
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this field from the particular perspectives of art history or curatorial studies, 
my entry point, and the frame of reference I exploit, is the image1. More 
generally, I have been preoccupied with how philosophy informs and 
interprets the construction of the image to social and political ends (and vice 
versa), in addition to how philosophy and political theory might contribute to 
the configuration and carving out of new paradigms for image making. The 
dissertation at hand attempts to synthesize this preoccupation with the 
general conversation on ‘art and democracy’ and in the process suggests 
ways of reordering and altering the terms and tenets of this debate. But why 
does this debate require such an overhaul and shifting of terms? An 
appropriate answer to this question requires some contextualization.   
 
From an art historical perspective, Anthony Gardner’s engagement with the 
art and democracy question brings to the fore contrasting positions on the 
issue. Gardner emphasizes and critiques the deep and profound ties 
between contemporary art and democracy. In exploring the evolution of 
Thomas Hirschhorn’s politically charged installations, Gardner (2012) 
identifies two major positions that art practices have adopted in their dance 
with the liberal democratic project. The first is participation, which is best 
represented by the turn to relational aesthetics theorized by Nicolas 
Bourriaud. Gardner suggests that this position – with its talk of participatory 
                                                     
1
 With Beech (2014), part of my interest lies in the way that “philosophy often, despite (and 
because of) itself, produces a figure – and how, at that precise point, art, or the image” is 
invited into the picture. Philosophy and political theory – as well as its subfield of democratic 
theory – are densely populated with such images. To make some of these images explicit 
and foreground them is part of this thesis’ methodology. More specifically, it is when such 
philosophically embedded images evoke ‘a people’ or a community that is of interest. Images 
in this abstract sense are the points at which the social aspects of a theory or a philosophy 
reach a sort of apex of abstraction and become circulatable in ways often detached from or 
untraceable back to it. 
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art projects as micro-utopias and its inclination to democratize art – 
contributes to the idealization of democracy. This is considered problematic 
because in the name of democracy, wars have been forged, nations have 
been unsettled, and lives have been lost. Thus Gardner seems to favour the 
second trope, which he arrives at by way of Hirschhorn’s reflections on his 
own work in the early 2000s developed in response to the changing global 
picture as it became permeated with wars and conflicts as a permanent 
condition. This is the position of implication in which the work is set-up to 
implicate the audience so as to engage them in a process of de-idealizing 
democracy. Hence, the transformation in Hirschhorn’s work from constructing 
monuments to his favourite philosophers to setting up spaces as immersive 
environments of implication, laden with images of war, conflict, and carnage 
brought about by the trigger-happy dimension of democracy. Implication, in 
this sense, depends on confrontation, whereby an audience is confronted 
with an overabundance of stimuli aimed at making them sensitive to the price 
of democracy as an excuse for interventionist politics. 
 
But the trope of implication can also amplify its confrontational dimension 
through what Gardner (2012) calls ‘retro politics’. This particular implicative 
mode of responding to the art and democracy question is epitomized in the 
work of the Slovenian collective Neue Slowenische Kunst (NSK) and its 
offshoots, the art group IRWIN and the music group Laibach. As Gardner 
suggests, for this strand and its representatives the main tactic tends to 
involve a kind of blurring between utopianism and totalitarianism and taking 
up historical imagery, icons, and symbols ambivalently situated between 
aspirations for social transformation and state/nationalist propaganda. 
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Overall, this strand practices a form of conflation of symbols and replication 
of past totalitarian motifs and is hinged on the idea that the appropriation and 
manipulation of this material and language can intervene into the fabric of the 
present in positive ways. Thus it illustrates a kind of belief that only “by 
speaking that same language could the totalitarian potential within that 
language be embodied, exceeded, and potentially revealed” (Gardner, 2012). 
 
It is clear that democracy is not simply an issue or a theme for contemporary 
art practices, but that – along with capitalism – it constitutes part of the 
structural reality that both constrains and enables their production and 
distribution. We can consider the general positions of both participation and 
implication as disparate ways of dealing with this structural relationship to 
democracy, tethered to the venture of integrating Central and Eastern 
European art practices into the bigger picture of contemporary art, the 
emergence of neoliberalism as we understand it today, and economic 
globalization. So what we can take from Gardner’s explorative study of 
contemporary art’s positions on democracy is that while participation has 
attempted to enact the democratic gesture, it risks falling into a naivety about 
the full structural implications of democracy, and that its antithesis, 
implication, avoids this risk through confrontation, sensitizing, critique, and 
blurring the boundaries between democracy and totalitarianism. 
 
Building on this general categorization, we can identify ‘agonistic pluralism’ 
as indicative of a variation on these positions. Although agonism calls for 
participation, I argue in Chapter 1 that it is perhaps better understood as a 
form of institutional occupation that works by what I term franchising 
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democracy, the idea that pluralist democracy – in its specific function of 
sustaining the stream of conflictual viewpoints – is an adequate institutional 
intervention in and of itself. This is only possible because agonistics adopts 
the Laclauian stance that not any “position in society, not any struggle is 
equally capable of transforming its own contents in a nodal point that 
becomes an empty signifier2” (Laclau, 1995). For Mouffe, the democratic 
struggle is obviously the best placed form of contestation and the struggle 
most adept at enabling the transformation of antagonists into agonists by 
becoming such a point revolving around an empty signifier. 
 
The pivoting of the democratic project on this particular concept of signifier 
harks back to the Lacanian psychoanalytic tradition, and as Laclau (1995) 
informs us, what is at stake is the attempt “to signify the limits of signification 
– the real, if you want, in the Lacanian sense – and there is no direct way of 
doing so except through the subversion of the process of signification itself”. 
For Mouffe, the name of this subversion process is agonistic pluralism. The 
move from participation and implication to the approach of occupation – 
which in this case is founded on a particular understanding of the real – 
brings into light the influence and impact of philosophical thought on the 
social movements of today and their convergence with art practices and 
image construction. 
 
It is readily accepted that images “can politicize and depoliticize” (Burnett, 
1995: 237). The question most relevant here, to my mind, is how do we want 
to politicize the image? Which version of the real is best suited to develop 
                                                     
2
 Laclau (1995) reiterates Lacan’s concept of the empty signifier as “strictly speaking, a 
signifier without a signified”. 
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images that politicize in ways that are not idealizing democracy and 
participation, nor suggesting that audience implication or occupational 
strategies are adequate forms of addressing and transforming structural 
power relations? For as we shall see, ‘the real’ taken up by Mouffe and used 
as the primary structuration device for her agonal democracy is the Lacanian 
impossible real touched upon above. 
 
Hence, an underlying and basic argument – that lays out the spine of this 
project – is that the specific understanding of ‘the real’ we begin from, when 
thinking and developing models for politicization, ends up directly delimiting 
and conditioning our political objectives and how we think intervention. This is 
clear in Mouffe’s agonism where ‘the real’ she draws on conditions her 
project towards the radicalization of democracy by leaving it open and 
preventing its possible closure by the depoliticization that is inherent to 
neoliberal forms of governance. An important corollary to this argument is 
that the phenomenon of post-crash social movements, such as Occupy, has 
often been linked to the notion of “constructing a people” or the construction 
of “a people to come”, at least within the interconnected milieus of political 
theory, philosophy and art. 
 
This not only evokes images of a politicized people, but implies that the story 
of ‘the real’ and the understanding of difference or pluralism used to envision 
such images are coded into them. This perhaps indicates why Mouffe speaks 
of “democratic designs”; her agonistic pluralism is a design for democracy 
which attempts to construct a people. In Chapters 3 and 4, I take up a similar 
modality, but instead of democracy, I propose as objectives 1) a pluralism 
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unhinged from the parliamentary imaginary and 2) a (Sellarsian) scientific 
realism. The aim is to provide a ‘design’, a proposal tailored to a wider more 
inclusive pluralism, one which is based on a more exhaustive anti-
foundationalism, while at the same time taking science seriously in the 
context of a political landscape geared towards maximizing an environment 
of untruth. It is important to note that while the Sellarsian account of scientific 
realism (or, as it is often referred to, scientific naturalism) has recently 
enjoyed a resurgence in interest and debate across a certain niche of art 
practices and their related theorizations, it has been mostly adopted and 
reworked into political and aesthetic enquiries on noise3. To my knowledge, it 
does not appear that the current blossoming of Post-Sellarsian theory – with 
its strong residues in research fields such as inferentialism, philosophy of 
neuroscience, and collective intentionality – has had the same impact on the 
theorization of the image. 
 
                                                     
3
 This has been largely due to the contribution of Ray Brassier and his interest in this field. 
Brassier’s (2009) proposition that noise plays the role of exacerbating “the rift between 
knowing and feeling by splitting experience, forcing conception against sensation” is clearly 
connected to the Sellarsian “myth of the given” which works against direct intuition as a 
source of knowledge. Sellars’ scientific naturalism can generally be thought of as having the 
benefit of counteracting the complacency of experience over methods of acquiring 
knowledge that proceed through inference, or better said, games of reasoning. In the context 
of the Sellarsian deprioritizing of intuitive experience, the artist Mattin (sometimes in 
collaboration with Brassier) and the GegenSichKollektiv have worked to develop a practice 
and theory of noise that would escape noise’s capture in the genre of music or ‘noise 
concerts’. This attempt has contributed to the further bridging of Sellars’ philosophy and 
Thomas Metzinger’s (2003) Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity in which there is no self as we 
understand it in popular culture, but instead a model that produces the unified image of the 
self for us. Metzinger’s related concept of Nemocentrism – the idea of a subjectivity centred 
on no one – is related to Sellars’ concept of pattern-governed behaviour. Hence, the work of 
the mentioned artists emphasizes the need to displace individual experiences as a strategy. 
As GegenSichKollektiv (2012) note, in a rearticulation of Brassier’s ideas: “[T]he 
commodification of experience now takes place not only at the ideological level but at the 
neurophysiological level. If we take the term literally, noise should not work ‘smoothly’ at the 
level of either aesthetics or experience”. 
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Broadly speaking, the second half of this project traverses some of Sellars’ 
main arguments while making implicit and explicit connections between those 
arguments and the distinct projects of contemporary thinkers, most notably 
Brassier, but also McDowell, Seibt, Brandom, and Trafford. While this 
traversal does not go so far as to propose a Sellarsian theory of the image or 
the visual, it does attempt to draw out a preliminary framework for what 
adopting post-Sellarsian games of reasoning might entail for the image. This 
line of inquiry also leads us to a ‘working through’ of difference and 
antagonism in which a major premise of the agonistic argument is 
questioned: the idea that there exists an intrinsic antagonism that through 
democratic processes can be tamed and modified into agonism. Rather, 
antagonism should not be thought of as an ‘outside’ external to what Sellars 
calls “the space of reasons”. The aim of this portion of the project is to 
suggest what might be required for a possible repositioning on the ‘art and 
democracy’ question.  
 
To arrive at this repositioning, we must return to the central line of this 
dissertation – the idea that the particular understanding of ‘the real’ that we 
use as our starting point when developing models for politicization 
circumscribes and confines our political objectives. The ‘impossible real’ at 
the core of Mouffian agonism only permits a specific function for ‘the people’ 
Mouffe works towards constructing. For Mouffe (2014; 2016), the 
construction of a people is envisaged through the role of social movements in 
proposing demands and questions that in turn are taken as the basis for 
strategies by political parties within the setting of parliament. I argue that this 
restricts art practices to forms of demanding and questioning bound to the 
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limitations of already existing parliamentarianism or “critical republicanism”, 
as Khan (2013) calls it – an emphasis on the supposed constructive role of 
conflict in a democracy that Mouffe ends up sharing with Habermas. 
 
From this particular conceptualization of ‘constructing a people’ developed by 
Laclau and Mouffe we shift our attention to the instigation of a ‘people to 
come’. The interpretation of Occupy through different and contesting filters of 
‘the real’ underlines how each version of the real pursues a different strategy 
of politicization4. While the Lacanian impossible real hooks up with the 
project of radical democracy and hegemony, another real – ubiquitous to the 
theorization of art and activism – seeks a radicalization of nature in its 
labouring to resist parochial forms of representation and power. 
 
As Chandler (2014) describes it, this real posits itself as an alternative power 
or “anti-power” which forms “a permanent ontological challenge to hegemonic 
power’s attempts to control or constrain the creative vitality of life”. What we 
are discussing here is the artificial real first articulated by Guattari and later 
fleshed out in collaboration with Deleuze as a politics of desiring-production, 
machinic filiation, and de- and re-territorialisation. The artificial real – to be 
more specific, its rearticulation into contemporary political theory – repeatedly 
                                                     
4
 See for example Conio’s (2015b) edited book making the argument that Occupy present 
the idea of a people to come. In one passage Conio (2015b: 25) states that “‘Occupy’ is a 
synecdoche for belief in the revolutionary transformation of the capitalist system: a new 
heterogenic world of protest and activism that cannot be thought in terms of the state, liberal 
democracy, parliamentary systems, or the hugely compromised nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) sector. Nor can Occupy be conceived in terms of class war or vanguard 
politics. These conceptualizations do not articulate fully where power is held, nor from where 
revolution may issue. A philosophical vocabulary that would materially inhabit the conditions 
of our present global world order is needed because the different registers of ontology (the 
movements of the earth), the social (the people yet to come), epistemology (concept 
formation), and aesthetics are nevertheless activated on the one single plane that is at 
considerable remove from the conventional terms of state or royal politics as they are 
understood today”. 
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assumes that it is “human hubris to assert frameworks of collective 
representation in terms of meaning or organization: these human constructs 
(the politics of the actual) are doomed to be constraining and exclusionary, a 
pale imitation of the virtual and the immanent” (Chandler, 2014). In Chapter 
2, I bridge Sohn-Rethel’s conception of ‘real abstraction’ –  in which social 
acts of exchange through the universal equivalent of money are articulated 
as prior to abstract concepts and intellectual labour, and thus condition them 
at the level of the unconscious – with the strong mutation in the Freudo-
Lacanian unconscious that is the ‘machinic unconscious’ developed by 
Guattari and Deleuze. This mutation to the unconscious, due to its 
reformulation according to the perceived demands of real abstraction, forms 
the basis for the artificial real and runs counter to Lacan’s impossible real. 
Thus it becomes rooted in a political unconscious that faces the future not 
antiquity, a future “whose screen would be none other than the possible itself, 
the possible as hypersensitive to language, but also the possible 
hypersensitive to touch, hypersensitive to the socius, hypersensitive to the 
cosmos” (Guattari, 2011: 10). 
 
This latter emphasis on ‘sense’ leads to a parallel inquiry into Deleuze’s 
concepts of Other-cide5 and ‘transcendental empiricism’ where the attempt is 
to understand how this transformational journey of the concept of ‘the 
unconscious’ – undertaken by both Guattari and Deleuze separately and in 
collaboration – crosses with the question of how to understand casual 
                                                     
5
 Brito (2009) suggests that Other-cide can be understood as: a march in the contrary 
direction from that of the constitution of the subject, the march towards the world of universal 
variation where the distinction of consciousness and its object no longer exists or already 
doesn’t. 
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efficacy in relation to the reality of abstraction. In his ‘superior empirical 
encounters’ and what he calls ‘strange reason’, Deleuze finds ways of 
escaping “the norm-bound world of judgment and representation” (Jelača, 
2014). He compresses art and science into a single expressive project which 
does away with the grounds for their epistemological differences. This 
prompts a comparative analysis between Deleuze and Sellars pivoted around 
how each thinker understands the empirical, abstraction, and knowledge. 
Deleuze’s (1994: 56–57) view amounts to an aestheticization of empiricism to 
achieve the transcendental. He writes that empiricism can become 
transcendental and aesthetics an indisputable field of knowledge when they 
are established in such way as to allow for apprehending “directly in the 
sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: 
difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason 
behind qualitative diversity.” This is a somewhat traditional mantra that 
continues to play a role in the conceptualization of images and art practices. 
A foray into Sellars’ magnum opus Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind 
puts this view into question and leads to ways of thinking about the image 
based on a Sellarsian understanding of empiricism. 
 
As Macbeth (2002) notes, “the fundamental and most profound lesson” of 
this book is Sellars’ assertion that “empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated 
extension, science, is rational, not because it has a foundation but because it 
is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not 
all at once”. And as Macbeth writes this is not to deny that science has a 
foundation “in the evidence of the senses”. Rather, that “it is not in virtue of 
that feature of it” that science is a rational venture. This lesson is key to 
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understanding Brassier’s (2015) position that “reason is inconsolable and 
non-conciliatory”. And in Chapter 3, this is taken as an opportunity to 
construct ‘a people’ established through this view. This is the image of people 
whose pluralism is neither subsidiary to the structures of parliamentarianism 
and political parties nor based on the invention of a ‘people to come’ in the 
Deleuzoguattarian sense (explored in Chapter 2). Whilst the political 
implications of this concept have not been fully articulated in this project, the 
aim is to open up to new methods for such people construction and 
demonstrate the methodology and concepts behind them as clearly as 
possible. 
 
This brings us to the final version of ‘the real’ featured in this project, the 
notion of a synoptic real articulated through Sellars’ distinction between the 
manifest and scientific images (of man-in-the-world). This distinction and 
Brassier’s call to avoid the “lure of reconciliation” between these two 
conceptions or images provide the premise for models and ‘designs’ for 
pluralism that are rooted in both the manifest and the scientific. And thus we 
can reconnect with our earlier enquiry around the positions art can take in 
relation to the question of democracy. As noted, the three main positions can 
be categorized as participation, implication, and occupation. But the 
groundwork provided in this thesis for an art-oriented understanding of 
Sellarasian anti-foundationalism and inferentialism brings to light 
contemporary philosophies and theories of reasoning, providing the basis for 
the suggested shift in positions on the ‘democracy and art’ question. 
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A theory of reasoning which also critiques Mouffian agonism and its 
incapacity to transform norms has been developed by James Trafford. 
Central to this is what Trafford (2016) dubs “transformative understanding”, 
whereby in understanding the constraints of structural power, those engaged 
in a conversation can work to surpass those constraints through dialogue and 
reasoning. Hence, along with such investigations into transformative 
reasoning, this dissertation works towards the reorientation of the established 
positions in the art and democracy debate, suggesting reasoning as a distinct 
project and position in contrast to those already discussed. I indicate that this 
repositioning can point towards possible models for making images or 
artworks that do not comply with the dominant aesthetic paradigm in 
contemporary art, a paradigm Malik (2015) captures in the term 
‘indeterminacy’. 
 
This while also allowing the image to be deployed as a site for pluralism that 
does not reduce the latter to the limitations of current parliamentary forms of 
democracy. In relation to this, I articulate a working concept for such a model 
for image construction based on a reading of Wilfrid Sellars’ concept of 
‘stereoscopic vision’ and Ray Brassier’s take on it. This concept, which I term 
an inaesthetics of jeopardy, can be considered a preliminary attempt at 
delineating an original theory for the politicization of the image from a 
synthesis of philosophy and political theory. 
 
What this model provides is essentially a way to think, construct the image 
around, and represent political antagonism and pluralism which is tied to a) 
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neither consensus (Habermas) b) nor the institutionalization of 
incommensurability and the franchising of democracy (Mouffe), but the 
cognitive orientation6 (Seibt) that a non-sceptical position on dialogue and 
reasoning makes possible.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
6
 Seibt (2015) develops a helpful description of what underlies dialogue in cognitive terms 
(i.e. the Sellarsian scientific image). Underlying dialogue is a process of cognitive orientation, 
a mental operation distinct from other forms of conversation in that it is not based on the 
extraction of information, the development of a plan for action, or the overcoming of an 
opponent, but the shared cultivation of the ‘space of reasons’ as such. 
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1. The Limits of the Differend: Rethinking Agonism 
 
1.1 Mouffian Agonism: Vehicle for Differends 
  
Politics demands coming to terms with the plurality of opinions, world views, 
and grievances that constitute the social spectrum, that is to say, the 
acceptance of antagonism as a formidable characteristic of thinking and 
doing politics. Chantal Mouffe emphasises this dimension and prescribes it 
as constitutive of politics proper. “It is only when division and antagonism are 
recognized as being ineradicable that it is possible to think in a properly 
political way” (2013: 26). The ineradicability of antagonism is also at work in 
Jean-François Lyotard’s concept of the différend, a concept that can be said 
to not only have strong residues in Mouffe’s formulation of ‘agonism’, but 
actually differentiates and sets apart her version of agonism from previous 
agonisms in the history of theory. Mouffe finds similarities between Hannah 
Arendt’s agonism and Jürgen Habermas’ “discourse ethics”, the latter used 
throughout her argument as the antithesis to her theory of agonism. 
According to Mouffe, what both Arendt and Habermas fail to recognize is 
none other than the differend: 
 
‘…a[A]lthough Arendt puts great emphasis on human plurality and insists that 
politics deals with the community and the reciprocity among human beings 
who are different from each other, she never acknowledges that this plurality 
is at the origin of antagonistic conflicts. According to her, to think politically is 
to develop the ability to see things from a multiplicity of perspectives. As her 
reference to Kant and his idea of ‘enlarged thought’ testifies, her pluralism is 
not fundamentally different from that of Habermas, since it is also inscribed in 
the horizon of inter-subjective agreement. Indeed, what she looks for in 
Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic judgment is a procedure for ascertaining inter-
subjective agreement in the public space. […] neither Arendt nor Habermas 
is able to acknowledge the hegemonic nature of every form of consensus 
and the ineradicability of antagonism, the moment of what Lyotard refers to 
as ‘the differend’. (2013: 23)  
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The differend can be most simply described as a mark of incommensurability 
between two parties who operate under different ‘phrase regimes’. 
Originating in mathematics, the term ‘incommensurable’ initially indicated the 
lack of a common measure between magnitudes. It was then taken up by 
various philosophers of science in the 1960s, subsequently finding its way 
into political theory.7 If the differend is “incommensurability politicized” 
(Spencer, 2001), then Mouffian agonism is an attempt to institutionalize the 
differend. In other words, it is an attempt to write the differend into the 
institution and bestow it with institutional normativity. With Mouffian agonism 
now an established and often cited concept, which is frequently relied upon 
within the expanded field of art, it seems relevant to map out its philosophical 
underpinnings as the most advanced formulation of what can be called the 
institutionalization of incommensurability. 
 
Lyotard’s differends “are conflicts of interest between parties that cannot be 
resolved, but must be acknowledged and kept in view at all times” (Grant, 
2001). Mouffe’s agonism attempts to tame antagonism while maintaining that 
“we will never arrive at the point where it has definitely been overcome” 
(Mouffe, 2010: 111). Mouffe shifts the differend from Lyotard’s favourite 
register of the sublime to that of politics in practice. Lyotard’s account of the 
sublime can be granted the title of his “master-concept of postmodern 
intervention”. It is from this concept that his other interventionist concepts, 
such as the differend, are derived. Lyotard’s sublime was formulated as a 
kind of update in logic to the Kantian sublime which he saw as the guiding 
                                                     
7
 For a detailed discussion of incommensurability as employed by Mouffe in relation to the 
term as used by Thomas Kuhn (whose theory Mouffe directly references) to explain scientific 
revolutions and competing conceptual schemes see Section 2.2 
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principle of modernism and the avant-garde. Lyotard saw Kant’s reflections 
on the sublime as representing “a rupture, occurring like the crash of a 
meteorite onto the surface of the book”. He declared that this rupturing was 
what “‘the ontological earthquake” called modernity was all about (1988, cited 
in Bukdahl, 2007). Re-writing what such a rupture could be for the new 
context of postmodernism, which, in Lyotard’s view, was dominated by 
techno-science and binary codes, formed the initial impetus and twist behind 
Lyotard’s postmodern sublime. The sublime, Lyotard (1993: 89–107) 
explains, is tied to the question ‘is it happening?’ Instants which are 
not demonstrable (susceptible of logical proof) are those which originate in 
ideas that elude representation, even in the form of examples or symbols. He 
explains that the universe, humanity, and “the moment” are all cases in point 
of non-demonstrable absolutes which, according to Lyotard’s interpretation of 
Kant, are so because to represent is “to make relative, to place in context 
within conditions of representation” (Lyotard, 1982).  
 
Thus, according to Lyotard’s account, we cannot represent the absolute, but 
we can demonstrate that the absolute exists through forms of negative 
representation. This is the task of presenting “the unpresentable in 
presentation itself" (1984: 81). This is the sublime as outlined and developed 
by Lyotard: it is all to do with the “temporality specific to contemporary 
capitalism”. This is the temporality of innovation or “the new” which 
subjugates the will to its “technology of time” to affirm the will’s hegemony 
over time, and in doing so tailors it to the metaphysics of capital. Innovation 
“works”, but the question mark affected through the is it happening? “stops” 
(Lyotard, 1993: 89–107). This capacity to ‘stop’ or halt can only be presented 
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as the unrepresentable in presentation itself. And with this momentary 
‘stopping’ the unrepresentable is represented only to be negated again and 
so on and so forth. Bertens (1995) puts it as follows: 
 
Lyotard’s art of the sublime is thus an art of negation, a perpetual negation 
[…] (his) postmodern aesthetic is based on a never-ending critique of 
representation that should contribute to the preservation of heterogeneity, of 
optimal dissensus. The sublime does not lead towards a resolution; the 
confrontation with the unrepresentable leads to radical openness. 
 
The differend is the result of Lyotard’s extensive reworking of the sublime in 
order to repurpose it for an abstract sphere of litigation. Mouffe’s agonistics 
carry forward the transformation process, taking the differend into a realist 
sphere of politics. Hence, the conceptual genealogy that might not at first be 
apparent, becomes clear: agonistics is a sophisticated form of postmodern 
sublime whereby the radical openness of the latter, as we shall see, is 
transformed into radical democracy. This perhaps makes clear why Mouffe’s 
agonism is such a prominent theory within art’s extended field, it is a political 
theory that is at least partially indebted to an aesthetic theory which it has 
managed to convert and sublimate into its principles.  
 
But in its transference to the immediate sphere of the political, agonism 
sheds any remaining metaphysical skin that may still have been attached to 
the differend. As such, agonism can be considered as part of what has been 
identified as a post-metaphysical move from the readerly to the writerly in 
political theory (Daly, 1994). This suggests – as some have pointed out and 
will be elaborated on later – that agonism perhaps shares more with the 
thinking of pragmatists like Richard Rorty and rationalists like Habermas than 
Mouffe would have us believe. A major question that these discourses 
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attempt to answer and, in so doing, allows us to compare and differentiate 
between them, is ‘what should we do with antagonism?’ which is to say ‘what 
place and function should antagonism occupy and serve within the design of 
democratic political systems?’ and ‘what kind of power should it have within 
such systems?’ The term ‘design’, which is used here in reference to Mouffe, 
comes up when she discusses what she believes to be the major task of 
democratic politics. This task consists of preventing the omission of passions 
or their banishment to the private sphere. Mouffe believes that this task has a 
dangerous enemy in the form of “rational consensus”, or what we can broadly 
call the culture of rational consensus within the public sphere. In opposition to 
such consensus, Mouffe stipulates that safeguarding these passions requires 
their sublimation by “mobilizing them towards democratic designs, by 
creating collective forms of identification around democratic objectives” 
(2013: 21, italics mine). Mouffe’s democratic designs are a) not compatible 
with rational consensus b) both an outlet for passions and a mechanism for 
forming counter-collectives based on these passions with the aim of 
contributing to furthering democracy by, as Lyotard would put it, not silencing 
the differend c) platforms for voicing in the public sphere those socio-political 
passions that are often kept private and off record.  
 
For Mouffe, agonism is the tool with which such democratic designs can be 
drawn for society. Agonism is based on the idea that conflict is the chief 
ingredient and guarantor of pluralist democracy as well as what constitutes 
its specificity. Instead of arguing for a rational consensus, agonism argues for 
a conflictual consensus that avoids falling into pure antagonism by 
reinventing conflict as a struggle between adversaries rather than a struggle 
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between enemies (2013: 19). This is the adversary principle at the heart of 
Mouffian agonism. This principle allows her to establish incommensurability, 
the absence of any common ground, as a criterion for the political and for 
democracy. What concerns us here is how this particular formulation of the 
political, which is based on incommensurability, has helped to configure what 
is arguably one of the most prominent strains of political imaginary, in the 
sense of a predisposition, in art and curatorial practice. As I hope will become 
clear, there are obvious reasons for the popularity of agonism in the field, one 
of which is its functioning as a contemporary extension of the notion of 
incommensurability. Tracing its history back to both the Lyotardian differend 
and Laclau’s Freudo-Marxist Lacanian conception of politics, and considering 
its conjunction with recent practices, we will look at the limits of the agonistic 
model and its consequences for the field. Later, we will begin to draft a 
possible alternative that will look to give antagonisms and their associated 
passions a different place and function in a speculative design for art practice 
that is not anti-rationalistic but rather strives to recognize and imagine 
processes of reasoning concurrently with antagonism. 
 
A closer reading of the differend reveals the complex dynamic it establishes 
in relation to exchange as the defining characteristic of life under capitalism. 
Brassier (2014) notes how many post-1968 continental thinkers, among them 
Lyotard, understood the process of capitalist valorisation as one that 
“subordinates worker’s activity to the activity of capital.” For them, this meant 
that the “despotism of real subsumption renders ideology critique redundant.” 
Real subsumption and formal subsumption are transitional stages that Marx 
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often used when postulating the development of capitalism. Brown (2012) 
describes them this way: 
 
Under conditions of formal subsumption, an industry or production process is 
drawn into a capitalist economy, but “there is no change as yet in the mode 
of production itself”. Under conditions of “real subsumption,” on the other 
hand, the production process itself is altered, such that the producers are no 
longer selling their surplus product to the capitalist, but are instead selling 
their labor to the capitalist, who will eventually be compelled to reorganize the 
production process altogether. […] we are already in the world of Marxian 
separation, where the whole production process is oriented towards 
exchange. 
 
Working outside or around the edges of direct ideology critique, because of 
the latter’s supposed redundancy, it is clear then that Lyotard’s differend is, in 
part, an attempt to formulate a critical concept that can reveal injustices 
under real subsumption by functioning as an intervener. Bill Readings (1991) 
makes this point when he states that: 
 
In The Differend, Lyotard understands capitalism as the giving of hegemony 
over all other phrase-regimes to the economic genre of exchange. Capitalism 
as the rule of commodification and exchange becomes capitalism as the 
determinant rule of the economic genre over the linking of phrases. That is to 
say, in capitalism, all phrases are treated as if their linkage were economic, a 
matter of the exchange of values. 
 
In other words, differends occur when the infiltration of real subsumption into 
language becomes dominant and those whose phrase-regimes have been 
left outside this subsumptionary process or cannot adapt to it are exposed. 
Lyotard (1988: 9) tells us that differends occur in situations “where the 
plaintiff is divested of the means to argue and becomes for that reason a 
victim.” This is because a case of differend emerges between two parties 
“when the regulation of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of 
one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that 
idiom.” One of the most telling examples Lyotard uses to explain his concept 
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- and one in which we can identify its relation with real subsumption - is that 
of a generic wronged worker who is unable to prove that she is a victim of 
injustice. Lyotard (1988: 9-10) explains that the legal language in contracts 
and agreements between workers and employers can only perform its role of 
litigation if workers identify with their labour as a commodity or a service. As 
a result, when they accept the terms of such contractual arrangements, their 
labour’s use-value is completely subsumed into exchange-value, which then 
allows them to exist within a legal framework as plaintiffs i.e. claimants. 
Without recourse to the abstraction of their labour as a commodity or service 
they would not be able to claim anything, it is their acceptance of and 
inclusion in this idiom through a process of real subsumption that allows them 
to escape slavery, but does it allow them to avoid becoming victims? 
 
Lyotard does not think so, on the grounds that the differend remains outside 
the contractual field of reference and outside the sphere of litigation. This is 
because “economic and social law can regulate the litigation between 
economic and social partners but not the differend between labor-power and 
capital” (1988: 10). In other words, the differend in this particular example is 
the wrong that is impossible to prove because of capitalism’s real 
subsumption of labour and the resulting hegemony of exchange over the 
social. Litigation is centred on an exchange of commodities and services and 
presupposes the plaintiff as a figure with something to exchange and so 
grounds communication in exchange. “Communication is the exchange of 
messages, exchange the communication of goods” (1988: 12). Lyotard’s 
differend, then, is an attempt to identify what legal frameworks are incapable 
of recognizing, because differends are born at the moment when human 
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labour-power is subsumed, reemerging as commodities and services, 
exchangeables and communicatory tools. This moment, for Lyotard, is the 
very condition that makes legal frameworks (in this case labour laws) 
possible. As a result, the differend can be seen as a form of tarrying with the 
injustices, passions, and feelings which linger as residuum after real 
subsumption has done its work. 
 
This is the basic scheme of incommensurability on which Lyotard establishes 
the differend. In it “everything is staked on the plight of a phrase whose 
regimen excludes cognitive verification” (Ronell, 2004). It excludes “cognitive 
verification” because in order to be cognitively verified the phrasing needs to 
accept that it must do commerce with words in the idiom of testimonial law 
established as a result of subsuming labour-power into commodity. This 
scheme lends the differend its conceptual force. Rather than submitting to 
the regime of exchange or setting out to engage with abstraction, the 
differend hinges its supposed efficacy on identifying these casualties of 
subsumption, then proceeds to locate its possibilities for intervention in 
language itself, because “it can be conceived that language is something 
other than the communication of a bit of information” (Lyotard, 1988: 12). “To 
give the differend its due”, Lyotard (1988: 13) writes, “is to institute new 
addressees, new addressers, new significations, and new referents in order 
that the injustice find an expression and that the plaintiff cease to be a victim. 
This requires new rules for the formation and linking of phrases.” All this 
seems rather confusing because the vocabulary by which such phrases will 
be formed and linked cannot be so alien as to be incomprehensible, and 
once we admit that it is not, then it cannot follow that the novel phrase 
31 
 
regimens are purged of any links to exchange. Additionally, how and where 
will such new rules be formed? Are not such rules a matter of societal 
deliberation and negotiation subject to the power of institutional 
endorsement? Also, can they emerge - as they seem to do - out of the blue 
at the command of the thinker’s will? To lessen the sense of confusion 
surrounding the possibilities and efficacy of Lyotard’s differend one only has 
to make the link that Alan Dunn (1993) establishes in the following: 
The invention that is inspired by the differend demands what might be called 
artistic recognition; like the work of art, it refuses to be measured by a single 
system of value. This invention expresses the transcendent heterogeneity of 
need, its refusal to be bound by the standards of exchange.  
 
Given the above, the differend seems to demand “that suffering be 
acknowledged as that which is not and cannot be recognized within a system 
governed by cognitive equivalence” (Dunn, 1993). The result is that its only 
recourse to intervention is the kind of expressivity found in a model of artistic 
freedom in which the autonomy of the artist’s expression from exchange is 
taken to be de facto ‘good’ and a necessary trait for anything to be 
considered an intervention. To be sure, Mouffe is able to considerably 
improve on Lyotard’s effort at envisioning agency outside a model of 
‘cognitive equivalence’ or ‘cognitive verification’, i.e. an agency based on 
adherence to a model of incommensurability. This is mainly accomplished by 
changing the imagined setting for her argument. When we read Lyotard, we 
imagine the site to be a courtroom, while the site conjured up in our 
imagination when we read Mouffe is that of a parliament. This change in 
imagined site and its mental relocation from courtroom to parliament 
indicates a shift from articulating the differend as a concept that normal 
litigation cannot grasp to the differend’s normalization as the everyday of 
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politics, thus establishing it as a condition for advocacy. This change in 
mental site has also been instrumental in enabling the differend to shed its 
traditional model of the autonomous artist. As Hagoort (2007) points out, 
“current liberal democracy is already reminiscent of” Mouffe’s agonistic 
model. “In parliamentary debates, politicians engage one another as ‘friendly 
enemies’”. Parliamentary adversarial relationships aligned with an agonistic 
model already seem to be a foundational element of contemporary pluralist 
democracy and are both the basis of this democracy and the means by which 
it puts a limit on attempts to reconsider how democracy might be improved. 
For Mouffe, an adversary is “somebody whose ideas we combat but whose 
right to defend those ideas we do not put into question” (Mouffe, 2000: 101). 
The mechanics of this parliamentary template are well suited for art practices 
that are contingent upon the differend and its institutionalization. 
  
This is embodied in what Mouffe refers to as the ‘artivist’, the artistic 
subjectivity through which political activism is established as a current in 
contemporary practice. It is through this subjectivity that we become aware of 
the displacement of adversarial parliamentary mechanics into a public sphere 
that is extramural and friendlier to aesthetic experimentation. Nevertheless, 
the undercurrent of incommensurability epitomized by the differend - with its 
deep-seated scepticism of exchange as a hegemonic idiom - is still the prime 
motif being put to work in such practices. What these practices, which Mouffe 
endorses, all have in common is their capacity to exploit the epistemological 
gap between particulars and universals, which, as Dunn (1993) has noted, is 
precisely where the differend resides. It is important here to propose a 
general definition of incommensurability as implied here. It is perhaps best 
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described as the idea that the epistemological gap between particulars 
(understood as ontological attributes or individual beings) and universals 
(understood as epistemological consequences of real subsumption) is 
constitutive of an irreparable rupture in society which leads to the 
exacerbation of injustices. It is then presumed that the role of thought is to 
formulate ideas that at least operate within the space of this rupture, and at 
best attempt to alleviate its effects by further exploiting this gap and 
emphasising its existence as actual, taking them to be the most pragmatic, 
unidealistic, and responsible courses of action. The exploitation of this 
epistemological gap is usually understood and described as “interventionist” 
because “it disrupts or interrupts normal flows of information, capital, and the 
smooth functioning of other totalizing systems” (Perini, 2010).  
 
Mouffe frequently cites the work of the Yes Men8 as a manifestation of what 
she means by an agonistic approach in art. Mouffe regards the Yes Men’s 
World Trade Organisation project (1999) as a counter-hegemonic 
intervention “whose objective is to disrupt the smooth image that corporate 
capitalism tries to spread, thereby bringing to the fore its repressive 
character” (2013: 104-105). The World Trade Organisation project began 
when the Yes Men decided to appropriate the source HTML code comprising 
the WTO’s website. Lifting this code from the original website, the Yes Men 
pasted it into a new domain and set up a copycat WTO website that at first 
glance seemed identical. However, the Yes Men’s website included textual 
                                                     
8
 The Yes Men are a network of activists originating in the alter-globalization movement.  
The main members, Mike Bonanno and Andy Bichlbaum, are based in the United States.  
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information that mimicked the institutional tone of the WTO but was 
resoundingly different, as we read in the excerpt cited by Mouffe (2013: 104): 
 
The World Trade Organization is a giant international bureaucracy whose 
goal is to help businesses by enforcing ‘free trade’, the freedom of 
transnationals to do business however they see fit. The WTO places this 
freedom above all other freedoms, including the freedom to eat, drink water, 
not eat certain things, treat the sick, protect the environment, grow your own 
crops, organize a trade union, maintain social services, govern, have a 
foreign policy. All those freedoms are under attack by huge corporations 
working under the veil of ‘free trade’, that mysterious right that we are told 
must trump all others. 
 
The mock website included email contacts. This led to the Yes Men receiving 
invitations to conferences and other events as representatives of the WTO, 
where, according to Perini (2010), they delivered presentations that pushed 
the neo-liberal logic of the WTO to the extreme, making claims such as 
“slavery is an economically sound business model”.  
 
We can evoke here Lyotard’s wronged worker who escapes slavery by 
acknowledging that the condition for the legibility of her contract is the real 
subsumption of her labour because it identifies her labour as a commodity or 
a service. In such a project, the wronged worker is generalized as a model 
citizen and positioned against the faceless bureaucratic transnational 
machine of the WTO as an exemplar of the force of real subsumption. 
Likewise, Mouffe endorses such ‘artivist’ practices because she regards them 
as “counter-hegemonic moves against the capitalist appropriation of 
aesthetics and its goal of securing and expanding the valorization process” 
(2013: 105). This clearly follows from a position very similar to Lyotard’s 
differend that sets itself up as a critical concept that can expose injustices 
under real subsumption by acting as an intervener. 
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The Yes Men play the role of satirical interveners flashing glaring spotlights 
on the epistemological gaps between the particular and the universal, which 
in this case are also depicted as gaps between the local and the global. 
General differends and wrongs become evident and incommensurability is 
reiterated. The figure of the satirical intervener or the intervener in general as 
formulated in such projects bases itself on an opposition between the lone 
individual or small community and transnational impersonal bureaucracy or 
markets and as a result seems incapable of understanding the compound 
nature of many subjectivities born of intensified participation in an exchange 
that such impersonal and bureaucratic infrastructures have enabled. Under 
such circumstances, the concept of intervention itself - here understood as 
interruption, disruption and the engendering of friction between the particular 
and the universal - is found requiring reconceptualization. 
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1.2 Franchising Democracy: the Impetus of Agonistic Pluralism  
 
But before we get ahead of ourselves, we must return to the question of why 
agonism has become one of the most frequently employed concepts in art’s 
expanded field, establishing itself as a mainstay in the theorization of art’s 
role and function in the public sphere. More precisely, it has come to be 
regarded as the natural counter-argument to Habermas’ formulation of the 
public sphere that has predominately been viewed as a problematic 
throwback to modernist and enlightenment ideals. A précis of this view can 
be found in Simon Sheikh’s (2004) statement that: 
 
We no longer conceive of the public sphere as an entity, as one location 
and or formation as suggested in Jürgen Habermas  famous description of 
the bourgeois public sphere. Jürgen Habermas' sociological and 
philosophical investigation of the emergence of the so-called 'public sphere', 
most often categorized and criticized for being normative and idealist, is 
basically a reconstruction of the ideals and self-understanding of the 
emergent bourgeois class - positing a rational subject capable of public 
speaking outside of itself, in society and of society. Thus the separation 
between the private (the family and the house: property), the state 
(institutions, laws) and the public (the political and the cultural). 
 
Sheikh suggests that the Habermasian stance towards the public sphere now 
seems “purely historical”. The question is whether the “bourgeois public 
sphere” ever existed in the first place “as anything other than a projection, an 
ideal”. It is precisely this projection of a public sphere which, for Sheikh, 
seems unsuitable “in our multi-cultural and hyper-capitalistic, modular 
society”. In such a society it would make more sense to think of a 
“contradictory and non-unitary notion of a public sphere, and of the art 
institution as the embodiment of this sphere” (Sheikh, 2004). It is hard to 
imagine anyone today insisting on adopting an exact Habermasian outlook 
on the public sphere within an art or art-institutional context: the diversity and 
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shear amount of forms, media, political positions, beliefs, and opinions that 
proffer themselves for consideration simply make it impractical. But Sheikh’s 
articulation is reflective of Mouffe’s strong anti-Habermasian engagement 
with the notion of ‘public sphere’, the results of which have proved popular 
within the expanded field of art. Generally speaking, this position represents 
the disqualification of any notion of ‘the universal’, replacing it with the notion 
of incommensurability (read contradictory and non-unitary). 
Incommensurability literally means the incapacity to be measured together 
(Connolly, 2015: 67), and in the agonist framework it is this notion that 
functions as the operational ground for democracy and/or a politics 
sympathetic to pluralism. Agonism is the political routine of living with 
subjectivities that are pre-assumed to be incapable of being measured 
together; it is the full acceptance of this as a fact and its utilization as the 
dynamo for a more radical democratization of the institutional and public 
spheres. 
 
It is perhaps much easier to find indicators for political and cultural 
incommensurability in daily life than it is to substantiate any claims of 
universality. But this is simply to misunderstand the function of ‘the universal’. 
Taking our cue from philosopher and sinologist François Jullien’s (2012) 
distinctions between the uniform, the common, and the universal, we can 
envision a model for art and its institutions in which pluralism is not put up 
against ‘the universal’, yet retains the latter’s political importance. Which is to 
say that the universal cannot be put into contestation or replaced with the 
incommensurable because, following Jullien (2012), the universal cannot 
accurately be described as something immediately given to us. Rather, we 
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ought to understand its function as “a horizon — a ‘regulative idea’ in the 
Kantian sense that it is never completely reached or known — that creates 
demand for the work of understanding”. Importantly, in addition to assigning 
this specific function to ‘the universal’, there are two categories that, for 
Jullien, need to be taken into consideration while operating within the 
universal as a regulative horizon. These are the categories of ‘the common’ 
and ‘the uniform’. 
 
We can understand the common as “what is intelligible, despite the 
observable distances between” various political and cultural subjectivities, in 
other words what enables any dialogue in the first place. And the uniform can 
be understood as an inversion or perversion of the universal. The uniform 
does not stand on any “rational necessity”; rather, it is founded on “the 
convenience of production, as with standards and stereotypes”. What we 
have in agonism is a model which collapses the distinctions between the 
universal (as horizon) and the uniform, (mis)understanding the uniform as the 
universal. Since agonism equates universality with this awkward version of 
itself based on the convenience of production, it seeks to dismiss any role for 
it in structuring or thinking models of pluralism, replacing it with democracy as 
an empty universal signifier  
 
For such reasons, a vision of the public sphere based on incommensurability, 
which agonism seems to offer, is not the only possibility for sustaining 
pluralism. Strangely, or perhaps not so strangely, we can retrace Mouffe’s 
intellectual enmity towards Habermasian discourse back to Lyotard. Lyotard 
(1988: 65-66) summarizes Habermas’ discourse as one concerned with the 
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process by which socio-political norms and values gain legitimacy in the 
public sphere. Habermas, according to Lyotard, emphasizes that legitimacy 
ought to be established on the idea of a universal consensus that is the fruit 
of ‘a dialogue of argumentation.’ Lyotard sees this as a mistake, first because 
it supposes that all the participants partaking in the argument will be able to 
reach an agreement on the general rules required to dictate which moves are 
acceptable in this ‘language game’ and which are not, and second, because 
it assumes that the endgame of dialogue is consensus. In Lyotard’s opinion 
this is proof of Habermas’ belief that “humanity as a collective (universal) 
subject seeks its common emancipation through the regularization of the 
“moves” permitted in language games and that the legitimacy of any 
statement resides in its contributing to that emancipation.”  
 
Lyotard admits that Habermas’ motivation is “an idea and practice of justice”, 
but he thinks linking justice to consensus is an unacceptable idea because 
consensus has “become an outmoded and suspect value.” Instead, he 
suggests, a better direction would be to shape an idea and practice of justice 
that recognizes the “heteromorphous nature of language games”. This idea 
is, of course, the differend. There is an uncanny combination of subtlety and 
violence in Lyotard’s choice of the term heteromorphous to describe the 
nature of language games. It is commonly used to describe the nature of 
insects that go through total transformations at different stages in their life 
cycle: larvae become worm-like organisms, and those organisms become 
moths or flies. Although, in principle, the moth is the larva and the larva is the 
caterpillar or worm, there is no common measure between them at these 
40 
 
different stages because although the caterpillar retains the genes that would 
enable it to develop wings, these genes are not yet switched on. 
 
The use of this peculiar term to describe language games is perhaps no 
coincidence. It anchors them in ontology, links struggle to a strong image of 
difference in action, and establishes a sense of time based on jarringly 
dissimilar stages. Such heteromorphous language games are what Mouffe 
has in mind when she draws up her agonistic approach to the general public 
sphere, underscoring the latter’s status as “where conflicting points of view 
are confronted without any possibility of a final reconciliation” (2013: 98). 
These points of view are also hegemonic projects or latent hegemonies, 
since for Mouffe public space can only be conceived as a perpetual 
battleground. As we have seen, adopting the agonistic model as an 
institutional template for art leads to the affirmation of a contradictory and 
non-unitary understanding of the public sphere, in other words, to a 
conception of the art institution as a permanent battleground. The upshot of 
this is that, as Thomson (2009) points out, agonism “replaces the idea of a 
public good with ‘politics’ itself as an abstract value deprived of any content, 
except for the pragmatic virtues of pluralism and tolerance”. As a complex 
manoeuvre of substitution or swapping it opens up the possibility of 
immanent critique for all groups in society that are able to identify with this 
political opportunity and make use of it. 
 
However, this opportunity comes at the cost of a kind of ontological 
entrapment. This is because, as Thomson (2009) again explains, agonism 
denies “the possibility or desirability of citizens being able to free themselves 
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from their attachment to social groups subsidiary to the larger political 
community, or whose borders overflow those of the polis”. It is because of 
this that the agonist trap only allows us to “articulate a distinctive political 
virtue in terms of the value of political conflict itself”. It is in this sense that 
agonism allows for a form of participation that resembles something like “a 
universality’”, albeit a negative one which can only be accessed through the 
value of a politics of conflict based on an absolutist-adversarial ontology. 
 
There are of course, legitimate grounds for adopting the agonistic view 
institutionally. Mouffe (2013: 106) outlines some of these grounds. Enacting 
agonistics can be regarded a bulwark against those who, for her, consider 
that “political action should only aim at withdrawing from existing institutions 
and relinquishing all forms of belonging”. This, of course, is Mouffe’s 
persistent critique of Hardt and Negri, who, according to Mouffe (2013: 137) 
“refuse the idea that it is necessary to establish any form of political unity 
among the different movements”. For Mouffe, Hardt and Negri fail to explain 
how the multitude is going to become a political subject in actuality. She 
states that although Hardt and Negri acknowledge the differences in 
objectives between various movements, they are not concerned with how to 
articulate these differences towards a shared end. In Mouffe’s view, the 
problem of the concept of the Multitude is that it implies that it is “precisely 
because those struggles don’t converge that they are more radical, each 
struggle being directed straight to the virtual centre of Empire” What runs 
across both Mouffe and Hardt & Negri, though, is perhaps the following: 1) 
The idea that ‘difference’ constitutes the key to unravelling Empire in the 
case of Hardt & Negri or forming a counter-hegemonic politics against the 
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hegemony of neoliberalism in the case of Mouffe: they agree that ‘difference’ 
constitutes a political force, but disagree on how to effectuate it. 2) The need 
to sever ‘difference’ from the social space of reasoning, the space in which 
knowledge of what a ‘we’ or a collective could be “is inseparable from a 
social practice—the practice of justifying one’s assertions to one’s fellow-
humans”, and is “not presupposed by this practice, but comes into being 
along with it” (Rorty, 1997). The severing of pluralism from reasoning, in 
Mouffe’s case, is accomplished by tying the ambition of the pluralist project 
with the ambitions and scope of parliamentary politics, since the appeal to 
conflictual incommensurable differences is perceived as the basis for 
disrupting the encroachment of a single ideology – neoliberalism – upon 
pluralist democracy. In Hardt and Negri’s argument pluralism is thought of the 
Deleuzian way, which, as I will argue in sections 2.2 and 2.3, contributes to 
the redirecting of ‘difference’ away from the dead-end of the 
incommensurability of cultures and identities as the basis for politics, 
although it still depends too much on difference as a political force in itself. In 
fact, as we shall see in section 2.2, Hardt and Negri’s Multitude is analogous 
to the Deleuzian idea of ‘Multiplicities’ which, as Deleuze states, are entities 
composed of “becomings without history, of individuation without subject (the 
way in which a river, a climate, an event, a day, an hour of the day, is 
individualized)” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: viii). This indicates that the 
concept of Multitudes dovetails with what Deleuze called his “strange reason” 
or “transcendental empiricism”, of which section 2.2 gives a full account. If we 
think of Mouffe as a political realist9, this Deleuzian strain of thinking 
                                                     
9
 In the sense of being concerned with how to theorize politics while always taking into 
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difference is the antithesis of her resoluteness to disengage from a politics of 
the transcendental. 
 
But as it turns out (in sections 2.1 and 2.2), the opposing concepts of 
‘agonism’ and ‘the multitude’ can be put in comparison and better understood 
as contemporary concepts of intervention each based on a different tradition 
of understanding ‘the real’. Agonism adheres to the Lacanian impossible real, 
while the Multitude is in line with Deleuze and Guattari’s artificial real. In 
Chapter 3 I suggest that the ambitions of pluralism and interventionism within 
the extended field of art might be better served by picturing, mediating, and 
putting into practice what Wilfrid Sellars called the stereoscopic view or 
synoptic view, which I describe under the umbrella term synoptic real. 
Accordingly, the question of ‘what to do with antagonism’ - or what place and 
function antagonism can be made to serve within the design of a pluralistic 
framework which art can imagine, picture, and contribute to - will turn out to 
be tied to the question of ‘what to do with science’, or how to place and give 
function to ‘the scientific’ within such a design. 
 
Returning to Mouffe’s critique of Hardt and Negri, her argument is that their 
distinct Deleuzian-Marxist10 approach has “led activists to avoid addressing 
                                                                                                                                                      
account the ‘facts’ imposed on political projects by the natural and or social worlds. Political 
realism in this sense is better defined through what it rejects, which is “any understanding of 
politics in which the distinctiveness of politics is overlooked”. This has been often articulated 
“in terms of avoiding forms of political moralism that give  priority of the moral over the 
political ”. See Sleat (2014). 
10
 In (Casarino & Negri, 2008: 110 – 120) Negri compares his work (with Hardt) to Deleuze & 
Guattari’s and Marx’s. For Negri, Anti-Oedipus was “an attempt to recover the deepest or 
highest level of ontological causality, namely, an attempt to reintroduce desire within 
postmodern philosophy, to rediscover desire as foundation of the postmodern, so as to 
counter that last great Marxist heresy which was structuralism”. The fact that for Negri, 
Lacan (and Lévi-Strauss) represents this structuralism makes clear why Mouffe and Laclau’s 
Lacanian conception of politics runs counter to his. The main issue he takes with Deleuze 
and Guattari is that “the very idea of the production of the common is nowhere to be found 
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the fundamental political issue: how to organize across differences so as to 
create a chain of equivalences among the different struggles” (Mouffe, 2013: 
138). For Mouffe, the problem is that Hardt and Negri think that institutional 
participation restricts the possibility of ever reaching a form of ‘absolute 
democracy’ that is compatible with the idealisms of total self-organization and 
a view on collectivity that is in line with the notion of the multitude. The 
multitude is a portrayal of social movement in which the collective or common 
is depicted as an extensive non-contractual body responding to injustice 
through resonance or indifference. According to Mouffe (2013: 106), 
individuals or groups aligned with such notions understand institutions as 
“monolithic representatives of the forces to be destroyed” and thus discredit 
any attempt at institutional transformation, denouncing those who take on 
such attempts and labelling every attempt at transformation a reformist 
illusion. Their idea is to transform by attempting to exist outside the 
institution, creating so-called alternative frameworks for social collaboration. 
But as a result they miss out on the possibility afforded by the institutional 
framework to contest the hegemonic order from a position of immanence.  
 
Mouffe suggests that such positions are unable to imagine art institutions and 
museums as sites for “critical political intervention” because doing so would 
mean turning a blind eye to the economic and political powers that make the 
institutions possible in the first place. Thus, for Mouffe, such visions of 
collectivist action tend to “ignore institutions and to occupy other spaces 
outside the institutional field”. Her view is that “museums and art institutions 
                                                                                                                                                      
in” their work. Hardt and Negri’s work can be seen as an attempt to forge such a conception 
of the common in relation to Deleuzoguattarian ‘ontological causality’ which is discussed as 
‘the artificial real’ in section 2.2.  
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can contribute to subverting the ideological framework of consumer society”. 
She sees them as potential “agonistic public spaces where this hegemony is 
openly contested”, pointing out that “the history of the museum has been 
linked to the construction of bourgeois hegemony, but this function can be 
altered.” (2013: 107) 
 
Consequently, the agonistic approach in art is quite clear on its stance 
against anti-institutionalism, a stance that seems pragmatic, helpful, and 
appealing to politically concerned artists and curators all over the world who 
are looking to launch and establish their careers in the expanded field of art. 
It can be agreed that anti-institutionalism, if it still exists, is futile and 
unrealistic. But what Mouffe’s stance indicates, to put it bluntly and rather 
generally, is a predilection towards replacing anti-institutionalism and the idea 
of an alternative outside of institutional frameworks with the notion of 
occupying the institutional field itself. One does not mean to reduce agonism 
to occupation. However, occupation - in the sense of inhabiting – is clearly an 
effect that the agonistic model generates, one which is related to the place of 
the institution, whether this is the actual institutional space or by proxy 
through an event, text, or context. 
 
There is a further, far more important point which concerns how such 
occupation is thought and comes into force. Institutional occupation as 
envisioned by agonism functions through what may be called franchising 
democracy11 as an adequate institutional intervention in and of itself. The 
                                                     
11
 The term franchising here is by no means meant to trivialize agonism as a concept with a 
long history in political thinking, nor is it in any way meant to refute democratic thought and 
its importance. Rather, the intention is to define how agonism operates at a formal level by 
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basic narrative is that democracy has been curtailed and encroached upon 
by the neoliberal bureaucratization forced upon states, institutions, 
economies, and citizens alike. In light of this, there is a need for establishing 
a “democratic ethos” that we can associate with “the mobilization of passions 
and sentiments, the multiplication of practices, institutions and languages 
games that provide the conditions of possibility for democratic subjects and 
democratic forms of willing” (Mouffe, 1996). Art and its institutions become 
sites for this distributed democratic ethos. If we consider the concept of 
agonism to be the franchisor, what it licenses to the franchisees, in this case 
artists, practitioners, and art institutions, is a particular operating method for 
democracy. This operating method upholds what agonism considers most 
particular about liberal democracy and what is at risk due to neoliberalist 
politics: 
[T]he specificity of liberal democracy as a new political form of society 
consists in the legitimation of conflict and the refusal to eliminate it through 
the imposition of an authoritarian order. A liberal democracy is above all a 
pluralist democracy. Its novelty resides in its envisaging the diversity of 
conceptions of the good, not as something negative that should be 
suppressed, but as something to be valued and celebrated. This requires the 
presence of institutions that establish a specific dynamic between consensus 
and dissent. Consensus, of course, is necessary, but it should be limited to 
the institutions that are constitutive of the democratic order. A pluralist 
democracy needs also to make room for the expression of dissent and for 
conflicting interests and values. (Mouffe, 1996) 
 
In other words, consensus is only on the table in parliament and similar 
governmental institutions whose role is to sanction democracy. Elsewhere, 
the operating method of agonism is licensed to operate as an end-point in 
                                                                                                                                                      
evoking the etymology and history of the word in relation to the currency Franc and 
originating in old French. The term originally meant freedom or to grant the status of being 
free. It transformed over the centuries to mean, at consecutive stages: a ‘special right or 
freedom’ a ‘specific legal privilege’, ‘the freedom or right to buy and sell’, to finally acquire its 
current meaning: ‘the authorization by a company to sell its commodities and or services’. 
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and of itself because, as we may recall, it can only express particular political 
virtues in terms of the value of political conflict itself (Thomson, 2009). It is in 
this sense that agonism functions as a franchising of democracy. The value 
of political conflict as an abstract force upholding pluralist democracy is the 
only content in the license obtained by art, everything else is considered as 
form and technicality. 
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1.3 How to Occupy an Abstraction: Agonism and Institutional 
Critique 
 
A telling example of this franchising rationale at work can be recognized in 
the Occupy Museums12 movement that was formed during the 2011 Occupy 
Wall Street protests in New York. Although this movement’s interventions 
might not be practiced as ‘art’, they circulate within the same economy, are 
advertised through the same platforms, depend on the same infrastructure 
for visibility, and have appeared in major international events such as the 7th 
Berlin Biennial (2012), where they were invited, among other occupy groups, 
to take over the ground floor of the Kunst-Werke institute for contemporary 
art. Occupy Museums (OM) reformulates the “we are the 99%” slogan of 
Occupy Wall Street to engender a conflict with institutions they count as part 
of the cultural elite or the 1%. OM’s statements paint a picture of the 
institutional landscape as a corrupt and hierarchical system where ‘high 
finance’ is synonymous with ‘high culture’ and the value of art is fully 
dependent on speculation. 
 
Various OM statements point fingers at museum board members, and 
remark on the worker inequality and the unfair wage gaps apparent in many if 
not most art institutions. In one statement OM proclaims “(we) held open 
assemblies on museum steps to free up a space of dialogue and 
fearlessness for the 99%. More and more people joined us. Museums must 
be held accountable to the public. […] We occupy museums 
because museums have failed us. Like our government, which no longer 
                                                     
12
 Occupy Museums was launched by members of the Occupy Wall Street Arts and Culture 
working Group in Liberty Park, artist Noah Fischer wrote the initial Manifesto.  
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represents the people, museums have sold out to the highest bidder”.13 In 
other words, the aim of occupying the museum is to democratize it so that it 
represents ‘the people’, unlike the said government. The move OM make can 
be crystallized in the following: by not attempting to answer questions that 
arise from this occupation, like, for example, what a democratic museum 
representing ‘the people’ would actually contribute to society, they assert that 
the gesture is supposed to leave such questions unanswered and open. This 
is because the act of occupying the museum or making it into a democratic 
franchise hinges on the idea of democracy as an empty signifier that needs 
to be contested in order to be identified. 
 
The contestation is enacted through what Mouffe calls a “constitutive outside” 
whereby the performing subject, in this case OM, forges an us/them 
relationship with an identity perceived as other. OM identifies itself with the 
so called 99%, while the elitist corrupt other, the 1%, are posited as those 
standing at the helm of the museums. As we have already seen in the case 
of the Yes Men, the end of institutional critique here and for agonism in 
general is franchising the empty signifier of democracy in the hope that this in 
itself will disrupt normal flows of information and exchange and destabilize 
the totalitarian streak in liberal capitalism. 
 
OM’s interventions clearly reflect what Gilbert (2013, Kindle Locations 1426-
1427) has identified as “Mouffe’s formulation of democracy as the 
institutionalisation of the emptiness and contestedness of the place of 
sovereignty”. Gilbert (2013) treads a fine line between critiquing and 
                                                     
13
 Stated in the about section of the Occupy Museums website. 
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elaborating on the theoretical sophistication of Mouffe’s signature concept. In 
the process, he crystallizes how this institutionalisation of the emptiness of 
the site of the sovereign evolves from the history of Freudo-Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory. Gilbert (2013: Kindle Location 1184) highlights the 
importance of the Lacanian empty signifier for Laclau’s project. In its vacuity, 
and now grafted onto the stage of politics, this signifier designates “nothing 
but the general coherence of the collective or project as such”. Modelling on 
this and deriving from it as well as Carl Schmitt’s critique of liberalism, 
Mouffe’s agonistic democracy, in Gilbert’s (2013: Kindle Locations 1186-
1189) words, is roughly summed up in the following argument in two 
interconnected parts: 
Every social formation, or at least every political order, depends upon the 
relationship of each constituent individual to a central figure, term, or idea 
that defines the coherence of the group (as well as on the designation of 
‘constitutive outsides’).  
 
However: 
What differentiates democracy from other types of social formation or political 
order is the fact that it institutionalises the idea of this central locus of 
sovereignty as being inherently empty, open or contested. 
 
 
If we follow this logic, democracy supposedly functions by making the 
sovereign empty and leaving it ‘up for grabs’. And the coherence of the 
collective is made possible by this empty nucleus of the sovereign. What 
seems obvious is the emphasis on thinking democracy as a kind of formal 
minimalist device that would make possible the radicalisation of the ‘idea’ of 
the collective. In order for this device or organising principle to work, it must 
be emptied of any ideals of a universal horizon and replaced with pluralist 
democracy. This in itself is not a concern, but what does matter in the end is 
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how this streamlined organising principle is developed by erasing any 
concept of discourse in favour of conflict as a base register to which we must 
submit as ‘the real’ of politics. In its somewhat commendable attempt to get 
rid of the necessity of agreement on the general rules of political dialogue 
(Lyotard’s point about Habermas’ project presupposing agreement on such 
rules), it disengages itself from the discussion on the place of discourse in 
politics, in other words, it hypostatizes a conflict-based ontology as vital for 
pluralism.  
 
Mouffe still wants to put in place a minimal structure that would indicate very 
general constraints under which different political positions could be enacted 
and negotiated. But within this structure, what actually ends up acting as the 
starting points and constitutive rules for political deliberation and 
argumentation? Very little, except ‘us’ and ‘them’, and ‘constitutive outsides’. 
This step appears to be anti-foundationlist, realist, and an attractive option, 
because it avoids the meta-critical and normative narratives of reason, 
human nature, and modernity that thinkers like Habermas set as standards 
for critical engagement in politics. The problem, however, is that this 
‘democratic design’ for a pluralist politics ends up making the functions of the 
‘constitutive outside’ and the ‘us-them’ relationship extreme, and this 
extremity is held up as foundational for a politics of challenging and forming 
the sovereign. To make the relation between Mouffe’s agonistic pluralism and 
the idea of the empty place of sovereignty clearer, Gilbert (2013: Kindle 
Locations 1190 - 1197) introduces the notion of ‘the Master’. Structurally 
speaking, ‘the Master’ – originally the central figure or idea that identifies the 
coherency of the group or collective – cannot be avoided. From the 
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perspective of agonal democracy the problem with fascism and various 
authoritarian collectivisms is not their investment in somewhat equally 
subjective visions of a central idea or leader, but their decision to make the 
type, values, and characteristics of the central idea or figure permanent and 
not open to change. In a pluralist democracy, the idea is to explicitly 
acknowledge the necessity of a ‘Master’ figure or idea and through this 
acknowledgement “institutionalise his very contingency and arbitrariness”. 
Gilbert recognizes that current forms of representative democracy already 
accomplish this when they are able to live up to their ‘pluralist promise.’ 
Representative democracy achieves this by: 
 
[…] putting a contested space (parliament, for example) at the heart of our 
public life, by institutionalising forms of public debate and contestation 
(elections) as key mechanisms of decision making, pluralist democracy 
acknowledges and makes visible the contingent and changeable nature of 
that content which fulfils the role of the master/ leader /ideal. 
 
 
Gilbert takes this to be a strong argument for democracy as a pluralist form of 
politics and more or less sides with Mouffe against Negri in suggesting that 
democracy is effective as a critique of neoliberalism since neoliberalism 
continually invests in the realization of “a singular ideology and system of 
government as ‘sovereign’” and in the process attempts to phase out 
competing political positions. This brings us to the question of what exactly 
distinguishes Mouffe’s agonistic democracy from current liberal 
representative democracy. Is agonistic democracy an altogether different 
democracy than the versions we already have? Or is it, simply put, an 
already existing ‘pocket’ within current trends which has been pushed 
theoretically to become the dominant type of democratic practice? Mouffe’s 
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deployment of agonistic pluralism stands against neoliberalism (the figure of 
bureaucratic or managerial totalitarianism) on the one hand, and deliberative 
democracy (the figure of old western-centric enlightenment ideals struggling 
to come to terms with the pluralism of worldviews) on the other.  
 
As such, agonism seems to refuse the inclination to managerial expertise: a 
presumed ‘technocracy’ encroaching on the space of politics. But it also 
refuses to think of the space of politics as one in which reasoning can take 
place: a dialogical space of social interaction. As Hauser (2014) points out, 
agonism folds into the larger narrative of the depoliticization of liberal 
democracy. For him, the questions and concerns regarding the fate of liberal 
democracy are hinged on the gap between “the ideals” of this order of 
democracy and “its phenomena”, which seem to be moving in the opposite 
direction. These phenomena range from “restrictions on the sovereignty of 
the people and the rule of law, beginning with the often described symbiosis 
of a representational government and economic special interest groups” to 
the nondemocratic nature of global institutions such as the World Bank, the 
IMF etc. This threat of depoliticization produces the idea that within liberal 
democracy the space of political struggle – the space in which decisions are 
made – is rapidly decreasing. 
 
Interestingly, although Gilbert seems supportive of the Laclauian-Mouffian 
conception of politics, he nonetheless is able to expose what in his view is a 
major weak point, its understanding of subjectivity. For Gilbert (2013: Kindle 
Locations1375–1389) the subjectivity underpinning and being put into play in 
Laclau and Mouffe’s politics’ is closely related to the subjectivity of Hobbes’ 
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Leviathan, and perhaps this form of subjectivity’s two most important 
characteristics are what he calls ontological individualism, by which he 
means the “insistence on the irreducible reality of the individual as the basic 
unit of human experience”, and its purely negative understanding of the 
social which, as he explains, becomes apparent when “the social, the 
collective or the group are not understood as having any substantial mode of 
existence, but instead are thought to exist purely by means of a negation and 
delimitation – a kind of prevention – of the free activity of individuals”. These 
two characteristics shape what Gilbert defines as the political subjectivity of 
meta-individualism, which is the explicit or implicit belief that if there is a 
collective subject then its agency, rationale, and political intentionality can 
only count as such if they pass the test of being formally indistinguishable 
from those of the individual subject. This, of course, is the exact opposite of 
the concept of Multitude, which does think collective subjectivity outside the 
post-Hobbesian paradigm of meta-individualism. And it is perhaps this meta-
individualistic backbone of agonism which most strongly contributes to its 
particular understanding of sovereignty. 
 
At any rate, the agonistic approach to art championed by Mouffe can be put 
this way: it is when art adopts her formulation of institutionalizing the said 
emptiness and contestedness of sovereignty as its operational logic for 
institutional critique. This produces forms of critique that occupy - in the literal 
sense - the institution as a place of sovereignty, or use the institution as a 
stand-in for the sovereign. Alternatively, the institution is imagined as a 
battleground and thus becomes an opportunity for representing or producing 
dissensus. It is thus perceived as an incubator harbouring places for dispute 
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and dissent (a courtroom for example), disputed places (such as Christoph 
Büchel’s Mosque at the 56th Venice Biennale, 2015), and various forms of 
staging conflicts and populating the institutional space with what we may call 
– taking up our earlier definition – incommensurable subjectivities. Mouffe’s 
accomplishment of normalizing antagonism as the basis for politics is 
frustrated when looped back into art’s legacy of institutional critique. The 
supposedly strong anti-foundationalism14 that manifests itself in the idea of 
democracy’s dependence on a constitutional lack, hence granting contingent 
antagonisms the power to shape the political, is counteracted or nullified by 
the need to single out institutions or the institutional realm as objects of 
critique. The latter characteristic is, as Amanda Beech points out, the basic 
perquisite of institutional critique:  
 
… a critical theory that seeks to rehabilitate or even do some institutional 
critique first of all has to identify the institution. The consequence of this is 
that institutional critique institutionalizes itself because it fantasizes about 
what the institution looks like, as it also fantasizes about its opposite, about 
what critique looks like. It is when critique is understood as an institution in 
itself that institutional critique really gets going. (Beech, 2007) 
 
“Critique understood as an institution in itself” is a concept that requires a 
complex process of elucidation and working through that I hope will gradually 
unfold in this thesis. Paramount to understanding the need or desire for such 
                                                     
14
 In epistemology, foundationalism can be described in short as the theoretical position 
claiming that beliefs ought to be justified according to prior foundational beliefs, so that these 
prior beliefs can give justificatory support that other beliefs can be built on. The point is that 
these so called ‘basic beliefs’ are argued to be self-evident and automatically justified and 
not in need of further justification by other beliefs, that is, they are thought to be of a special 
kind. So, if a belief stands in need of justification, a foundationalist thinks it can be justified by 
such a basic belief or a string of connected beliefs founded on an initial basic belief. An anti-
foundationalist holds that no such basic beliefs stand as the basis for justification of other 
beliefs. Mouffian agonism appears to be an unusual case because it claims an anti-
foundationalist position regarding democracy, but in effect can only be anti-foundationalist on 
account of it acquiescing to the foundationalist beliefs of all participating members in a 
democracy or some such community.  
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 a concept, we need to recollect how the agonistic occupational tendencies of 
movements such as Occupy Wall Street were theorized in relation to ‘the 
establishment’ as an abstract power. Blogging and posting on social media, 
theorist McKenzie Wark formulated what back then sounded like a 
surprisingly new question, how can you occupy an abstraction?:  
 
The occupation isn't actually on Wall Street, of course. And while there is 
actually a street called Wall Street in downtown Manhattan, "Wall Street" is 
more of a concept, an abstraction. So what the occupation is doing is taking 
over a little (quasi) public square in the general vicinity of Wall Street in the 
financial district and turning it into something like an allegory. […] The 
abstraction that is Wall Street also stands for something else, for an inhuman 
kind of power, which one can imagine running beneath one's feet throughout 
the financial district. Let's call this power the vectoral. It's the combination of 
fiber optic cables and massive amounts of computer power. Some vast 
proportion of the money in circulation around the planet is being 
automatically traded even as you read this. Engineers are now seriously 
thinking about trading at the speed of light. Wall Street in this abstract sense 
means our new robot overlords, only they didn't come from outer space. How 
can you occupy an abstraction? Perhaps only with another abstraction. 
(Wark, 2011) 
 
 
To occupy the abstraction that is Wall Street (the latter itself of course a 
marker for neoliberal capital), according to Wark, another abstraction must be 
formed against it. This makes Occupy Wall Street (OWS) a counter-
abstraction abstraction that functions allegorically by proposing an 
incomplete open-ended narrative against the abstraction of Wall Street/Neo-
Liberalism. OWS is an occupation that “does not have demands”15: central to 
                                                     
15
 This is important because the apparent reason for an absence of demands is OWS’s 
adoption of the agonistic model within the movement. Individuals participating in OWS 
considered working towards a list of demands a problem. This is because such a list would 
need a consensus, possibly leading to the unravelling of the idea of a ‘conflictual consensus’ 
already embodied in the occupation’s pluralism and diversity. This became evident when a 
list of OWS demands circulated in the media.  The group quickly refuted the claim that there 
was an official list of demands, stating that it was ‘submitted by a single user’. See Occupy 
Forum (2011) and Picket (2011). 
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its political performativity is the question “what if people came together and 
found a way to structure a conversation which might come up with a better 
way to run the world?” (Wark, 2011). With no pressure on formulating 
demands based on consensus and an understanding that Wall Street, the 
physical place, represents but a fraction of the power they seek to challenge, 
OWS attempted to perform a double occupation. This is because, in Wark’s 
(2011) words, it is “an occupation of a place, somewhere near the actual 
Wall Street; and the occupation of the social media vector, with slogans, 
images, videos, stories. ‘Keep on forwarding!’ might not be a bad slogan for 
it. Not to mention keep on creating the actual language for a politics in the 
space of social media.” 
 
What is striking in this passage is, first, the acknowledgement of abstraction, 
not only as a predominant feature of the power of the establishment but also 
as a property of a counter-establishment, here represented by OWS. 
Second, it is the division of the space of power into a physical on-the-ground 
place and a transient and disembodied online media space. The agonistic 
battleground, so to speak, is both online and offline, each feeding the other 
with ammunition in the form of translocal social media language games and 
local physical presence. Although one sympathizes with Wark’s account, it 
seems to bring to our attention a number of concerns about agonism 
revolving around those instances when through such accounts the institution 
is expanded into a ubiquitous offline-online presence, while at the same time 
OWS’s agonistic tactics remain unquestioned. These tactics are structured 
around the belief that the us/them model of politics is permanent and that any 
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attempt at challenging this dichotomy, at the core of democracy, places plural 
democracy itself in peril (Mouffe, 1996). 
 
Thus we can take Wark’s account as an entry point into a territory of thought 
in which we can begin to carve out the complex relationship between 
agonism, antagonism, the (art) institution, and abstraction, furnishing and 
laying the foundations for our argument for “critique understood as an 
institution in itself”. By adopting Bonefeld’s (2015: 13-16) Marxist reading of 
critique, we can say that OWS and or OM’s physical occupation is 
representative of a critique of ‘the capitalist’ rather than of the category of 
capital. Identifying and occupying Wall Street or the Museum as a foothold is 
based on the approximate personalisation of the capitalist in the form of a 
legal person instead of a natural person. 
 
According to Bonefeld (2015:14), “the critique of the capitalist manifests itself 
as a demand for a better capitalism, one that works in the interests of the 
‘workers’ […] (it) does not touch the category of capital by thought. Instead, it 
identifies the guilty party, condemns it, and demands state action to sort 
things out and set things right”. Linking back to the notion of franchising 
democracy as the mode of intervention sought by agonism, we can see that 
such an occupational mode necessitates a clearly identified capitalist, or 
rather a concrete capitalist who can demarcate the institutional domain for 
the agonist. Once demarcated, this domain becomes the agonist’s platform 
for intensifying their political passions and sentiments. However, this comes 
at increasing cost and is starkly contrasted by the desire to occupy 
(according to Wark) the abstraction that is the establishment as well as the 
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media space. The cost is best highlighted in the following passage by 
Bonefeld (2015: 15): 
 
The personalised critique of capital identifies the ‘wrongdoer’ of the wronged 
society and calls him a merchant of greed. For the sake of employment and 
industry, something needs to be done. Something can be done! The 
personalised critique of capitalist social relations is open to abuse from the 
outset. It thinks akin to a register of blame, and condemns the identified party 
as a power that hides behind the economic phenomena, sucking the living 
life out of the national community of hard-working people. This identification 
of the subject of misery leads to the condemnation of the world market 
society of capital as a network of money and power that imposes itself with 
destructive force on a national people who appear thus as victims of the 
cosmopolitan peddlers. 
 
Following on from this, we can see that the emphasis on the us/them model, 
its need to occupy at the register of the institutional and thus its inability to 
operate outside of a personified critique of ‘the capitalist’ produces a kind of 
surplus incommensurability between an ‘us’ against ‘the capitalist’ and a 
‘them’ that classifies institutions as ‘the capitalist’. This entrenches liberal 
democratic thought in the space of the reactionary because it makes a 
caricature of the interactions between capital and people that can be easily 
exploited through demagoguery. This not only leaves the category of capital 
itself untouched, but also elevates ‘capital’ to a thing beyond critique. Capital 
thus appears to be no more than an economic mechanism that can be made 
to work for this class interest or that class interest rather than a general 
category to be transformed. (Bonefeld, 2015: 14) Here, a linkage emerges 
between Bonefeld’s elaboration on the critique of the capitalist and Beech’s 
(2007) insistence on a critique that not only avoids but surpasses the urge to 
define the institution, an urge she regards as “the very locus of 
instrumentalism”. 
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The notion that an abstraction can be occupied, acknowledges the reality of 
abstraction and this, as we shall see later, is important as a first step in 
rethinking the role of antagonism in the development of art making. However, 
Wark’s account of OWS’s (and by extension OM’s) bi-occupation of a 
physical institutional space with agonistic pluralist democracy on the one 
hand, and the attempt to occupy an abstraction on the other, forestalls the 
second occupation from having an operative model that is different to that of 
agonism’s end of distributing a democratic ethos based on adversarial 
parliamentary mechanics. What is significant about the agonistic model is its 
refraining from the formulation of any hypotheses that do not prioritize the 
value of political conflict itself. Any hypothesis agonism produces loops back 
into itself, returning to conflict as an end and guarantee for democracy. This 
is why agonism requires – as Thomson (2009) points out – “something like a 
theoretical attack on theory. […] a problematically theoretical move designed 
to reverse the priority of theory over practice”. The result is that agonism 
demobilizes theoretical impetus and thus becomes incapable of producing a 
hypothesis that does not refer back to itself or its requirement of a stasis of 
conflict, incommensurability and pluralism. Here, it might be helpful to remind 
ourselves of some questions put up for discussion earlier, namely, ‘what 
place and function should antagonism occupy and serve within the design of 
democratic political systems?’ and ‘what kind of power should it have within 
such systems?’ 
 
Relative to such questions is Mouffe’s contention that “the very condition for 
the constitution of an ‘us’ is the demarcation of a ‘them’”. This leads her to 
think that the key and decisive question to consider for democracy is “how to 
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establish this us/them distinction, which is constitutive of politics, in a way 
that is compatible with the recognition of pluralism” (2013: 19). If we look into 
the history of pluralism and how it came to gain its current function and place 
within democratic systems, we can say with Balibar (2015: 89) that an 
“insistence on pluralism was linked to an insistence by advocates of 
liberalism on the necessity of putting an end to such antithetical forms as 
despotism (even when ‘enlightened’), absolutism, and totalitarianism, doing 
so in reality or in the imagination – perhaps even in myth”. However, we can 
also track how the concept has accrued non-emancipatory justifications and 
purposes over political history. 
 
Feldman (2012), for example, describes what he calls “conservative 
pluralism”, a way of thinking pluralism politically and ascribing it a function 
that he associates with the development of British colonial politics and their 
residuum in a contemporary multicultural democratic society. He outlines how 
the colonial policy of “indirect rule” sanctioned a type of pluralism that 
“became the vehicle for British rule”. The aim was to conserve and shape 
“the power of traditional rulers and established rulers – or those who the 
British (sometimes mistakenly) imagined these figures to be”. Accordingly, 
the “Empire endorsed and helped to perpetuate the rulers and institutions it 
sanctioned”. This had various implications for the diverse peoples of the 
colonies, the pluralism in place was one that was planned around reinforcing 
the powers of traditional and religious figures while at the same time 
delimiting these powers without much consideration for the pluralism and the 
possibilities of political and cultural diversification within their communities. 
Feldman construes this as a kind of template that would evolve back home 
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over the course of two hundred years, as Britain became a multicultural state 
needing to find a blueprint for cultural and religious pluralism within its 
democracy. He comes to the conclusion that the path of “conservative 
pluralism” can be understood as a “strategy of containment”, the objective of 
which is the preservation of the dominance of the traditional hierarchy. 
 
This depiction of pluralism might seem to run against the grain of Mouffe’s 
counter-hegemonic intentions. Still, what we can take from it is that 
overemphasising the role of passions - in a plural democracy - over any 
identification with a dialogue based on rationality leaves pluralism open to 
forms of appropriation that can contribute to an impasse in social relations 
between different socio-cultural groups. Mouffe seems unaware of 
conservative pluralism when she recurrently accuses “liberal discourse” – 
perhaps Habermas or, more obviously, Rawls and Rorty – of wanting to 
eliminate antagonism. Her suggestion is that it should be sublimated: 
 
When the agonistic dynamics of pluralism are hindered because of a lack of 
democratic forms of identifications, then passions cannot be given a 
democratic outlet. The ground is therefore laid for various forms of politics 
articulated around essentialist identities of a nationalist, religious or ethnic 
type, and for the multiplication of confrontations over non-negotiable moral 
values, with all the manifestations of violence that such confrontations entail. 
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, let me stress once again that this 
notion of ‘the adversary’ needs to be distinguished sharply from the 
understanding of that term found in liberal discourse. According to the 
understanding of ‘adversary’ proposed here, and contrary to the liberal view, 
the presence of antagonism is not eliminated, but ‘sublimated’. (2013: 20) 
 
A number of points can be put into question here. The idea that a simple 
adjustment to the adversarial scheme of politics, from the elimination of 
antagonisms to their sublimation, can somehow produce a democracy that 
challenges the hegemonic order seems a stretch of the theoretical 
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imagination. This is because absolute dependence on passions for the 
sublimation of antagonism, i.e. its rerouting into the domain of the 
adversarial, plays into and solidifies historic processes of containment and 
places a ban on the means by which such rooted strategies can be thought 
through and reassessed. A politics that accepts antagonism as a manifest 
characteristic of politics, while refusing to step away from discourse, 
dialogue, and reasoning, simply has more tools to address the modes of 
politics voiced through “essentialist identities of a nationalist, religious or 
ethnic type” that Mouffe claims are the result of placing restrictions on 
passions in democratic systems. Moreover, Mouffe’s adversary principle, in 
its adoption of the notion of sublimation, offers no constructive premise for 
the rethinking of containment strategies. Oddly, it can be seen as part of the 
problem rather than a solution since, in taking the route of sublimation, it 
affirms cultural incommensurability as a foundational characteristic of 
pluralism qua democracy in multicultural democratic states. This is one angle 
of the institutionalization of incommensurability for which agonism has 
provided a solid and accessible theoretical structure.  
 
From this angle, it becomes apparent that such a mechanism is capable of 
not only contributing to containment, but also of entrenching the said 
essentialist identities further into their essentialisms, whatever they may be, 
granting them normative powers. Reflecting on an argument put forward by 
sociologist Chetan Bhatt, Pathak (2008: 139) observes that by endorsing 
incommensurability in its cultural form such essentialisms are placed “beyond 
the analytic reach of reason” and thus become the playing ground of 
reactionary movements. Bhatt’s (1997: 35) original argument is perhaps 
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harder to swallow, but he articulates a sharper argument against the 
institutionalization of (cultural) incommensurability by asserting that:  
 
[T]he claim to dissimilarity, difference, closure and uniqueness is a 
foundational declaration of religious and racialist movements and it is this 
authority that they now use to disavow critical assessment or political 
challenge. Versions of Spivak’s argument that reason is Eurocentric […] or 
Bhabha’s arguments on foundational incommensurability are rehearsed by 
those same movements as legislative norms.  
 
It is not difficult to make comparisons between such claims to “dissimilarity, 
difference, closure and uniqueness” and the claims and opinions held by 
ultra-nationalist and nativist movements agonising the political landscape in 
Europe in the second decade of the twenty-first century. This lends the 
agonistic model the credibility of a self-fulfilling prophecy and stamps it with 
the seal of a pragmatic truth, which, in turn, makes it harder to imagine or 
construct alternative models – and here I am thinking about models that use 
images, sounds, performativity, and language - in which democracy and/or 
pluralism could be thought differently within the scope of art making. 
 
Now we can return to Wark’s question and begin to unpack his formulation in 
relation to agonism by placing the spotlight on abstraction. How can an 
abstraction be occupied? The answer Wark suggests is: perhaps only by 
another abstraction. But after identifying the abstraction of occupation or of 
OWS and OM with the agonistic model and inspecting the abstraction of Wall 
Street or the economy more closely, it can be claimed that we need a clearer 
sense of what we are actually discussing: are these two abstractions related 
or dissimilar? From where do these two abstractions – the one that wills and 
enacts occupation and the one that is to be its receptor– come? In the 
following chapter I will argue that the abstraction of Occupy-related 
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movements and the agonistic model is a Laclau inspired real abstraction. 
Adopting Laclau’s version of real abstraction has consequences that limit art 
making – understood as a political practice that deals with representation and 
images – to a scope of thinking related to the agonistic as well as to notions 
of cultural and political incommensurability. If premised on Laclau’s 
formulation of real abstraction, art’s agency is instantly equated with 
intervention in the sense already explained, founded on the epistemological 
gap between universals and particulars and the disruption or interruption of 
capitalism’s flows. The terminology of real abstraction is a contested one. 
There is no monopoly on its meaning, although the various versions 
contesting on the theoretical field all share Marxist roots. To examine the 
idea of an abstraction occupying another abstraction I will first put this Laclau 
inspired agonistic real abstraction in contrast with Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s 
formulation of real abstraction developed in his seminal book Intellectual and 
Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology (1978). There are advantages to 
the latter, but it also suffers from a number of problems and drawbacks when 
we begin thinking ‘intervention’. These will be gradually clarified over the 
course of the discussion. 
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2. Outlooks on Abstraction, Models of the Real, and the Question of 
Intervention 
 
2.1 Real Abstraction: Laclau and Mouffe Contra Sohn-Rethel 
 
 
What is left to be noted, before exploring the notion of real abstraction, is that 
Mouffe’s agonistic model is analogous to Laclau’s formulation of real 
abstraction. Mouffe breaks down Laclau’s real abstraction, turning it into a 
clear set of principles. This sharpens what is perhaps one of Laclau’s lesser 
apparent theoretical undertakings - but one through which we can summate 
his general position on the political -, making it application-ready for work in 
art, politics, and theory alike. Moving on, there is an illuminating passage in 
Laclau’s essay Identity and Hegemony (2000) where he discusses and 
compares the “hegemonic logics” of Trotsky and Gramsci. Laclau explains 
that Trotsky’s popular notion of a “permanent revolution” is basically an 
instant of “hegemonic transference” that Trotsky devised when he realized 
that “the relation between global emancipation and its possible agents is 
unstable: the Russian bourgeoisie is too weak to carry out its democratic 
revolution, and the democratic tasks have to be carried out under the 
leadership of the proletariat …” Trotsky’s and Gramsci’s judgements about 
this transference of what Laclau sees as the “task of hegemony” were very 
different. Trotsky held that “it was simply the strategic occasion for the 
working class to carry out its own class revolution”. According to Laclau, this 
leads to a problematic presumption on Trotsky’s part: if that is the case, 
Laclau writes, then the “hegemonic task does not affect the identity of the 
hegemonic agent”. What it boils down to then is something akin to Lenin’s 
conception of “class alliances”. 
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Gramsci, however, theorized that this transfer of hegemony “led to the 
construction of a complex collective will” (Laclau, 2000). He understood that 
“the transference of the democratic tasks from one class to another changes 
not only the nature of the tasks but also the identity of the agents (who cease 
to be merely  class   agents)”. As a result, the political dimension “becomes 
constitutive of all social identity, and this leads to a further blurring of the line 
of demarcation state/civil society.” For Laclau (2000), a contemporary logic of 
hegemony involves taking this Gramscian observation seriously and updating 
it. This is because, as Laclau points out, Gramsci was operating when “both 
subjects and institutions were relatively stable - which means that most of his 
categories have to be redefined and radicalized if they are to be adapted to 
the present circumstances”. But, today we find a more intense blurring as a 
result of globalization, a decline in the power and function of the nation-state, 
and international organizations with ‘quasi-state’ statuses. All this, for Laclau, 
means that fleshing out a relevant hegemonic task ought to no longer involve 
the articulation of complex collective wills in the descriptive sense of 
sociology, nor should it dodge, as Trotsky had, the evidence that hegemonic 
transferences engender shifts in the identities of hegemonic agents. Laclau 
then offers us what he regards as an updated corrective to both the 
Trotskyist and Gramscian formulations of counter-hegemonic thought, which 
he formulates as an explicit corrective task: 
[T]o move from a purely sociologistic and descriptive account of the concrete 
agents involved in hegemonic operations to a formal analysis of the logics 
involved in the latter. We gain very little, once identities are conceived as 
complexly articulated collective wills, by referring to them through simple 
designations such as classes, ethnic groups, and so on, which are at best 
names for transient points of stabilization. The really important task is to 
understand the logics of their constitution and dissolution, as well as the 
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formal determinations of the spaces in which they interrelate. (Laclau, 2000: 
53, emphasis in original) 
 
This formal analysis of the logics involved in hegemonic operations, is not 
simply an analysis but also an axiom that can generate its own realities, 
since it is premised on the general yet pivotal Marxian observation that 
“social reality itself generates abstractions which organize its own principles 
of functioning” (Laclau, 2000: notes p. 86). However, in contradistinction to 
Sohn-Rethel, Laclau firmly establishes this social reality on the grounds of a 
political ontology of difference: 
… Marx, for instance, showed how the formal and abstract laws of 
commodity production are at the core of the actual concrete workings of 
capitalist societies. In the same way, when we try to explain the structuration 
of political fields through categories such as 'logic of equivalence', 'logic of 
difference' and 'production of empty signifiers', we are attempting to construct 
a theoretical horizon whose abstractions are not merely analytical but real 
abstractions on which the constitution of identities and political articulations 
depends. This, of course, is not understood by a certain empiricism, very 
widespread in some approaches within the social sciences, which confuses 
analysis of the concrete with purely factual and journalistic accounts. (Laclau, 
2000: notes pp. 86 – 87, emphasis in original) 
 
What this passage in its entirety demonstrates is how Laclau wants to 
account for a historical reading of his theory of hegemony/counter-
hegemony, identifying specific sources and explaining the problems we run 
into if we overlook the change in context and circumstances produced by the 
forward march of capital. Although it sometimes seems that his general 
political ontology of antagonism and hegemony is ahistorical, he wants us to 
know that this is not the case and that he has drawn it from political history. 
While these historical sources remain sociologically descriptive and thus are 
not systematized into a basic general political-ontological framework, he still 
wants to retain a connection with them when structuring his axiomatic 
articulation of a political-ontological model of the zeitgeist - which also forms 
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the basis for Mouffe’s more minimalist agonistic model. Rekret & Choat 
(2016) have developed the idea that Laclau’s usage of the notion of real 
abstraction is a kind of stopgap deployed in an “attempt to develop abstract 
concepts that are connected to a particular historical context yet that 
nonetheless transcend that context and attain wider application”. For Rekret 
& Choat (2016), this reveals the true identity of Laclau’s abstractions: in this 
case they cannot be real abstractions but should be understood as 
intellectual abstractions, since they do not spring from a social reality. But, 
what does this mean? They note that “Laclau ultimately fails to connect the 
ontological and the historical because his notion of real abstraction maintains 
the divide between them: his ontological concepts are (at most) intellectually 
abstracted from historical tendencies (or, at worst, basically unrelated to 
them)”. 
 
The writers make a strong case for disqualifying Laclau’s “real abstractions” 
as actual real abstractions connected to a materialist understanding of the 
terminology. A materialist account would always start from social relations 
emphasising their mediation by “abstract logics”. The commodity form and 
abstract labour, for example, imply that “the process of abstraction is 
operative in the world, anterior or a priori to abstractions in thought”. To back 
this up, they cite Jameson’s (2013: 51) articulation of a kind of implicit rule for 
abstract thinking: “[W]e can think abstractly about the world only to the 
degree to which the world itself has already become abstract”. But if capital 
produces an ever-growing range of cumulative ‘bad’ abstractions which 
precede our interventions how are we to engage with them? The questions 
asked by (Williams, 2014) highlight the challenge: “Is it enough to oppose 
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dangerous abstractions with ideology critique, or is the plane of the abstract 
itself a battlefield upon which we ought to set in play new abstractions of our 
own? If our age is one of increasing abstraction from our lived experience, is 
this something to be overcome – or alternatively to be embraced?” 
Jameson’s articulation, very generally, grasps some dimensions of Sohn-
Rethel’s rigorous account of real abstraction, while it should be noted that 
Laclau and Mouffe’s project of hegemony remains a serious attempt at 
addressing the questions more recently put forth by Williams. To a certain 
degree, they understand abstraction as a battlefield. Unlike Jameson their 
concepts are developed to tackle the problematic abstractive effects of neo-
liberal capital rather than to critique it. However, it is the question of how 
abstraction relates to contesting interpretations of ‘the real’ that is of most 
concern to us, and Mouffe and Laclau’s heavy theoretical dependency on the 
Lacanian real nominates their model to be theoretically utilized as a gateway 
through which we can tackle the various dimensions of the abstract/real 
relationship in the formulation of a politics in art making. According to Rekret 
& Choat, Laclau’s attempt at theorizing ‘real abstraction’ runs contra to the 
materialist inceptions developed by thinkers like Sohn-Rethel, leading them 
to identify Laclau’s (and Mouffe’s agonistic real abstractions by extension) as 
“intellectual abstractions”. 
 
A way to illustrate this latter form of abstraction would be to think about how 
the concept of human rights works upon society. They argue that in the case 
of human rights “there is an abstraction from real inequalities or differences 
to produce a generic concept of personhood: the formal subject of rights is an 
a posteriori intellectual or even ideological abstraction from a real person”. 
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Such abstractions are developed with hindsight and as afterthoughts to a 
generic political subject that has already been abstracted from real instances 
of injustice and inequality. They draw a comparison between Laclau’s logics 
of hegemony and between the abstractive operations of human rights. They 
see the process of their formulation as being similar to an imposition “upon 
social reality by the intellectual act of the theorist”. What these impositions 
consequently do is “produce insights that are then taken as evidence for the 
nature of social being as such. The abstraction from the content of particular 
social struggles or demands does not occur in practice but in an a posteriori 
imposition of mental logic upon the world” This is basically the logic of 
occupation, by which an intellectually abstracted past attempts to occupy the 
present as a generic real abstraction. In theory, this has worked to instigate 
political movements across the board. Nevertheless, it has also been marred 
by a real sense of incapacitation made apparent in the years following the 
2007 - 2008 financial crash and the proliferation of political demonstrations 
across different contexts. Although it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reasons 
for such incapacitation, this reading suggests that one possibility might be a 
misconstruction of ‘real abstraction’ in the process of developing hegemonic 
and agonistic logics. Breaking that down further, it could be that the historicity 
and contexts from which the tendencies have been abstracted lag behind or 
cannot match up with the generic universalization of the abstract logic being 
imposed. Rekret & Choat put it as follows: 
Laclau’s reference to the concept (real abstraction) does not rescue him from 
the problem of the historicity of his categories. In fact, in drawing upon an 
intellectual conception of abstraction his dilemma is not unlike that of the 
idealist defence of human rights, inevitably caught oscillating between 
defending the universality of rights while affirming the historical and cultural 
specificity of their origins. 
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Based on Rekret and Choat’s reading, Laclau’s real abstractions can be 
described as a process - like Mouffe often points out in her work - of making 
new subjectivities. Laclau’s explicit exercise is to move from social and 
descriptive accounts of concrete historical agents to a formal analysis 
whereby the logic implied in hegemonic operations can be drawn out to 
produce new subjectivities which retain abstract ethical dimensions from 
historical-political tendencies. This exercise may be called the design of 
abstract hegemonic agents. Theoretically, this exercise is deeply susceptible 
to producing problematic voluntaristic16 incarnations of agenthood. Along 
similar lines, Boucher (2008) has developed the reasons for this susceptibility 
and problematized the Laclau & Mouffe post-Marxist paradigm of agent-
formulation. Boucher (2008: 113) reminds us that Laclau and Mouffe 
construct society as a plurality of particularistic groups and demands. This is 
not a problem in itself, but complications emerge when this construction is 
tethered to a conception of ‘the universal’ as a void or empty space that can 
never be reached or occupied. 
 
For Boucher, this instantly produces a performative contradiction that is 
inescapable for the would-be hegemonic agent, because it instantiates the 
agent as an impostor whose “universality” cannot be of herself since 
universality is voided and restricted to impossibility. Rather, within such a 
formulation, universality is downgraded to a “masked particular”: this is a 
result of the transformation process that any public speech-act or act of 
                                                     
16
 Voluntarism is, broadly speaking, the theory that considers (the) ‘will’ to be the most 
fundamental agency ascribing to it a freedom to act not constrained by precedent causes, 
such as natural or materialistic ones. See section 5.1 for a detailed discussion on the 
question of voluntarism in relation to agonism and postagonistics. 
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representation undergoes in light of this particularity-universality relationship. 
When the hegemonic agent speaks, “their position of enunciation is 
transformed from ‘I speak’ to ‘the people speaks’”. The implication is that 
behind their “abstract universal” announcement is a sectarian particular. The 
result is that the hegemonic agent’s agency is bound to a kind of ‘Liar 
Paradox’17. Ultimately, the reason for this conundrum is that the constraint or 
rule which allows or enables them to speak or represent their ‘particularities’ 
is: the recognition and adherence to the ‘impossibility of universality’ which is 
itself seen as the empty or floating signifier that makes a pluralist democracy 
possible.  
 
Although, Laclau’s project tackles the transformations that social movements 
and political actors have gone through in their relation to shifts in capitalism, 
his imposition of intellectual abstractions as ontological forces disables the 
proper explanation of such transformations. Perhaps this is because Laclau 
and Mouffe, as Rustin (1988) remarks, made a decision to choose radical 
democracy “above other political projects”. But, as Boucher (2008: 111) 
points out, the idea of founding a leftist politics based on the generalized 
myth of the radical democratic imaginary ought to be taken with a pinch of 
salt because its rallying call is not unlike asking us to “accede to self-
mystification”. For Boucher (2008: 111) this is the problem of a simple 
theoretical presumption that the thinkers refuse to validate “ethically”: left 
                                                     
17
 The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy illustrates the Liar Paradox through the following 
exemplar argument: Let L be the Classical Liar Sentence. If L is true, then L is false. But we 
can also establish the converse, as follows. Assume L is false. Because the Liar Sentence is 
just the sentence that ‘says’ L is false, the Liar Sentence is therefore true, so L is true. We 
have now shown that L is true if, and only if, it is false. Since L must be one or the other, it is 
both.  
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underdeveloped as such, it sets in motion the performative contradictions in 
their hegemonic logics: 
Postmarxism cannot justify its intervention ethically or defend its politics as 
something more than another particularism. It cannot substantiate its claims 
that the political agon of radical democracy is anything more than a 
redescription of parliamentary politics through a rose-tinted ideological lens. 
The performative contradictions begin from Laclau’s efforts to justify a 
preference for democratic politics. Modernity is not only constituted by the 
democratic revolution, but also by post-democratic totalitarianism. Laclau and 
Mouffe simultaneously claim that totalitarianism is impossible (total 
equivalence meaning the elimination of all differential identity) and prohibited, 
something that is an ethical abomination. 
 
The decisive value of radical democracy for Laclau and Mouffe, in Rustin’s 
words is “that it leaves everything open”. This openness though is of a 
specific nature, it is an openness premised on the real as the impossible18 , 
and instituted specifically to prevent the closure of the pluralist democratic 
project against the forces of neo-liberal hegemony. Subsequently, in this 
section and afterwards, this idea will be developed by confronting it with 
attempts at a non-Lacanian understanding of the real, teasing out the 
advantages of disengagement with the Lacanian framework of the real when 
thinking the art work, representation, pluralism, and politics. 
 
What models for ‘the real’ would enable antagonism to perform a different 
role than the sanctioning of an undefined and ambiguous radical democratic 
imaginary as an end in itself? For the moment, the claim in connection to our 
previous section is that this formulation of real abstraction (which in principle 
                                                     
18
 Žižek [in the Lacanian Real: Television] defines a real object as “a cause which in itself 
doesn’t exist, i.e., which is present only in a series of its effects, but always in a distorted, 
displaced way”. Further explaining Lacan’s ‘impossible real’, he writes, “if the real is 
impossible, it is precisely this impossibility to be grasped through its effects. Laclau and 
Mouffe were the first to develop this logic of the real in its relevance for the social-ideological 
field in their concept of antagonism: antagonism is precisely such an impossible kernel, a 
certain limit which is in itself nothing, and which is only to be constructed retroactively, from a 
series of its effects, as the traumatic point which escapes them and prevents a closure of the 
social field”.  
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is an intellectual abstraction) as an insertion of hegemonic logic based on an 
ontological axiom underpinned by ‘empty signifiers’, difference, and 
abstracted from historical tendencies, appears close to what Wark (2011) 
identified as the abstraction that was Occupy Wall Street. There is an 
alternative route that formulates real abstraction as emergent from exchange 
and thus social reality; this is Sohn-Rethel’s conception. This opens up a 
number of questions regarding thinking as a form of mental labour in an 
economy that is no longer based on material coins as was the case when 
Sohn-Rethel developed his theory, and what we might suggest as models for 
artistic intervention that do not ‘occupy’ in the sense of agonistics but 
‘embody’ in the sense of “critique understood as an institution in itself” as 
posited by Amanda Beech. 
 
Staying with Rekret & Choat (2016), their comparative account of the two real 
abstractions favours Sohn-Rethel’s because his is a version “of real 
abstraction which neither reduces politics to ontology nor reduces ontological 
abstractions to some unexamined historical base”. Sohn-Rethel traces 
abstraction back to its historical origins, but it is rather the materialistic 
deduction that the journey makes possible than the historical account in itself, 
which is important. His research led him to trace abstraction back to the early 
circulation and usage of gold and silver coins in ancient Greece. His 
argument was that when money became the form that society adopted and 
began using to exchange things of unequal material value through the 
guaranteed universal equivalent of the coin, the first pure thought 
abstractions (The One, the Many, Being, Becoming etc.) in pre-Socratic 
philosophies began emerging as a result of the cognitive process adapting 
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itself to this new form of social exchange. This basically means that thought 
is always grounded in the activity of material social exchange and that such a 
real activity of exchange produces thought abstractions – for example, the 
concept of value - that then have import for the social. These are real 
abstractions because although they only exist in our minds, they don’t 
originate in them but in the social acts of exchange, or, in other words, 
abstractions emerge from material practices. To use Sohn-Rethel’s (1978: 
20) own words, “the economic concept of value is a real one. It exists 
nowhere other than in the human mind but it does not spring from it. Rather it 
is purely social in character, arising in the spatio-temporal sphere of human 
interrelations. It is not people who originate these abstractions but their 
actions”. 
 
Toscano (2008) assesses that while this may seem to be “a very truncated 
vision of the Marxist debate on abstraction”, it nonetheless serves to make 
evident the shortcomings of other critiques dealing with this notion in that 
they “can ignore the resilience of abstractions that are really, practically ‘out 
there’, operating in a manner that a merely conceptual therapy leaves 
unaffected”. Sohn-Rethel’s epistemological inquiry into consciousness is 
based on the division between manual and mental labour, and the direction 
of his formulation of abstraction runs counter to Laclau and Mouffe’s. “Instead 
of abstracting from historical conditions, Sohn-Rethel begins with our thought 
abstractions and traces them back to real abstractions”. He starts by 
pondering that “given these concepts and truths, what must have been the 
conditions that gave rise to them?” (Rekret & Choat, 2016).  
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Thinking the reality of abstraction this way is both “more dialectical and more 
materialist”, because it means that “a real abstraction is also a relation, or 
even a thing, which then becomes a thought” (Toscano, 2008). The upshot of 
taking up this position on abstraction is that it sets up a basic delineation for 
the relationship between capital, the social, and cognitive abstraction. This 
particular delineation makes us sensitive to both a) the limits of voluntaristic 
and idealistic endeavours that aim to modify our abstractionist practices 
without comprehending the degree to which they are already incorporated 
into the mechanisms of social reproduction, and b) the political and 
epistemological questions to which destabilizing such abstractions might give 
rise. 
 
Brassier (2009) disagrees with the tendency to formulate and think of capital 
as if it were autonomous and floating freely of the “little human subjects who 
compose it”. Although global capitalism produces an austere impersonal 
complexity which is hard to unpack, it achieves this through supervening “on 
the banal personal and psychological traits of the dealers, brokers, traders, 
executives, managers, workers, and shoppers, who are not just its 
dispensable machine parts but its indispensable support system, without 
which it would simply not be able to function”. Instead, he suggests, what can 
dismantle this mystifying tendency is an understanding of “the mechanical 
banality of the processes through which capital reproduces itself”. While 
capital appears as a complex force beyond the boundaries of persons and is 
attributed to what seem to be self-moving causes, this force is in fact nothing 
other than “an effect generated by the myriads of micro-processes that 
compose it: it is neither more nor less mysterious in its operations than any 
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other complex, multi-layered emergent phenomenon. This kind of 
emergence and complexity are banal and ubiquitous”. One merit of Sohn-
Rethel’s account of real abstraction is precisely its demystifying treatment of 
abstraction’s relation to society and capital in that it reduces this relation to a 
mechanical banality while maintaining - in fact highlighting - the place of 
social exchange in its mechanics: 
‘[I]n speaking of the abstractness of exchange we must be careful not to 
apply the term to the consciousness of the exchanging agents. They are 
supposed to be occupied with the use of the commodities they see, but 
occupied in their imagination only. It is the action of exchange, and the action 
alone, that is abstract. The consciousness and the action of the people part 
company in exchange and go different ways. We have to trace their ways 
separately, and also their interconnection [...] [T]he abstractness of that 
action cannot be noted when it happens, since it only happens because the 
consciousness of its agents is taken up with their business and with the 
empirical appearance of things which pertain to their use. One could say that 
the abstractness of their action is beyond realisation by the actors because 
their very consciousness stands in the way.’ (Sohn-Rethel, 1978: 26–27) 
 
This is a pivotal passage from which we can carve out some important 
observations. The consciousness of agents who are practicing exchange is 
made distinct from the actual practice of exchange. The act itself – whether 
practiced by a human or a machine - is what perpetuates the force of 
abstraction; it is not to be confused with the consciousnesses of the subject 
or agent who partakes in it. Seen this way, the act of exchange in itself or the 
“exchange abstraction”, as Sohn-Rethel calls it, is attributed a non-
experiential quality, it cannot be empiricized - i.e. confirmed or verified as 
something which occurs concretely - even when we are partaking in the 
process of exchange. Money, as a universal medium of exchange, 
represents this exchange abstraction in its most obvious manifestation. 
“Money is abstraction in material form, which, strictly speaking, is a 
contradiction in terms” (Abel, 2014: 207). If we are to believe Sohn-Rethel, 
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the introduction of coins - authorized by a state or state-like entity - to social 
life radically changed our intellectual history. These “abstractions in material 
form” ushered in an age in which the division of “head and hand” or “mental 
and manual” labour begins to dominate society, creating a divide between an 
intellectual class and a working class.  
 
For Sohn-Rethel, the exchange abstraction’s unempirical nature sparks off a 
process of deempiricizing knowledge and allowing theoretical and analytical 
explanation to emerge as a practice that splinters off from social reality. For 
Sohn-Rethel, this is most evident in how mathematics emerges out of the 
more experiential and manual exercise of measuring. While the ancient 
Egyptians had a sophisticated tradition of measurement linked to their 
architecture and materialistically bound to ropes as measuring tools, the first 
abstract mathematical and geometrical practices delinked from any social 
reality were conceived in ancient Greece after the spread of coinage as 
universal equivalent. Thus, as Sohn-Rethel (1978: 102) explains, the 
abstraction of coins enabled theoretical enquiry to become “independent not 
only from this or that particular purpose but from any practical task”. This, in 
the words of Toscano’s (2008) reflection, is the effect of “the ‘thought 
previous to and external to the thought’. It lies in the prosaic activity, the 
doing of commodity-exchange, and not (in both the logical and historical 
sense) in the individual mind of the doer”. 
 
For Sohn-Rethel, this “thought previous to and external to the thought” fully 
manifested itself in the Kantian a priori which he sees as a “second nature”. 
This second nature is basically a nature mirroring the non-empirical quality of 
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the exchange abstraction, leading to a kind of parallel thought that has 
abstracted itself from social reality and nature while at same time, oddly 
enough, retaining the capacity to represent nature, but only nature’s most 
prosaic and fundamental qualities, those which are present and happen 
during the social act of exchange. This is what Sohn-Rethel identifies as the 
“mechanistic thinking” of science, mathematics, and (non-historical-
materialist) philosophy since the inception of coinage. He explains that the 
concepts of mechanistic thinking are to be regarded as the “original 
categories of intellectual labour” and asserts that: 
 
It is a labour serviceable to the rule of private property and in particular to 
capital. It is the science of intellectual labour springing from the second 
nature which is founded upon non-empirical abstraction and on concepts of a 
priori nature. The form elements of the exchange abstraction are of such 
fundamental calibre – abstract time and space, abstract matter, quantity as 
mathematical abstraction, abstract motion etc. – that there cannot be a 
natural event in the world which would elude these basic features of nature. 
(1978: 73) 
 
It seems important not to miss Sohn-Rethel’s own conclusions. It is striking 
that these conclusions are almost never mentioned in the recent theoretical 
resurrection of this thinker’s nonetheless important work on abstraction. The 
problem that is made glaringly apparent is that what is behind his analysis is 
his desire for socialism to establish “an alliance of society with nature” (1978: 
181). Nature here is not simply the woods, forest, or desert, a presumably 
unspoilt place, so to speak; rather it is an order of thought cleansed of the 
bad abstractions of an ‘intellectual labour’ resulting from the exchange 
abstraction. If science, technology, mathematics, etc. are second-order 
nature made possible via the real abstraction of money, what then is first-
order nature, society before the corruption of the coin? Yet, Sohn-Rethel - 
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unlike some socialist thinkers of his era – does not take to the vulgar bashing 
of techno-science or to farfetched exit strategies. Rather, he thinks that this 
social alliance with nature “demands the aid of science backed by the unity of 
mental and manual work”. 
 
Mental, according to Sohn-Rethel’s analysis, stands for abstract, non-
empirical, analytical, mathematical, theoretical, platonic timeless concepts 
etc., in other words, thought in general bound to and emergent from capitalist 
class relations. And manual means experienced, felt, embodied, and 
sweated out hard labour bound to a concept of the proletariat. There can be 
no denying that a difference between intellectual and manual labour exists 
with a visible gap between them, one that varies in magnitude and detail 
depending on where one is located in the world. What is questionable, 
however, is the implicit penchant for purging the first nature (as if we could 
ever recall it in a pristine and untouched state) of its second one. But let us 
look at how Sohn-Rethel himself suggests overcoming this gap that has been 
exposed by his very own distinction between a first-order natural socially real 
manual labour and a second-order abstractly socially real mental labour: 
 
[S]ocialism has the means to counteract the properties which, in capitalism, 
constitute the bourgeois character of this science. These properties are: that 
the basic categories of science are of the second nature and totally alienated 
from the qualitative realities of the first nature; that science is compelled to 
single out its objects as isolates; and that it must be carried out as an 
intellectual exploit. All these properties are capable of remedy by the feature, 
the essential one of socialism, that the people as direct producers must be 
the controlling masters of both the material and the intellectual means of 
production, and that they act in concert to establish prosperity within nature 
and its global unity. For this feature signifies that the material practice of the 
people in their social exploits commands the need for scientific findings to be 
integrated into the relationship of society to nature. (1978: 183 – 184) 
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From this passage, we can read that Sohn-Rethel pins his hopes on an 
abstraction he calls ‘the people’, a vague and romantic idea of direct 
production (ill-suited to many contexts where natural resources are too 
scarce for a notion of production which is not vastly transformed through 
techno-scientific labour), and a utopian vision of ‘prosperity within nature’ 
hinged on the promise of scientific findings that would somehow evade being 
of his second-order nature. In other words, Sohn-Rethel’s science-to-come 
implies that if we were ever able to abolish the capitalist relation of economic 
exchange19 or bypass it in one way or another, we would be able to reach 
this state of alliance between society and nature. 
 
So the view is one of re-socializing a de-socialized labour, and according to 
Sohn-Rethel, the capitalist logic of appropriation through the exchange 
abstraction cannot be replaced by a socialist one of production until people 
are capable of creating a society that is re-socialized through their efforts at 
becoming direct producers. As Black (2013) points out, the problem is that 
Sohn-Rethel thinks “the only thing preventing social labour from becoming 
directly socialized is the exchange relation”. He thinks that a society is 
capable of being classless if its form of social synthesis is operated directly 
through the process of production rather than through the mediation of 
exchange which inflicts capitalist appropriation. Sohn-Rethel’s ‘real 
abstraction’ is then premised on an opposition between what can be called 
‘essence’ on the one hand, i.e. concrete ‘useful’ labour which is considered to 
                                                     
19
 Interestingly, Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 192) make a strong point concerning the abolition 
of the capitalist relation and the embrace of socialism through the attachment to their ideal of 
radical democracy: “Every project for radical democracy necessarily includes […] the 
socialist dimension — that is to say, the abolition of capitalist relations of production; but it 
rejects the idea that from this abolition there necessarily follows the elimination of the other 
inequalities”. 
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be the source of all value, and what can be called ‘form’ on the other, i.e. “the 
phenomenal form and phantasmagoria of exchange-values” (Black, 2013). 
But as is clear and crystallized in arguments by Black (2013 b: 27) and 
Postone (1993: 178), Sohn-Rethel favourably evaluates the mode of 
societalization put into action by industrial labour in paradigms such as 
Maoist China or the Soviet Union (even though he strongly objects to many 
facets of Stalinism) and considers it non-capitalist, while any mode of 
societalization effected by the exchange abstraction is considered by him to 
be problematic because he construes the exchange relation as the essence 
of capitalism. 
 
Black and Postone regard this as an error because it restricts abstraction to a 
market phenomenon not essentially part of labour in capitalism. As Black 
argues, in the paradigms Sohn-Rethel approves of as socialist (and thus not 
due to the exchange abstraction), abstract labour still exists and forms the 
very premise for the alienated social structures which, in such paradigms, are 
intrinsic to social transformation. Hence, alienation, it seems, cannot be 
erased so easily by jumping to the conclusion that manual labour somehow is 
the essence and intellectual labour is the form promulgated by the exchange 
abstraction.  
 
Following on from this, it is apparent that although Sohn-Rethel offers us a 
clear template on how socio-political abstraction might work, he ends up 
falling short of embracing the consequences of his own conceptualization 
and falls back on what now appears to be the classical ‘mend the alienation 
from nature’ narrative. This is because according to Sohn-Rethel’s 
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perspective alienation is solely linked to money; money is what drives it, 
while Black and Postone’s simple arguments prove that alienation is not 
necessarily connected to the exchange abstraction. Furthermore, it has been 
argued by Williams (2014) that the implications for taking actions of a socio-
political or representational nature based on Sohn-Rethel’s theory of real 
abstraction ought to be made explicit: 
[W]ithin a capitalist reality system, there exists no ‘real productive’ element to 
return to. Attempts to reform the system from within radically misread the 
intrinsic nature of the abstractions of capital. Moreover, because these 
abstractions are not so much in the head as in everyday life, in capitalist 
practices, mere ideology critique alone will never be sufficient to undo or 
challenge them. 
 
Moreover, we can detect a link between Sohn-Rethel’s Realabstraktion and 
Lyotard’s differend. Having already described Mouffe’s agonism as an 
attempt to institutionalize the differend, which is to say to bestow it with 
institutional normativity, one can suggest that agonism also shares some 
links with Sohn-Rethel’s formula. The differend sees capital’s abstractive 
force, its absolute subordination of language to the regime of exchange, and 
its real subsumption of labour as a call for intervention through inventions 
that attempt to exclude ‘cognitive verification’, practices that, like ‘art’, refuse 
to be measured by a single standard of value. Agonism boosts the chances 
of such inventions by its insistence that they should occupy the establishment 
to amplify the project of ‘radical democracy’ as a final and ultimate guarantee 
against the total mechanization of democracy through the techno-scientific 
agency put into action by neo-liberal modes of bureaucratization. Agonism’s 
mode of operation when thinking through institutionalism is infiltration by 
intellectual abstractions. But these abstractions are themselves steeped in a 
cryptic and generic abstract historicity. They have been designed to relieve 
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Trotskian and Gramscian notions of hegemony of any kind of stable concept 
of the social, because the gamble is on the empty signifier that is radical 
democracy, which Laclau and Mouffe (1985: 193) tell us is: 
 
a form of politics which is founded not upon dogmatic postulation of any 
'essence of the social', but, on the contrary, on affirmation of the contingency 
and ambiguity of every 'essence', and on the constitutive character of social 
division and antagonism. Affirmation of a 'ground' which lives only by 
negating its fundamental character; of an 'order' which exists only as a partial 
limiting of disorder; of a 'meaning' which is constructed only as excess and 
paradox in the face of meaninglessness — in other words, the field of the 
political as the space for a game which is never 'zero-sum', because the rules 
and the players are never fully explicit. This game, which eludes the concept, 
does at least have a name: hegemony. 
 
Given the obvious centrality of the Lacanian conceptualization of the real as 
impossible in this passage, it is worth enquiring into what it would mean to re-
evaluate and rearticulate Laclau and Mouffe’s use of the concept of ‘agent’ in 
their term ‘hegemonic agent’. How can this much used term be refashioned 
for a specific political undertaking to which art - with its capacity to develop 
representations, identify with pluralism, and engage with political material – 
can contribute? This thinking towards a reformed concept of the ‘agent’ will 
lead us to call for reasoning to be put back into the larger picture of politics. 
This implies deviating from the centrality of the Lacanian heritage of real. To 
reach this alternate grounding of the real we will come into contact with a 
critique put forth by Dylan Evans and an alternative formulation of the real 
proposed by Félix Guattari. Ultimately we will find that Guattari’s (or to be 
more precise, Deleuze and Guattari’s) version of the real is not our final 
destination. But before we arrive at that point we need to first round off our 
discussion of Sohn-Rethel and finally grasp what it is that is important to take 
from his concept of ‘real abstraction’. 
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2.2 Real as Impossible vs. Real as Artificial (Mouffe and Laclau 
Contra Deleuze and Guattari) 
   
Simplifying, the classical philosophical investigation into the origin of thought 
took two major directions. Empiricists like Hume, for example, argued that 
symbolic forms of thought come about through direct physical experiences 
and sensations, while on the other hand, rationalists like Kant insisted that 
the faculty of reasoning must have been instituted a priori, since without such 
an a priori apparatus there can be no understanding of sensations. Sohn-
Rethel in turn has come up with a third, materialist and economic hypothesis 
(Pasquinelli, 2015). 
 
This speculative hypothesis, based on an anthropological imagination of how 
an intellectual class must have thought after the advent of coinage, states 
that the symbolic and abstract forms of thought of any epoch are abstract 
carriers and expressions of the acts of social exchange that establish its 
social synthesis. And nowadays our acts of social exchange continue to be 
largely conducted through the abstraction of money; this historical genealogy 
which starts with the Greeks still persists, albeit in altered and more 
advanced abstract forms. Whether Sohn-Rethel’s account is correct or 
incorrect is highly debatable, because there is no litmus test to prove its 
accuracy. We have not yet invented a quantum device which would be able 
to penetrate the brain and conduct a neural analysis predicting and sifting out 
thoughts while they are being generated, then computing them back to us as 
first-order nature or second-order nature. It seems to provide a convincing 
speculative hypothesis for what appears mysterious in the capitalist relation, 
yet through this very accomplishment, it produces another problem with 
87 
 
enigmatic characteristics, which is that in its tying any form of abstract 
rationality to money, it posits the untested presumption that if the money-form 
in all of its variations were to be ever successfully overthrown, then science 
and/or rational thought (what Sohn-Rethel calls symbolic thought) would 
dramatically and substantively change in character and for the better. 
Nevertheless, we can maintain that after Sohn-Rethel’s truncated version of 
materialism, what can be built on is that in attempting to “occupy 
abstractions” one must acknowledge that one is always already “occupied by 
abstractions”, or, as Pasquinelli (2015, emphasis in original) puts it:   
 
Sohn-Rethel should be remembered if only for one basic resonance of his 
argumentation: the genealogical relation or molecular contamination that he 
registers between the money form and the thought form (or the labour form, 
we could add). Yet if such a connection is ventilated here, it is not to indulge 
in an archaeology of the modes of production but, on the contrary, to 
investigate the cognitive effects of the money form also in the current age 
(considering that, since McLuhan, we investigate the cognitive effects of all 
media in general).20 
 
Here we can introduce our second model of ‘the real’ in relation to the 
abstractive forces of capital. This model identifies with the above-mentioned 
so-called ‘contamination’ constituted through the exchange abstraction. The 
machinic nature of this abstraction mutates and expands into a machinic 
filiation21 through which intellectual labour is host to the ‘real abstraction’ of 
                                                     
20
 Another way of putting this would be Noys’s (2010: 10) assertion that: “There is not a 
simple separation between theoretical intervention and capitalist ‘reality’, but rather the 
fraught struggle between the capitalist production of real abstraction and the attempt to work 
on and against these abstractions without returning to some simple underlying reality 
supposedly obscured by abstraction. To put it in a lapidary fashion we might say reality itself 
has become abstract: this is its ‘ontological fabric’”. 
21
 I take the term filiation here from Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1983, English 
transl.), where it is mentioned numerous times. It is a particularly precise choice of wording 
which is fascinating when contrasted with the notion of Sohn-Rethel’s second and first 
natures. Its etymology harks back to the Latin filiatio, meaning to be descendant or 
genetically derived from a father. A father has a paternas relationship and a son one of 
filiatio. The relationship of human to machine expressed in such terms can therefore be 
interpreted as an expanded familial one through which the father/son (or originary oedipal) 
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the money form and thus, to a certain degree, accepts its own captivity as the 
condition of its own ‘desire’ to produce and think politically. This model, and 
its divergence from the Lacanian impossible real, is best summed up in a 
short articulation by Félix Guattari from his Anti-Oedipus Papers: “[T]he real 
is the artificial – and not (as Lacan says) the impossible”22 (cited in Alliez, 
2011: 262). To grasp the basic conjecture behind ‘the real as artificial’, it is 
important to touch on its resistance to the Lacanian real. Evans (1996; 2005), 
a disillusioned former Lacanian psychoanalyst, has been at the forefront in 
unpacking the Lacanian framework. 
 
The eschewal of this framework, for Evans, is triggered by a number of 
issues and concerns. He goes to pains to point out that Lacan was not a 
literary critic but a practicing psychoanalyst. “Every time that Lacan discusses 
a work of literature, or a piece of art, he does it for one reason, and one 
reason only; to illustrate a psychoanalytic concept so that other 
psychoanalysts can understand that concept better and use it in their clinical 
practice” (2005). Practicing Lacanian psychoanalysts, Evans remarks, and 
even Lacan himself, have voiced their concerns about how a methodology 
developed for treating patients and the adjunct theorization of how that 
method works could be so extensively mischannelled into literary criticism, 
                                                                                                                                                      
relationship is grafted onto the relation between man and machine to be affirmed, decoded, 
obscured, and rewritten through an intellectual labour that is no longer held hostage by the 
father-in-flesh, i.e. a natural paternas.   
22
 In his notes, Alliez (2011: 272, no.15) points out that this signals something like a machinic 
Nietzschean “will to power” whereby ‘becoming’ is restructured as a revisionary projection 
into the structural field of thought of a ”constructivist pragmatics”. This is a pragmatics that 
individuates itself by “the machinic affirmation of desire”. According to Alliez, this sentence or 
claim that “the real is the artificial and not the impossible” is what prompted the discussion 
that led to Deleuze and Guattari’s collaboration on Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (first published in French in 1972). 
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cultural theory, and academic contexts without so much as a wink to its 
clinical foundations. But for Evans (2005), the clinical practice of 
psychotherapy and psychoanalysis itself did very little to justify the Lacanian 
worldview: every time he put his Lacanian theory to one side during his years 
of experience, he discovered that he was more capable of helping the 
patient. When he opted to take the Lacanian route, it seemed to backfire. 
Evans (2005) describes how the Lacan of the 1930s was actually at the 
forefront of experimentation with the new biological and computational 
theories of the mind that we recognize today as the neuro- and cognitive 
sciences. 
 
By the 1950s, however, it seemed that traces of such early experimentation 
had almost vanished, to be replaced with a deepened ‘culturalist reading’ of 
Freud. In terms of a timeline this makes sense: the horrors of the war years 
and the tragic instrumentalisation of science might have weighed heavily on 
Lacan’s development, but it remains unclear why Lacan backtracked into 
Freudian territory. In Evans’s (2005) narrative, we come to recognize a Lacan 
who rewrote Freud to save the latter from being dismantled by the modern 
sciences. Lacan’s project, on this account, is not simply revisionary but 
moved by fears such as the trivialization of the human subject by the natural 
sciences. To this end, Freud’s vocabulary was repurposed and refashioned 
to serve as a counter-hegemonic agent against the grey and banal facticity of 
science. Freudian ‘instinct’ was transformed into ‘drive’ which was a move, as 
Evans (2005) mentions, Lacan considered necessary to emphasise “the 
contrast between the flexible, culturally-determined behaviour of humans and 
the rigid, biologically-determined behaviour of animals”. On Evans’s account, 
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Freud’s biology was incorrect, as was his model of a brain built on modern 
hydraulics23, but he provided clear testable claims. The Freud that Lacan 
reinvented, however, was a pure cultural linguist, and one could add an 
‘intellectual abstraction’ that was not just sealed off from scientific enquiry but 
totally removed from that world’s registers. This Lacanian reinvention of 
Freud leads Evans to believe that Lacan was a closeted neo-Romantic 
whose seemingly unromantic view of the subject foraying into the 
formalisation and mathematisation of psychoanalytic theory was fuelled by 
his penchant for the poetic and the surrealistic. 
 
Against this background, the real as impossible emerges as a theoretical 
frontier against what can be described as the demystification of the human 
subject through science. It is an intellectual operation in which an entire 
humanist tradition of subjectivity is replaced with the Midas touch of 
emptiness and lack, not to establish it against foundationalism and our 
predisposition for unchecked givens, but to maintain the mystery or the 
poetry of the human. The radical democratic imaginary as envisaged by and 
through agonism, with the Lacanian real at its core, is a political extension of 
this project. Its positing of the notion of incommensurability, borrowed from 
                                                     
23
 Freud, in collaboration with Joseph Breuer (Erwin et al., 2002: 364), devised a new theory 
of psychopathology on the basis of this model. The “hydraulic” model is one “in which the 
mind is conceived as if it were a pressure cooker: A person comes upon an upsetting event 
in her current life. She is unable to react to it emotionally, and the memory of the event (with 
its concomitant feelings) is split off from consciousness. The unreleased energy, unable to 
be expressed, is bottled up in the system and exerts itself as a physical symptom”. Erwin et 
al. suggest that such a theory (besides of course being scientifically incorrect) is predisposed 
to the role or agency of the psychoanalyst as a kind of cosmopolitan curer because it 
provides a “traumatogenic theory for neurosis”, whereby neurosis is a reaction to an 
upsetting external event. Freud later realised that external traumatic experiences where not 
always the causes of neurosis and this led him to redevelop the hydraulic mind model, 
making it more intra-physical with a pre-conscious (containing things we are not immediately 
aware of), a conscious, and a dynamic unconscious (as the part of the mind cut off from 
consciousness).  
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Thomas Kuhn’s theory on the incommensurability of different scientific 
paradigms, is perhaps more rhetorical device - finding in it alternatively 
articulated echoes of the Lacanian impossible real - than philosophical 
commitment to the idea of conceptual change as an enabling factor in the 
revision of previously acquired knowledge and the development of novel 
concepts – which is arguably how Kuhn’s thesis ought to be understood. 
 
This apparent conceptual displacement of Kuhn’s account is pronounced in 
Mouffe’s (2000: 102, emphasis in original) formulation of her adversary 
principle when Kuhn’s thesis is evoked. This evocation provides a quasi-
scientific propping up for what is essentially based on the Lacanian 
impossible real. It is Mouffe’s argument that to “accept the view of the 
adversary is to undergo a radical change in political identity. It is more a sort 
of conversion man a process of rational persuasion (in the same way as 
Thomas Kuhn has argued that adherence to a new scientific paradigm is a 
conversion)”.  
 
For further clarification, and to put Mouffe’s usage of Kuhn’s 
incommensurability into context, Connelly’s (2015, kindle locations 1539-
1584) analysis of Kuhn’s argument can help articulate the distinction between 
how Mouffe and Kuhn use the notion of incommensurability. The 
incommensurability developed by Kuhn in his The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (1962) emerges from his study of the history of scientific 
concepts and how they shift into new paradigms. Kuhn calls a paradigm 
anything that like a judicial decision is accepted as part of the common laws 
of a scientific field providing guidance for future decisions rather than taken 
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itself to be an object of enquiry. When phenomena appear that cannot be 
explained by use of this paradigm and after numerous attempts to 
accommodate them under it, a break with the old paradigm emerges with a 
“new set of commitments” that form the basis for a new scientific practice. A 
“scientific revolution” is Kuhn’s name for the process whereby a new 
paradigm overtakes a previous one. His incommensurability is then a 
description of the ways that pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary 
paradigms cannot be measured up against each other, as in the case of Pre-
Copernican scientists and Copernicus’s heliocentric paradigm. 
 
There are three ways in which such paradigms are incommensurable. 
Roughly, that they are a) developed around different norms regarding what 
questions and problems science ought to be investigating, and it is in these 
areas where the radical shift occurs to make sense of new phenomena b) the 
reappropriation of some of the vocabularies in the old paradigm by the new 
paradigm radically alters their meaning to a degree that they might not have 
much in common c) out of this, different paradigms can still subsist as 
competing paradigms, but their followers, in a sense, inhabit different worlds. 
 
The point about ‘conversion’ enters Kuhn’s theory when he discusses what it 
takes for a scientist to leave an old paradigm and adopt a new one, since 
these paradigms are incommensurable; Kuhn thinks it would need something 
like a leap of faith or a conversion. He argues that new revolutionary scientific 
paradigms can hardly be adopted through rational persuasion, but that 
ultimately they come through as dominant when advocates of the pre-
revolutionary paradigms are finally outnumbered. It is clear here that Kuhn’s 
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theory is one of evolutionary conceptual change and how it emerges 
historically, while the point where Mouffe finds an intersection is the ‘faith’ 
required by a practitioner in adopting the revolutionary paradigm. But taken 
out of context, this deviates from Kuhn’s theory of knowledge, since for Kuhn 
it is clear which paradigm ought to be taken up: his theory is a pragmatic 
description of how such paradigms end up being dominant rather than a 
prescription of how different (incommensurable) paradigms ought to contest 
for hegemony. The latter prescriptionary take on the incommensurable is 
what Mouffe understands as the power of agonism to shape a radical 
democracy, yet it has minimal connections to Kuhn’s reading of the history of 
science and conceptual change. It is clearly grounded in the ‘impossible real’ 
rather than a concept explaining the evolution of scientific paradigms.   
 
With regard to the ‘impossible real’, Evans (1996: 162 – 164) demonstrates 
that unexplainable inconsistency was part of Lacan’s idea of the real until the 
early to mid-fifties, when it began to stabilize as the impossible. It is in this 
period that it begins to emerge as “that which is outside language and 
inassimilable to symbolisation”, as an object incapable of being expressed 
symbolically, resisting symbolization in any way, and forming itself as a 
domain for whatever lives outside the possibility of symbolization. Evans 
continues: 
This theme remains a constant throughout the rest of Lacan’s work, and 
leads Lacan to link the real with the concept of impossibility. The real is ‘the 
impossible’ because it is impossible to imagine, impossible to integrate into 
the symbolic order, and impossible to attain in anyway. It is this character of 
impossibility and of resistance to symbolisation which lends the real it’s 
essentially traumatic quality. 
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Accordingly, and under the shadow of this traumatic quality imposed by the 
Lacanian real, the individual projects of Guattari and Deleuze develop 
separately and in collaboration to transform Lacan’s unconscious into a 
“machinic unconscious” that would transcend the former’s impossibility. The 
extent to which Guattari and Deleuze’s work breaks from Lacan’s has been 
contested by Pierre Boutang who has suggested that the origins of 
Deleuzoguattarian desiring-machines can be traced back to Lacan’s lectures 
on the machine24. 
 
However, the parallels that emerge between the Deleuzoguattarian project 
and ‘real abstraction’ may help in identifying the scope of transformation 
inflicted on the unconscious and its legacy by both thinkers separately and 
together. Their model of doing philosophy and thinking its efficacy is 
premised on the real as the artificial25. Generally speaking, the real is artificial 
because in this political ontology we come to understand the real as a 
process of perpetual reconstruction and creation. Arguably, the most concise 
route to grasping this framework is through the concept of fabulation. The 
real is not something we have simply been given to recognize, but something 
which is fabulated, absorbed, and refabulated continuously within a plane of 
immanence. To clarify, an explanation of fabulation and its embedment in 
Deleuze’s ontology is required. 
 
                                                     
24
 This point is brought up by Schmidgen (1997: 17 - 18) 
25
 The aim here is to broadly paint what each philosophical conception of the real is able to 
afford the practitioner or art maker who seeks to embody critique in her practice. Additionally, 
it is to understand in which ways such embodiment might be possible. The engagement 
should be understood as one of simple nomenclature aimed at identifying three versions of 
‘the real’ (Impossible, Artificial, and Synoptic) in relation to the question of abstraction and 
causal efficacy.  
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Fabulation is present throughout Deleuze’s work in particular – although not 
always clearly labelled as such - and is also mentioned on a number of 
occasions in his joint work with Guattari.26 A vivid instance of Deleuze’s 
(1990) evocation of the fabulatory - perhaps illustrating some dimensions of 
its relationship to nature, difference, and Deleuzian sense based ontology - is 
his reading of Michel Tournier’s 1967 novel Friday, or, The Other Island, a 
book that reinvents Daniel Defoe’s classic Robinson Crusoe. Petit (1991: 19-
21) provides us with a clear account of how Tournier returns to the classic to 
pick up aspects that have been left out and could have been exploited to 
reach other conclusions or potential endings. Notably, she emphasises the 
same main axis Deleuze had developed earlier, the strange and total 
absence of sexuality in the original, “surely a man marooned alone on an 
island would suffer, at least at first, from sexual frustrations”. This absence in 
the classic is the empty margin which Tournier exploits to develop a 
fabulatory forward-looking rewriting of Defoe’s classic. The reimagination of 
Robinson’s sexuality gradually strips the protagonist of “the trappings of his 
civilization” and in doing so he 
symbolically returns to the womb and reexperiences the entire process of 
sexual maturation. But instead of re-creating his previous sexual orientation, 
he creates first a new adolescent genital sexuality, then a nongenital 
sexuality of “solar coitus” which involves his entire body in mystic union with 
the sun. This sexuality is either infantile or beyond adult sexuality. (Petit, 
1991: 20) 
 
Evidently, this is an anti-oedipal sexuality in which the phallic impossible real 
plays no part. However, as we shall see later, the development of this new 
form of sexuality in the absence of others can also be thought of as 
advancing a dialectical inhuman twist on the Lacanian model of the other as 
                                                     
26
 See in particular Deleuze and Guattari (1994), pp 167–171.  
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a structural field. This twist in Lacanian thought - developed by Deleuze 
through his reading of Tournier’s novel - is crucial in understanding the ‘real 
as artificial’ and how this ‘artificial’ becomes a link between political 
philosophies with a psychoanalytic grounding and contemporary realist 
theory. This twist in the Other as a structural field does to Lacan what Lacan 
did to Freud, it helps his Other survive the current wave of scientific 
expansion into the mind and cognition. It keeps his Other not only alive but 
functional, and imbues it with creative potential by dephallusizing constitutive 
lack, or the constitutive outside, which is to say dehumanizing it and 
displacing it to the realms of the cosmic and the molecular. 
 
Fabulation’s artificial real originates in its craving to liberate the real from the 
historic burden of the phallus in its ever-present absence in the Freudo-
Lacanian trajectory. This is in stark contrast to Laclau and Mouffe’s 
formulation of democracy, in which that same ever-present absence is 
postulated as the mechanism which makes democracy possible. Agonism is 
the phallic version of democracy par excellence. Democracy, it tells us, is the 
process hinged on an empty signifier through which we, the adversarial 
children, can temporarily adopt a paternal signifier in a quick turnaround of 
desires, identities, and frustrations. 
 
Returning to Deleuze (1990: 303), a personal friend of Tournier, we see that 
he captures what is most important in the latter’s reformed Robinson when 
he identifies the three interrelated areas in which the new Robinson differs 
from the old. The Robinson written in the twentieth century is 
related to ends and goals rather than to origins; he is sexual; and these ends 
represent a fantastic deviation from our world, under the influence of a 
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transformed sexuality, rather than an economic reproduction of our world, 
under the impact of a continuous effort. 
 
The reworked cosmic sexuality of the protagonist is a form of becoming that 
Deleuze holds as a subversive power of disruption to the capitalist economic 
model, it is a deviation. The basic principle is that through their exchange and 
circulation, such fictional deviations produce “creative becomings” that can 
have effects on the very fabric of politics. The concept of perversion in 
relation to the notion of ‘the Other’ is the major axis that Deleuze’s reading of 
Tournier’s novel runs through. Although difficult to unpack at times, it is clear 
that Deleuze attributes a positive form of perversion to Tournier’s Robinson. 
Perversion, for Deleuze, is at the heart of developing a creative relationship 
to what he calls “the structure-Other”, which is his contribution to the 
revamping of the Lacanian constitutive outside. Deleuze (1990: 310) tells us 
that “Other = an expression of a possible world”. But in fact, this is the 
structure-Other which has the fundamental effect of distinguishing between a 
subject’s consciousness and its object. The result is a world filled with 
possibilities, backgrounds, fringes, and transitions; inscribing the possibility of 
a frightening world when I am not yet afraid, or, on the contrary, the 
possibility of a reassuring world when I am really frightened by the world; 
encompassing in different respects the world which presents itself before me 
developed otherwise; constituting inside the world so many blisters which 
contain so many possible worlds - this is the Other. Henceforth, the Other 
causes my consciousness to tip necessarily into an “I was,” into a past which 
no longer coincides with the object. […] If the Other is a possible world, I am 
a past world.  
 
Deleuze understands the notion of Other as “not reducible to either an 
alternative subject or particular object”. , it is “that which announces the 
structure that makes possible a coherent account of the world” (Hamilton, 
2013). In Defoe’s classic, Robinson’s seclusion on the island does absolutely 
nothing to destabilize the coherency of his account of the world. Although the 
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protagonist suffers on a number of levels, what allows him to keep his sanity 
is the somewhat frightening intactness of his structure-Other. He finds a 
stash of coins and laughs at how money has no value, obviously an allusion 
to the coins not being exchangeable for anything under his current 
circumstances. But he proceeds to take the coins nonetheless, for future 
possibilities that may arise and in which the money may regain its value. 
Although the Defoe Robinson’s existence is always in tandem with the Other, 
he remains blind to what the Other instigates as a structure that makes his 
version of the world coherent, i.e. consistently and logically possible. Here 
the structure-Other is at work, it doesn’t need people or objects to account for 
the coherency of Robinson’s scope of thought. Hamilton (2013) draws on this 
when he remarks: 
The fact that Crusoe takes the money, even though he knows it can have no 
value on the island, is truly noteworthy because it shows that […] Crusoe’s 
experience of isolation has not compromised his vision of a world of others 
that is at work beyond his visual horizon. Importantly, his notion of such a 
functioning world is maintained by those things which ‘prove’ the idea of the 
other – the shield and the weapon he manufactures, the coins he cannot 
leave behind, the work ethic that he cannot abandon, and the God who has 
not abandoned him. 
 
This structure-Other untouched by the traumatic experience of being 
stranded in a secluded world without others is exactly what enables the 
protagonist (Defoe’s Robinson) to resume from where he started, on leaving 
the island and returning to civilization, along with his new island acquaintance 
Friday. Deleuze’s interpretation of Tournier’s novel is telling because in the 
new Robinson’s attempts to deviate from the structure-Other we are given a 
prime example of how Deleuze’s idea of political efficacy is basically 
intervention as the disruption of the structure-Other. In working through 
Tournier’s protagonist Deleuze also develops a coarse image of his own 
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transcendental empiricism. Deleuze emphasises the new Robinson’s creative 
sexualisation and complex – as well as at times mystically-dependent – 
“coming to terms” with his existence in a “world without others”. Tournier, he 
proposes, is able to meld together a protagonist who becomes aware of the 
structure-Other and in doing so develops a kind of weird positive freedom by 
living creatively in the absence of the Other and taking that existence to its 
full conclusion. This conclusion is forcefully articulated by Bourassa (2015) 
when he points out that:  
A ‘world without others’ is not a world without other people, other encounters, 
other relationships, but a world in which others do not function within the 
constraints of the Structure-Other. So there is an Other that is not the 
Structure-Other, but the Double […] If the Structure-Other “appears as that 
which organizes Elements into Earth, and earth into bodies, bodies into 
objects, and which regulates and measures objects, perception and desire all 
at once” (Deleuze 1990: 318), then the Double is “the new upright image in 
which the elements are released and renewed, having become celestial and 
forming a thousand capricious elemental figures” (Deleuze 1990: 312). To 
encounter the Double is already to have the walls of the Structure-Other 
crumble. The Double offers not a new ‘structure’ or ‘organization’ but a 
reassembling of a field of being. The Double must, then, function tactically. 
The Double must be about the work of freeing, of redrawing, distraction, 
displacement, intensification: an infinity of strategies that will belong to the 
Double insofar as they all serve the future, the opening up and recasting of 
the Structure-Other. 
 
The Double is fabulated and inserted into the flow of desires, its end - as we 
shall soon see – is a superior empiricism which is to say a form of knowledge 
which can decode, recode, and recast the structure-Other through sensual 
and intuitive experiences. The Robinson written in the twentieth century has 
arrived at a positive – although unusually fantastical – understanding of 
positive freedom. Paraphrasing Isaiah Berlin’s (1977: 124) well-known 
definition of ‘positive freedom’ we can say that the protagonist has arrived at 
an awareness of the constraints and conditions that afford him ‘the wish’ or, 
in this case, the desire to be the instrument of his own acts of will, not those 
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of others. But this knowledge of the constraints and conditions (the structure-
Other) enables another life, another encounter with the world which is 
constituted through another type of knowing that is non-dependent on other 
humans and their actions. It is also empirical – in that it can be intuitively 
accessed (the moment of intense solar coitus, the point at which Robinson 
imagines himself as composed of and living as ‘”free elements”). Through 
this superior empiricism the protagonist becomes a deciding subject, not one 
who is decided for, which is to say, a subject capable of conceiving ends of 
his own and realizing them. The Robinson of the twentieth century feels “free 
to the degree that (he) believe(s) this to be true, and enslaved to the degree 
that (he is) made to realize that it is not”. 
 
In Tournier’s novel, Robinson and Friday do not end up leaving the island 
together and returning to Europe as they did in Defoe’s narrative. Rather, 
Robinson remains on the Island while Friday decides to leave. Deleuze 
argues that this is because in this version Robinson is no longer shaped by 
the structure-Other, he has created his own determinate fictional world that is 
not tethered to the possibilities of the structure-Other like the Defoe 
Robinson’s whole existence was. Deleuze (1990: 303) expresses this when 
he remarks that by 
raising the problem in terms of end, and not in terms of origin, Tournier 
makes it impossible for him to allow Robinson to leave the island. The end, 
that is, Robinson's final goal, is "dehumanization," the coming together of the 
libido and of the free elements, the discovery of a cosmic energy or of a great 
elemental Health which can surge only on the isle-and only to the extent that 
the isle has become aerial or solar. 
 
The contours of fabulation are already outlined here. Fabulations are 
dehumanizing in the sense of proposing a being, a practice of life that 
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attempts to release itself from the structure-Other. And this, in a passage that 
bears similarity to Bourassa’s interpretation of Deleuze’s depiction of the new 
Robinson, is what Kaufman (2012: 113–114) picks up on her discursion into 
Deleuze’s “world without others”. For Kaufman, it is “not simply that the Other 
is missing from the desert island”, but more importantly, what is at stake “is 
the opening that this absence provides, an opening onto an impersonal and 
inhuman perceptual space that is entirely beyond the realm of other people”. 
If this inhuman perceptual space beyond the realm of other people sounds 
like an evocation of the Kantian thing-in-itself, it is because Kaufman thinks 
this is what it actually is. In fact, she thinks that this “world without others” is 
Deleuze’s formulation of a space for thought that would not be determined by 
what Quentin Meillassoux markedly coined as “correlationism” which 
Kaufman describes in short as “the idea that everything must be described 
as relative to the perceiving consciousness and not in and of itself”. 
 
Building on this observation, intellectual labour for Deleuze is founded upon 
his particular understanding of the Other as structure. It is a form of labour 
that works towards supplanting the structure-Other with what Deleuze calls a 
“superior empiricism” based on fiction. This is accomplished through forms of 
perversion, which according to Deleuze is  
not defined by the force of a certain desire in the system of drives; the pervert 
is not someone who desires, but someone who introduces desire into an 
entirely different system and makes it play, within this system, the role of an 
internal limit, a virtual center or zero point […] The perverse world is a world 
in which the category of the necessary has completely replaced that of the 
possible. (1990: 304, 320) 
 
This is what Tournier’s Robinson manages to accomplish according to 
Deleuze. And we can see in the figure of this Robinson, Deleuze’s mirror 
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image of himself, an avatar of Deleuze, or at least something of his 
philosophical blueprint bent on introducing desire into different systems and 
labouring towards replacing the possibilities circumscribed by the structure-
Other with the category of the necessary, which amounts to an elemental 
nature. 
 
Coming at this constellation of ideas from another angle, Fabulation is 
defined by Bogue (2010) as “the artistic practice of fostering the invention of 
a people to come”. Here, it is notable how fabulation’s desire to be forward-
looking rather than entrenched in a return to a first-order nature is picked up 
by cinema. Tournier’s island and his Robinson’s ability to transcend the limits 
imposed by the structure-Other on his mental, physical, sexual and spiritual 
existence bears a strong similarity to the storyline and thematic at play in 
James Cameron’s Avatar (2009). In fact, at the height of the film’s popularity 
and cultural influence Latour (2010) detects the connection and elaborates 
on what he regards important about it. For Latour, Avatar is the first 
Hollywood script about 
the modernist clash with nature that doesn’t take ultimate catastrophe and 
destruction for granted—as so many have before—but opts for a much more 
interesting outcome: a new search for hope on condition that what it means 
to have a body, a mind, and a world is completely redefined. The lesson of 
the film, in my reading of it, is that modernized and modernizing humans are 
not physically, psychologically, scientifically, and emotionally equipped to 
survive on their planet. As in Michel Tournier’s inverted story of Robinson 
Crusoe, Friday, or, The Other Island, they have to relearn from beginning to 
end what it is to live on their island—and just like Tournier’s fable, Crusoe 
ultimately decides to stay in the now civilized and civilizing jungle instead of 
going back home to what for him has become just another wilderness. But 
what fifty years ago in Tournier’s romance was a fully individual experience 
has become today in Cameron’s film a collective adventure: there is no 
sustainable life for Earth-bound species on their planet island 
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A noticeable problem with Latour’s reading of the film, a problem which 
extends to the concept of fabulation, and ultimately to the regime of ‘the 
artificial real’ itself, is how prone it is to conflictual positions on modernity’s 
second-order nature. Notice how we are given a coin with two sides. On one 
side we have a picture of hope which pays tribute to the power of scientific 
understanding: modernism’s (here understood as Western civilization’s 
philosophical and scientific trajectory) clash with a primordial nature can only 
be resolved through a total overhaul of how we understand our bodies, our 
minds and the world in general. On the other side of this coin we have a 
negative picture of modernity that claims that “modernized and modernizing 
humans are not physically, psychologically, scientifically, and emotionally 
equipped to survive on their planet”. Further modernization, it seems, is not 
the answer for Latour, but rather the espousal of a position which takes 
modernism itself to be the structure-Other. How are we to accomplish the 
total overhaul of understanding the body, mind, and the world? 
 
Arriving at an image of science in which Modernism is dehumanized seems 
to be Latour’s answer, echoing Deleuze’s take on the meaning of Tournier’s 
Robinson. When the main character in Avatar, the paraplegic veteran marine 
Jake Sully, decides to stay, it is after he (in his avatar form) helps put an end 
to the occupation of Pandora and undergoes a strange cosmic process 
through which his consciousness is transferred from his human body to his 
avatar, enabling him to remain on his adopted alien planet with the Na’vi 
race. What better example for Deleuze’s metaphor of the ‘Double’ than this 
avatar becoming the artificial reality of a new existence that annuls the 
sometimes invisible walls of the structure-Other. But in this film set in a 
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fictional future world, the eventual ‘dehumanized’ outcome depends on a 
series of events, technologies, and research programmes that would not 
have existed without modernism, and one might add, the darker side of 
modernism’s techno-scientific breakthroughs fuelled by the interests of 
military occupation and exploitation. This is a point Latour clearly misses: this 
futuristic Hollywood parody of the modern Crusoe cruises over such complex 
questions to arrive at an image of alien sublime beauty where the military 
machine can finally be laid to rest. In a sense, the reconciliation with nature – 
albeit in a future estranged from a typical image of nature – is achieved by 
destroying the military might of colonial power. This is the whole point of the 
film; what it wants to mediate and its main service is the easing of colonial 
guilt, or more generally, of contemporary imperial discomfort. Consequently, 
it proves incapable of transcending the structure-Other after all. 
 
Fabulation or intellectual labour as the invention of a people to come is prone 
to such unresolved and conflictory struggles with the concept of nature and 
the notion of modernity because it does not see the point in positing 
processes of reasoning as a positive force capable of redefining the human 
understanding of and interaction with nature. It is true that Latour points 
towards the “collective adventure” through which this alternative 
understanding of nature and the human is perceived. But this collective 
adventure was of an absolutely techno-spiritual or techno-theological nature. 
As portrayed towards the end of the movie, in the process of consciousness 
transfer between Jake’s physical body and his avatar, Avatar’s collective 
adventure did not involve individuals analysing, negating, and discussing with 
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each other but rather direct experiential and intuitive access to precepts, 
concepts, and empirically vivid worlds of abundant emotion and beauty. 
 
Revisiting Sohn-Rethel’s ‘real abstraction’, it was noted how it lead him to 
conclude that another science ought to be developed, one in which society 
comes into alliance with nature. This is a version of nature in which the 
alienation of the unempirical second-order nature can be counteracted with 
what he describes as the central characteristic of socialism, namely the idea 
that ‘the people’ must be direct producers and masters of both the material 
and intellectual means of production: only then can unity with nature emerge. 
We called this Sohn-Rethel’s science-to-come, and it can be claimed that - in 
a much more sophisticated and refined way - Deleuze’s fabulations are 
swayed by similar convictions, which is to say that Deleuze’s intellectual 
labour works against alienation despite insisting that the real is artificial. 
Instead of a science-to-come, Deleuze opts for the creation of a people-to-
come, inserting this fictional collectively into the here and now. Instead of 
prescribing the questionable economic model of direct production as a 
remedy, Deleuze and Guattari embrace a model of ‘desiring-production’ in 
which desire is not primarily constituted by a negative lack à la Lacan or a 
return to a first-order nature but is a force that produces the real. This is the 
real as artificial, but the artificial here should be understood as a process of 
“naturing Nature”27. Jason Read (2008) conveys the exact point of 
convergence between Deleuze & Guattari and Sohn-Rethel when he writes:  
                                                     
27
 Khandker (2014) maps out Deleuze’s conception of nature as a fusion between Bergson’s 
understanding of time and Spinoza’s understanding of nature. As she points out, the result is 
that duration “insofar as it is continuous, unfolding, and able to encompass ‘other durations,’ 
is a naturing nature” while matter “insofar as it is capable of (artificial) division and tends 
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[T]he point where Sohn-Rethel and Deleuze and Guattari overlap […] is that 
they locate in Marx’s analysis of the commodity form the schema of what 
could be called the political unconscious: the unconscious is not a bundle of 
drives in need of socialisation, but desires which are already organised by 
the practices and relations (what Deleuze and Guattari call flows) of 
capitalism. 
 
Thus, for Deleuze, the so-called molecular contamination of the intellect by 
the abstractions of money and labour is perhaps better thought of as a 
source of multiplicity, as a web of criss-crossing lines and paths and flows 
which pose a challenge for the philosopher: abstractions do not explain 
anything but must themselves be explained through creative forms of 
analysis. The questions Deleuze seems to ask, as Ansell-Pearson (2015) 
puts it, are “how can the human become a creator equal to the whole 
movement of creation and invent a society of creators? How are we to think 
such a possibility? That is, by what means or methods of philosophy and of 
action can such a superior human nature become accessible to us?” If 
techno-science is dictated by real abstractions that cannot be empiricized 
because they are generated in social acts of exchange and not in the minds 
of people, then exchangeable fabulations that are at one and the same time 
empirically-enabled and oriented towards the ‘creative evolution’28 of the 
human, propose a form of intervention that takes nature in general as its 
grounding for a political subjectivity rather than the specific quarters of 
parliament or the courtroom. However, fabulations share some similarities 
with Laclau and Mouffe’s agonistic intellectual abstractions. Obviously, 
                                                                                                                                                      
toward repetition, is a natured nature”. Matter is a natured nature, i.e. the product of an 
active naturing of nature brought into existence through a single duration in which everything 
takes part, encompassing human consciousness, beings, and the entire material world. (All 
emphasises mine)  
28 The influence of Bergson’s book of the same title (1907) on Deleuze is well documented 
and the subject of various essays, see for example Ansell-Pearson (2015) and Khandker 
(2014). 
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Laclau and Mouffe are as far as possible from the ‘pure metaphysics’ of 
Deleuze, and are not interested in thinking through forms of 
transcendentalism29, so the connection is limited to how these largely 
dissimilar thinkers perceive change qua intervention. Clearly, fabulations – or 
fabulatory abstractions (fabstractions) – are evolutionary and not based on 
lack: they also emphasise the experiential and sensible domains, their end is 
not a radical democracy but rather a radical nature, and contra Laclau’s 
abstraction of historical political tendencies into a formal logic or pattern for 
antagonistic politics, fabstractions are imbued with a touch of the baroque30 
and are clearly not as rigid nor predetermined by a historical-materialist ideal 
of political hegemony. 
 
Yet, they both share the will-to-power of interventionism while appealing to 
two different but interconnected notions of community – one by upholding 
democracy as an empty signifier and political difference as absolutely 
incommensurable (pluralist democratic community), the other by upholding 
                                                     
29
 Although, as noted earlier, Laclau’s recourse to the notion of ‘real abstraction’ can be 
understood as an attempt to keep the historical tendencies connected to a socialist 
understanding of hegemony alive while transcending them by abstracting them into a 
formalist axiom. 
30
 Langlois (2014) builds a conception of Deleuze’s philosophy as an updating of Leibniz’s 
baroque metaphysics pivoted on the monad, from which Deleuze develops a modern 
baroque aesthetics or an image of modernism as a new baroque that can be connected to 
similar elaborations by the likes of Walter Benjamin. Leibniz’s thought ought to be 
considered the “first serious attempt to supplement for the shadow of nihilism that began to 
sweep across the cultural landscape of Europe” after the collapse of theological reason. 
Deleuze’s reworking of the monad in modern times, as a type of abstract machine, should be 
seen as a continuation of Leibniz’s work in the wake of this crisis. Langlois’s reading of 
Deleuze (based on the latter’s book The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque - 1993) is that he 
regards the baroque as “fundamentally an aesthetic borne out of a crisis at the heart of 
modernity, and what it exposes is not the opportunity, for instance, of either philosophy, 
literature, painting, or science to pick up the reins of a metaphysics where they are dropped, 
say, by the theological hegemony of divine transcendence or the commodity form of 
capitalist ideology”. Rather, the Baroque is an exposing and an expression of what Deleuze 
labels the dark background of immanence that is manifested through Leibniz’s monadic 
ontology, this dark background appears at the point where “the theological and 
enlightenment fictions of transcendence begin historically to dissolve”. 
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the force of desiring-production, creative difference, and affirming the being 
of thought on the same ontological plane as the being of every other object 
(creative community). Here we can arrive at a point that was articulated 
differently earlier. The ‘real as impossible’ has a strong presence within the 
expanded field of art practice and relies on intellectual abstractions as 
developed by Laclau and Mouffe. The interventionism empowered by this 
real seeks to disrupt and undermine neoliberal bureaucracy – seen as an 
effect of the increasing transformative power of real abstractions – by 
radicalizing democracy as an end. The ‘real as artificial’ also has a strong 
foothold in the expanded field and relies on what we have termed 
fabstractions as developed by Deleuze and Guattari. 
 
Instead of abstracting historical tendencies into a formal paradigm to 
transcend them through the process of democracy, fabstractions are 
abstractions that cultivate historical readings of nature, politics, and the 
human by returning to such material and ‘fixing’ it. This fixing takes a creative 
ontological course of action by reconstructing the materials so as to bring 
thought, i.e. intellectual labour (second-order nature) and nature onto the 
same plane of being through desire as a force. Both these interventions then 
seek an ontological manifestation although on different grounds, one through 
the insertion of a historically abstracted formal mechanism of hegemony in 
the style of human rights, the other through the reordering of the place and 
status of intellectual labour on the plane of being itself. 
 
Fabstractions can be traced back to Deleuze’s conception of empiricism, 
which we can claim is specifically fashioned to warrant empirical awareness 
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in contexts where social exchange is dictated by the real abstraction of 
money, that is to say abstractions that emerge through social acts prior to 
thought and that cannot be empiricized. Such a conclusion can be arrived at 
from Deleuze’s various attempts at defining his empirical inclinations. The 
most straightforward appears in (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: vii) when 
Deleuze states: 
I have always felt that I am an empiricist, that is, a pluralist. But what does 
this equivalence between empiricism and pluralism mean? […] [T]he abstract 
does not explain, but must itself be explained; and the aim is not to 
rediscover the eternal or the universal, but to find the conditions under which 
something new is produced (creativeness). 
 
Tellingly, Deleuze – indirectly echoing Sohn-Rethel – goes on to explain that 
in the rationalist tradition in philosophy the abstract has the task of 
explaining. In this tradition the abstract is realized in the concrete. Such 
intellectual labour starts with abstractions (he mentions the One, the Whole, 
the Subject) and searches for “the process by which they are embodied in a 
world which they make conform to their requirements (this process can be 
knowledge, virtue, history . . .)”. Empiricism, says Deleuze, makes a different 
assessment: abstractions are not to be confirmed into the world, so to speak, 
but rather, we should start by “analysing the states of things, in such a way 
that non-preexistent concepts can be extracted from them”. What Deleuze 
means by the ‘states of things’ is the pluralism – in fact the multiplicity – of 
states in which things exist. The new ‘extracted’ concept must dovetail with 
the multiplicities that constitute the states of a thing; this means neither 
simply resisting totalization nor unification. Essentially for Deleuzian 
empiricism, multiplicity serves to identify a “set of lines or dimensions which 
are irreducible to one another”. 
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Everything is constituted through and by such sets of lines and dimensions. 
The extraction of empirically enabled concepts which correspond to a 
multiplicity is the labour by which we 
trace the lines of which it is made up, to determine the nature of these lines, 
to see how they become entangled, connect, bifurcate, avoid or fail to avoid 
the foci .These lines are true becomings, which are distinct not only from 
unities, but from the history in which they are developed. Multiplicities are 
made up of becomings without history, of individuation without subject (the 
way in which a river, a climate, an event, a day, an hour of the day, is 
individualized). That is, the concept exists just as much in empiricism as in 
rationalism, but it has a completely different use and a completely different 
nature: it is a being-multiple, instead of a being-one, a being-whole or being 
as subject. Empiricism is fundamentally linked to a logic - a logic of 
multiplicities (of which relations are only one aspect). (2002: viii) 
 
It is important to note how such ‘extracted concepts’ are connected to a 
process of tracing and tracking the multiplicity of dimensions and lines from 
which some ‘thing’ emerges but also reject a binding to the historical events 
through which the multiple lines forming the ‘thing’ might have been 
triggered. The journey of the multiplicities which constitute a thing – and the 
transformations, becomings, subjectivizations, and intersections which they 
go through – makes it illogical to abstract (here rechristened as extraction by 
Deleuze) the new concepts from the historical situations or struggles which 
initiated them. Here we can clearly see how Deleuze’s labour with abstraction 
is in opposition to Laclau’s understanding of ‘real abstraction’ which, as 
explained earlier, amounts to a form of intellectual abstraction. 
 
This is the manoeuvre through which Deleuze makes his empirical 
abstractions/extractions distinct, and is precisely why they can be identified 
as conforming to the model of ‘real as artificial’. Deleuze’s bet on the 
empirical is connected to his understanding of the multiple transformations 
things undergo, transformations that social acts of exchange play an active 
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role in producing. Deleuze’s formulation of empiricism is also fleshed out in 
Difference and Repetition (1994: preface, xx–xxi) where he expresses that 
philosophical writing ought to be conceived as “a very particular species of 
detective novel, in part a kind of science fiction”. What Deleuze is alluding to 
by citing detective novels is the formulation of concepts as a kind of 
intervention in order to “resolve local situations”. The practice of philosophy 
as a science-fictional detective novel means that interventionary concepts 
“must have a coherence among themselves, but that coherence must not 
come from themselves. They must receive their coherence from elsewhere”. 
And, according to Deleuze, this coherence from elsewhere is the secret of a 
new type of empiricism. Accordingly, we can speculate that Deleuzian 
empiricism receives its coherence from the real abstractions constituted by 
the acts of people and not their consciousness, this viewpoint can find 
support in the following passage: 
Empiricism is by no means a reaction against concepts, nor a simple appeal 
to lived experience. On the contrary, it undertakes the most insane creation 
of concepts ever seen or heard. Empiricism is a mysticism and a 
mathematicism of concepts, but precisely one which treats the concept as 
object of an encounter, as a here-and-now, or rather as an Erewhon31 from 
which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, differently distributed 'heres' and 
'nows'. Only an empiricist could say: concepts are indeed things, but things in 
their free and wild state, beyond 'anthropological predicates'. I make, remake 
and unmake my concepts along a moving horizon, from an always decentred 
centre, from an always displaced periphery which repeats and differentiates 
them. The task of modern philosophy is to overcome the alternatives 
temporal/non-temporal, historical eternal and particular universal. […] Neither 
empirical particularities nor abstract universals: a Cogito for a dissolved self. 
We believe in a world in which individuations are impersonal, and 
singularities are pre-individual: the splendour of the pronoun 'one' - whence 
the science-fiction aspect, which necessarily derives from this Erewhon. 
                                                     
31
 Deleuze is referring to Samuel Butler’s 1872 classic. The title Erewhon is derived from 
Nowhere spelt backwards but according to Deleuze is also meant to represent ‘here’ and 
‘now’. A Victorian satire, the novel depicts a utopian society opposite to that of England at 
the time and paints a different picture of evolution similar to that of Deleuze’s in which 
singular units such as living cells have the will and capacity to shape their environment.  
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What this book should therefore have made apparent is the advent of a 
coherence which is no more our own, that of mankind, than that of God or the 
world.  
 
What kind of world can be described as individuating through the impersonal 
and singularizing through the pre-individual? Is this the world of ‘real 
abstractions’ in which social acts of exchange acquire the power of ‘thought 
previous to and external to thought’? Or is it rather a world in which nature is 
philosophically constructed to counteract the seemingly deterministic 
implications of ‘real abstractions’? An argument could be made for the latter, 
but how is this philosophical construction of nature accomplished? 
 
Sohn-Rethel’s formulation of real abstraction was tethered to a historical 
materialist understanding of time; it depended on imagining an initial blank 
slate nature which evolves and accelerates into abstraction through the 
emergence of the money form as a vehicle for exchange that, metaphorically 
speaking, “invisibly rides the mind” even before the mind can think it. What 
Deleuze introduces is a particular conception of time that hosts both first-
order and second-order nature in a continuum. As Bryant (2009) articulates 
it, this re-conception of time is what allows Deleuze to reinvent Kant’s 
transcendentalism, morphing it into his own transcendental empiricism. The 
main move is to discredit Kant’s understanding of time as something imposed 
by the mind on intuitions and introduce a conception of time which is “not in 
the subject or mind”, but one within which both subjects and objects exist. 
This move shifts “time from the epistemic register where time is a condition 
for appearances to the ontological register where time is the condition of 
subjects, organisms, and things. Time consequently becomes a material 
reality, the material essence of beings, rather than a form imposed on 
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things”. This repositioning allows for a transmutation in the notion of agency 
in which the agent is both an intervener and part of this material reality, since 
the universe is nothing else but modifications, disturbances, and changes in 
tension and in energy. Bryant elaborates that Deleuze’s being within time 
does not imply that time is a kind of container, but rather that subjects, 
entities, and beings are “to be understood as being rhythms of duration”. 
 
This is time as the very material of being, which is apparent in Deleuze’s 
definitions of duration as naturing nature and matter as natured nature. Thus, 
there seems to be a correspondence between Sohn-Rethel’s ‘real 
abstraction’ in which incogitable social acts of exchange preceding thought 
end up conditioning intellectual labour, and Deleuze’s understanding of time 
in which subjects and entities are rhythms, which is to say flows of duration, 
in other words, a force of naturing nature. Exchange in the economic register 
has mutated into rhythm in the register of time, and what is more, it can be 
made sensible and affective32. 
 
It is in Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘artificial real’ that Sohn-Rethel’s ‘real 
abstraction’ finds a naturalistic mirror image almost constructed to sync with 
it, much like digital devices made by the same manufacturer sync with each 
other. This syncing seems necessary for any disruption, interruption, break, 
or change to occur. If we take the speculative licence to connect these 
thinkers, we can make the deduction that real abstraction – within the 
                                                     
32
 It is important to mention here how the Marxian notions of real abstraction and real 
subsumption posed the general problem which Deleuze and Guattari attempted to solve and 
were the girding of their philosophies, yet were radically transformed by the duo’s rootedness 
in other traditions. Negri (2008, in Casarino and Negri: 117) states that “Deleuze and 
Guattari thought within a Marxist domain, deployed their concepts in the context of a Marxist 
problematic—and yet such a domain and such a problematic were neither primary in nor 
internal to their intellectual formation. The sources of their thought were never Marxist […]”. 
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paradigm of the ‘artificial real’ - can only be disrupted within its own flow, 
within its own rhythm, through what Deleuze calls a superior empiricism, 
which he clearly associates with an aesthetics capable of sharpening direct 
intuition through an experience of the sensible: 
 
Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic 
discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can 
only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference 
and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity. It is in 
difference that movement is produced as an 'effect', that phenomena flash 
their meaning like signs. The intense world of differences, in which we find 
the reason behind qualities and the being of the sensible, is precisely the 
object of a superior empiricism. This empiricism teaches us a strange 
'reason', that of the multiple, chaos and difference (nomadic distributions, 
crowned anarchies). It is always differences which resemble one another, 
which are analogous, opposed or identical: difference is behind everything, 
but behind difference there is nothing. (Deleuze, 1994: 56 – 57)  
 
The claim here, read in-between the lines so to speak, is that the unempirical 
acts of exchange that inhabit our intellect through real abstractions can be 
countered and intervened upon by making sharper and more intense 
experiences of intuition through which “difference, potential difference and 
difference in intensity” are cognitively accessed. On accessing them through 
this superior empiricism, we transcend to the weird reason of multiple 
rhythms of chaos and difference in the universe, a kind of frontier which – 
now that we have zoomed in on it – reveals to us that difference is the 
instigator for everything, while nothing can account as an instigator for 
difference in the sense of its occurrence in nature. We can put forth some 
observations and linkages taking the latter passage as a starting point. 
Difference, multiplicity, and pluralism in Deleuzoguattarian interventionism 
are not played out as components in a world of political and cultural 
incommensurability, but rather as the rhythmic being of subjects, entities, and 
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beings in a univocal33 existence. Unlike agonistic interventionism or the 
interventionism of the differend, fabulatory interventionism is not premised on 
the epistemological gap between universals and particulars. This stands for 
two reasons, first and foremost because the Deleuzian ontology of the 
univocal is developed precisely to allow for thinking difference without the 
essentialism of identity, which is to say without difference slipping into the 
quagmire of those – echoing Mouffe’s previously mentioned articulation – 
“essentialist identities of a nationalist, religious or ethnic type”. 
 
This lurking essentialism haunted Lyotard’s differend and was transformed 
into a decisive component through ‘sublimination’ in Mouffian agonism and its 
adversary principle. We have none other than Michel Foucault (2001) to 
thank for this observation. Foucault points out that Deleuze’s “univocity of 
being, its singleness of expression, is paradoxically the principal condition 
which permits difference to escape the domination of identity, which frees it 
from the law of the Same […]”. Second, the gap between universals and 
particulars is also not exploited because the end of the Deleuzoguattarian 
intervention is not the radicalization of democracy but of nature itself, as 
Hallward (2006: 62) makes clear: 
Deleuze and Guattari will never stop inventing new mechanisms to undo or 
dis-organise the organism, to evacuate worlds, environments, territories, 
                                                     
33
 Hallward (2006: 8-9) presents a clear articulation of Deleuze’s univocity, the basic 
characteristic of Deleuzian ontology. In this ontological framework being is univocal “rather 
than equivocal or polyvocal. A univocal ontology declares that all beings 'express' their being 
with a single voice […] Thoughts and things, organisms and ideas, machines and sensations 
- they all are in one and the same sense of the word. All individuated beings contribute to 
one and the same activity and articulation of being”. Hallward (2006: 10) also makes an 
interesting point regarding the somewhat inadvertent theological undertones of this ontology: 
Deleuze annuls “the difference between God and world but he does this in favour of God, not 
world. More precisely, what he annuls is rather the world's own capacity to negate God, to 
say no to God, to hold God at a critical or interpretative distance from itself”. 
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species, and individuals of their actual or molar identity. The general goal is 
always a variation of the same effort – to make Nature operate in the only 
way it should: ‘against itself’. 
 
Here we have the overarching aim of the ‘artificial real’, an encapsulation of 
what fabulatory abstractions labour for, the pitting of nature against itself. 
This implies that despite escaping the Oedipal trap of the impossible real 
Deleuze and Guattari’s superior empirical intuited abstractions remain 
interventionist in the sense of disruption and interruption. However, this is a 
disruption which differs greatly from that of agonistics, whereas agonistics 
proposes an occupation through the (Lacanian) empty signifier of democracy, 
that disruptive emptiness is traded in for a disruption which fully embraces 
the creative potential of Nietzschean ‘powers of the false’. Flaxman (2011: 
xvi-xviii) develops a solid account of how Deleuze adopts Nietzsche’s ‘orphan 
concept’ raising it as his own and developing it into a properly philosophical 
problem, because “this concept designates the power of invention that 
conditions all concepts and all conceptualization”. Deleuze believes that 
falsification is already implied in the notion that truth is created. Thus the 
false – which is to say the artificial – overtakes signifiers, empty or otherwise, 
and requires an endless creation of concepts that have the dual 
characteristic of being rigorously formulated, yet essentially inexact. 
 
If agonism, building on the differend, depends on a refusal to be measured 
by a single measure of value, and seeks inventions that challenge the norms 
of ‘cognitive verification’. Then, Deleuzoguattarian fabulation seeks invention, 
or perhaps more specifically, creation, in the ceaseless permeation of the 
abstract concept of value with empirical assemblages of superior intensity. 
This intensity is due to the powers of the false, and fabulations depend on 
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this strange empiricism for their existence, in other words, they are released 
into the fabric of value to become. They have a particular mode of becoming 
which, as Bogue (2010) has noted, “is that of fashioning larger-than life 
images that transform and metamorphose conventional representations and 
conceptions of collectivities, thereby enabling the invention of a people to 
come”.  
 
The invention of a people to come is not on the radar for agonism. Its 
intellectual abstractions already contain the formal abstracted characteristics 
of its historical hegemonic agents, which are deposited as a trace into a 
simplified operational logic for present day democratic politics. This leaves it 
susceptible to an umbilical relationship with the parliament – understood as 
the space or final image of the real – which cannot be easily shrugged off. 
Rather, this relationship seems to be uncritically transferred to embryonic 
formulations of collectivism influenced by the agonistic discourse, OWS and 
affiliated movements being a case in point. This unshruggable image of 
parliament as real – via democracy as an empty signifier – seeps into the 
structurational logic of art. It reproduces itself across geographies and 
institutional forms and channels as an anticipatory “indeterminacy”34, to be 
made determinate in the mind of the subject encountering the art object or art 
experience. The unshruggable image of parliament is the relational 
                                                     
34
 Indeterminacy is Suhail Malik’s term for this typical feature of ‘contemporary art’. Malik  
(2015) writes “contemporary art depends upon its receiving subject, the addressee of the 
work who is taken to constitute it rather than arrive as late-comer after its production. Put 
colloquially, the art ’leaves space’ for the viewer, the viewer ‘completes’ the work”. 
Accordingly, it can be claimed that this indeterminacy to be completed by the subject 
experiencing the ‘art’, has its origins within – or is partially constituted through – the image of 
parliament as the real tied to art’s quest for a radical democracy as an end in itself.  
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conditioner that pre-formulates the addressee of  a work of art as an 
individual in the space of democratic decision thus facilitating the smooth 
passing of the agonist ideal of ‘radical democracy’ into the system. Thus, 
agonist interventionism retains the concrete space of liberal democratic 
parliament as a kind of imprint wherever it goes and whatever it does: if it 
were to attempt inventing a people to come, this invention would contain both 
deposits of abstracted historical hegemonic struggles and imprints of lived 
parliamentary democracy. Contra this interventionist end, fabulations act 
upon the real with the aim of perpetual metamorphosis, since the (artificial) 
real is understood as a dynamic durational continuity between physical 
space, natural processes, and the flows of capital. 
 
The parliamentary image that agonism cannot seem to get rid of is nowhere 
to be felt in Deleuzoguattarian interventionism – that is, intervention pivoted 
on the artificial real – and the work of artists who have taken up this model of 
intervention through their work. What this suggests is that fabulatory 
practices - in aiming to function as forms of determinate ‘Other-cide’35 - share 
some common ground with Beech’s notion of “critique as an institution in 
itself”. Roughly speaking, Other-cide is accomplished when actors or 
subjects produce according to desiring-production while overturning the 
structure-Other. Other-cide follows desire as a kind of duty or necessity, as 
opposed to the structure-Other which only allows us to function within a 
realm of possibilities that are preconditioned by the system within which we 
circulate. Our examples were: a) the classical Robinson of Defoe who, 
                                                     
35
 Other-cide is putting an end to the structure-Other, the ending – cide originates in the Latin 
cida, to kill or slay. As in suicide, sui being Latin for oneself.  
119 
 
despite the tumultuous experience of living in the absence of others on an 
island, was unable to break away from the structure-Other inhabiting his 
thought structure through language and the real abstraction of money, and b) 
Tournier’s Robinson who was able to commit this Other-cide through the 
perversion of introducing desire into the experience of living on the island 
without others. 
 
Thus, Other-cide is practiced through the introduction of desire (not 
necessarily sexual) into new realms of experience and the result, according 
to Deleuze (1990: 320), is a perverse world which he defines as “a world in 
which the category of the necessary has completely replaced that of the 
possible”. Other-cide is a form of determinate agency for Deleuze and in a 
sense it intersects with the basic premise of “critique as an institution in itself” 
since it jettisons what Beech (2007) noted was institutional critique’s 
tendency to perform a “fantasizing about what the institution looks like” and 
its opposite, a fantasizing about “what critique looks like”. Despite this 
intersection, Other-cide’s determinism depends on Nietzschean ‘powers of 
the false’ and forms of direct Avatar-like intuitive realisation which make it 
read as a mystical reformulation of Kant’s transcendentalism. This is due to 
Deleuze’s suspicion of reason and his dependence on the kind of rebellious 
“strange reason” he identifies as superior empiricism. 
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2.3 From Desiring-Production to Reason: The Question of   
Representing Abstractions 
 
Now that we have examined both the impossible and artificial real, this short 
section can be considered a juncture into the key notion of the synoptic real 
which will provide the basic premise for reimagining the function of pluralism 
and antagonism i.e. difference within the politics of the image. Beginning with 
a step backward, what is left to note about the artificial real and its Other-cide 
is that although they seem on first glance closer to the model we are trying to 
establish, they are disqualified for the main reason that Other-cide should not 
mean Community-cide, which is to say that as I hope to make clear, 
reasoning and intersubjective recognition remain the most convincing 
methods of establishing individuality in the world. Furthermore, in the escape 
of reasoning and intersubjectivity there is also an escape of antagonism 
which as I hope to show is interconnected to processes of social reasoning 
and not external to them. It is important to note a number of points here. 
Earlier, we came into contact with the idea of a ‘conservative pluralism’ which 
rested on the notion of cultural and political incommensurability. This 
incommensurability was essential for the functionality of the agonist 
argument since without it one could not arrive at a ‘conflictual consensus’ 
springing from adversarial politics. 
 
This is how difference is a necessity activating and structuring politics for 
Mouffe and Laclau. Although Deleuze’s univocal ontology allows for thinking 
difference without this essentialism of identity and his Other-cide calls for a 
quashing of the structure-Other through the introduction of desire into the 
productive space of experiences, difference in Deleuze’s interventionism 
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plays the role of the absolute necessity that cannot be reduced to a 
scientifically materialist explanation. As previously mentioned, for Deleuze, 
the state of things is always multiple and plural, difference is behind 
everything but nothing is behind difference and this is what for him ultimately 
supplies difference with the agency to abstract new concepts from an 
analysis of the state of things. The intellectual-fabulatory space is one where 
this intense world of differences can be mined, reformed, and recreated as a 
superior empirical encounter that can teach us the ‘strange reason’ of 
multiplicity, pluralism, difference, and chaos. This Deleuzian reason alludes 
to both the supposed necessity of molecular chaos and difference, and the 
supposed limit on knowing beyond the chaos of the molecular, the atom, and 
the difference behind every ‘thing’. 
 
The space of chaotic difference from which agency emerges is the 
Deleuzoguattarian ontological bulwark against the absolutism of ‘real 
subsumption’. But, the point here is that Deleuze’s ‘strange reason’ wants to 
avoid reasoning or more specifically classical rationalisms in the sense he 
describes when he elaborates on his empiricism, that is, rationalism as the 
realisation of the abstract in the concrete, and the search for the processes 
through which abstractions are embodied in the world. Because he wants to 
start the other way round, creating new concepts which function ‘within time’ 
as opposed to the timeless abstract concepts of rationalism, Deleuze 
reinvents the old metaphysical idea of substance36, rearticulating it as 
multiplicity, plurality, and difference. Difference is the substance of nature, 
the substance behind which we can find nothing. This basic Deleuzian 
                                                     
36
 This observation is Daniel W. Smith’s (2013) and due to Williams (2011).  
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articulation of difference, for Noys (2010: 53 – 65), amounts to what he calls 
the “positivisation of difference”. Noys points to how the reworking of Marxist 
thought in Deleuze has its power in the latter’s “articulation of the ‘economic’ 
as virtual ‘positivity’”. For Noys, this is what allows Deleuze to “give full 
ontological weight to the problem of real abstraction”. Noys argues that real 
abstraction is exactly what Deleuze and Guattari formalize in ‘their 
description of capitalism as an ‘axiomatic’ machine of de- and re-
territorialisation.’ The complication which occurs due to this is that “this 
positivisation of the economy gives capitalism a ‘full’ reality”. And, he goes on 
to argue that: 
Although the couplet de- / re-territorialisation provides perhaps one of the 
most powerful means for grasping the new articulation of capitalism, the 
conception of such a ‘structure’ as positive neglects the ‘creative destruction’ 
of capital, which operates by a ‘negation of negation’ that captures and 
integrates elements into new positivities of accumulation. […] [T]he couplet 
de- / re- territorialisation also fails to provide the interventional space of 
negativity to disrupt the capitalist re-composition of such positivities. Instead 
we are called, already, to an accelerationism that would exceed capitalist 
deterritorialisation in an ‘absolute deterritorialisation’. 
 
For the present purpose, I will not enter into a full discussion on 
accelerationism37 in both its recent and older post-1968 iterations. However, 
                                                     
37
 Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy (1974) and Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus (1972) have 
been recognized as early accelerationist works. In the 1990s, the work of Nick Land, Sadie 
Plant and a list of thinkers associated with the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit at Warwick 
University left a strong mark on philosophy by developing a distinctly nihilistic Deleuzian- 
Bataillean strain of thinking. More recently, new manifestations of accelerationism have 
divided opinion and have been contested by Noys, Shaviro, Wark, and others. In a critical 
account, Noys (2014) has portrayed accelerationism as a form of political thinking hooked on 
speed and supporting processes that push and aggravate capitalism to reach its extreme 
excesses. In the introduction to Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, Mackay and 
Avanessian (2014) summarize it as a heresy based on “the insistence that the only radical 
political response to capitalism is not to protest, disrupt, or critique, nor to await its demise at 
the hands of its own contradictions, but to accelerate its uprooting, alienating, decoding, 
abstractive tendencies”. For Mackay and Avanessian, there is an assertion that lies behind 
all accelerationist thought, namely that “the crimes, contradictions and absurdities of 
capitalism have to be countered with a politically and theoretically progressive attitude 
towards its constituent elements. Accelerationism seeks to side with the emancipatory 
dynamic that broke the chains of feudalism and ushered in the constantly ramifying range of 
practical possibilities characteristic of modernity. The focus of much accelerationist thinking 
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as we shall see, the notion features prominently in the discussion on the 
reality of abstraction, and the question of how to best represent abstractions 
and their possible interventionary role in capitalism and its financialization. 
 
Noys is dedicated to the project of conceptualising an “interventional space of 
negativity”, which, as he proposes, can disrupt the lopsided inclination to 
positivisation, production, and acceleration that the capitalist relation 
produces. But a further step is to think the interventional not as a space for 
and of negativity itself, but as a space for and of reasoning, a reasoning that 
is bound to the negative as in the famous Hegelian dictum of ‘the 
understanding’ which only proceeds by looking the negative in the face. The 
interest lies specifically in thinking how such an interventional enterprise can 
be represented and traversed utilizing the realm of images, sounds, objects, 
words, and performativity normally associated with art practice. This interest 
intersects with questions surrounding the emergence of a twenty-first century 
Prometheanism in theoretical discourse, particularly in its Marxist (post-2007-
2008 financial crash) frame of reference espoused by Alberto Toscano, and 
                                                                                                                                                      
is the examination of the supposedly intrinsic link between these transformative forces and 
the axiomatics of exchange value and capital accumulation that format contemporary 
planetary society”. Mohammad Salemy (2015) provides a short and clear depiction of 
divergent accelerationist thinking. Salemy states that the neo-rationalist line taken up by 
Reza Negarestani and Ray Brassier “represents the abandonment of the phenomenological 
binary of time and space, focusing instead on how insides and outsides are constituted 
through the movement and navigation of thought or cognitive resources of the collective 
general intellect”. Brassier’s work blends a particular continental metaphysics with the 
analytic tradition, especially the ‘naturalism with a normative turn’ of Wilfrid Sellars and the 
work of Robert Brandom. Salemy points to “another shade” of accelerationism that emerges 
from the work of Suhail Malik via his interest in the work of Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon 
Bichler. Salemy summarizes Malik’s work on this front as arguing that “acceleration should 
abandon Marxist notions of labour and production and utilize finance as a constructive 
technology towards a post capitalist future”. It could be argued that the term or label 
‘accelerationism’ reached its peak in 2014-2015, it is notable that the authors of the 
manifesto for accelerationist politics Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams in their book Inventing 
the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work (2015) make a conscious shift in their 
formulation putting more emphasis on a Laclau-based idea of hegemony, full automation, 
and a universal basic income and less emphasis on the term ‘accelerationism’ itself. 
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its transcendental realist formulation developed by Ray Brassier. My aim is 
not to embark on an analysis of these and other strains of contemporary 
Prometheanism but to traverse their philosophical underpinnings and 
theoretically roam through their territory, so to speak, all the while extracting 
ideas that will gradually accumulate to shape a concept of Postagonistics. 
What would this concept propose in terms of an interventional stance that is 
decidedly different from the intellectual abstractions of agonistics and the 
fabulatory abstractions of Deleuze and Guattari? 
 
Weighing in on the Manifesto for Accelerationist Politics developed by Nick 
Srnicek and Alex Williams in 2013, Brassier (2014) expands on what he 
regards as Srincek’s and Williams’s distinction between ‘epistemic 
acceleration’ and ‘political acceleration’. For Brassier, epistemic acceleration 
indicates conceptual abstraction i.e. knowledge, while political acceleration 
indicates social abstraction i.e. politics. The premise of the manifesto, 
according to Brassier, is that the feedback between social abstraction and 
conceptual abstraction can play “a positive emancipatory role”. We have 
seen how Deleuze and Guattari’s work enabled thinking a similar feedback 
through their adoption of the artificial real which in its bare scaffolding as a 
concept is their articulation of something like the political unconscious of real 
abstraction. Real abstraction through social acts of exchange or flows of 
capital already organizes the desiring force of the political unconscious. This 
‘desiring-production’ is made to contour with a conception of nature axised on 
duration as the impetus of a naturing nature, and material as the product of a 
natured nature. This contouring effectively collapses the thinking of 
knowledge and concepts as something other than forms of de- and re-
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territorialisation and grants the latter couplet unchallengeable political 
agency. According to both Brassier (2014) and Noys (2010), we are in the 
historic territory of a classical accelerationism38 that has vitalist39 tendencies 
and in which political agency was connected to “Aeolian40 processes of 
deterritorialisation and emancipation” that were “propelled by the 
metaphysics of desiring-production” (Brassier, 2014). But while for Noys, 
intervention lies in rehabilitating negativity and its role in politics against the 
forces of accelerationism, Brassier points to the rationalization of 
accelerationism as a process which would allow a more progressive version 
of accelerationism to develop. This version would employ negativity in the 
rationalizing process, rather than rely on the kind of affirmationism41 that is 
distinctive of classical accelerationism. He sees Srnicek’s and Williams’s 
manifesto as having already set off this process and thinks its significance 
                                                     
38
 Both Brassier (2014) and Noys (2010) mention a passage from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
Anti-Oedipus as holding the quintessential logos behind classical accelerationism: “But 
which is the revolutionary path? Is there one? – To withdraw from the world market, as Samir 
Amin advises Third World Countries to do, in a curious revival of the fascist ‘economic 
solution’? Or might it be to go in the opposite direction? To go further still, that is, in the 
movement of the market, of decoding and deterritorialisation? For perhaps the flows are not 
yet deterritorialised enough, not decoded enough, from the viewpoint of a theory and 
practice of a highly schizophrenic character. Not to withdraw from the process, but to go 
further, to ‘accelerate the process’, as Nietzsche put it: in this matter, the truth is that we 
haven’t seen anything yet.” 
39
 The evocation of forces distinct from purely chemical or physical ones when explaining the 
processes of life and functions of living organisms; the charge of vitalism is often levelled 
against Deleuze’s work in particular and is due to his usage of Bergsonian conceptions of 
time and evolution. 
40
 Brassier’s use of the term ‘Aeolian’ seems to be strongly connected to the ‘naturing nature’ 
and ‘natured nature’ of Deleuze’s philosophy in that it both evokes the ‘Aeolian harp’, more 
commonly known as the wind harp, an instrument built to create music by harnessing the 
energy of the wind. This evokes the difference in rhythm and types of winds that provide 
patterns of difference and repetition in sound for the instrument. It also evokes a vital god-
like force guiding the winds in Aeolus, ruler of winds in Greek mythology. 
41
 Affirmationism is perhaps best described and mapped out by Noys (2010: preface). Noys 
describes post-1968 (French) philosophy’s relentless commitment to the assertion of 
creativity, desire, and productive potential to the disadvantage of the negative, he states that 
“the politics and metaphysics of affirmationism are indicative of a response and resistance to 
the dynamics of contemporary neoliberal capitalism […] The wider tendency in 
affirmationism to ontologise resistance as a perpetually occluded actuality left that resistance 
all too vulnerable to the cunning of capitalist reason”. 
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lies in the idea of “an intervention into the politics of abstraction”, since they 
argue that “the representation of abstraction is not only unavoidable but 
necessary in order to mount an epistemic and political challenge to 
capitalism” (Brassier, 2014). Brassier comments that the necessity of 
representing abstraction does not guarantee the possibility that such 
representation will align itself with emancipatory action. What Brassier finds 
wanting in the manifesto is a “theory of totality” capable of clarifying the 
conditions “under which epistemic practices might be realised” with the view 
to an emancipatory politics. This resonates with Toscano’s (2011) definition 
of Prometheanism as the problem of “articulating action and knowledge in the 
perspective of totality”. But, what could this totality be? Brassier identifies this 
totality, for him simply put, it is reason. Prometheanism for Brassier (2015) 
lies in 
the attempt to eradicate the discrepancy between what is humanly made and 
what is nonhumanly given – not by rendering the world amenable to human 
whim or by merely satisfying our pathological needs, but by remaking our-
selves and our world in conformity with the demands of reason. 
 
It could be argued that reason in Brassier’s schema replaces and plays the 
role of desiring-production in Deleuzoguattarian philosophy, but this would be 
an oversimplification that would give us a distorted picture of Brassier’s 
thinking. However, it is worth noting the connection to the ‘artificial real’ in the 
first part of Brassier’s formulation: eradicating the difference between the 
human-made and the non-human given (i.e. nature) rings a Deleuzian 
metaphysical bell. It is in the second part – the conformity to reason – that 
Brassier completely parts ways with Deleuze. In general, Brassier’s work 
could be read as centred on the possibilities of a synthesis between 
epistemic and socio-political forms of acceleration. In other words, Brassier 
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attempts to develop a totality schema answering to how an alignment 
between abstract theoretical representation and social action ought to be 
accomplished. The aim, or end, is to achieve a spontaneity whereby thinking 
registers as a kind of doing rather than as a form of contemplation42. This, of 
course, presents us with the perfect philosophical background or the master-
idea behind what was earlier identified as Beech’s “critique understood as an 
institution in itself”. It could be said that Beech’s work as an artist uses text, 
image, and sound to depict a world-model in which subjects have either 
achieved this spontaneity or are embroiled in a process that stimulates and 
provokes it as an end. But returning to Brassier (2015), the question for him 
seems to be how to achieve this without what he calls the lure of 
reconciliation. The lure of reconciliation is what seduces Deleuze to develop 
his ontological framework in which he makes multiplicity and difference the 
substance of being, and places thinking on the same level as being itself. It is 
what leads him to claim that concepts are things in their free and wild state 
transcending their 'anthropological predicates'.  
                                                     
42 Brassier (2014) proposes adopting a (Wilfrid Sellars-inspired) reading of Kant’s 
‘transcendental spontaneity’ in which the faculty of apperception (or of recognition) exercises 
its freedom as a kind of spontaneity resulting from the human will’s acceptance of 
intersubjectively initiated rules. This understanding is opposed to understanding Kantian 
spontaneity as an eruption indifferent to external determination. Freedom in this sense, 
Brassier notes, “is not simply the absence of external determination but the agent’s rational 
self-determination in and through its espousal of a universally applicable rule”. It is notable 
that the use of the word ‘contemplation’ here does not mean ‘reflective thought’ as such, but 
more specifically thought as an engagement that seeks to pass beyond mental images, 
discourse, and concepts to a direct experience of ‘the real’. Brassier (2014) claims that 
contemplation is the “source of the human activities and practices that constitute the 
abstractions of capital”. Interpreting this rather ambiguous statement through Sohn-Rethel, it 
could be said that the abstractions of capital are accelerated through forms of 
‘contemplation’ that wish to access the real of the market, or simply the exchange 
abstraction, without doing cognitive commerce with the persons who enable it and are its 
support system.  
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This is in contradistinction to a discourse where concepts and things are 
divided, the trajectory that Brassier adopts. Deleuze’s transcendental 
empiricism, as we have seen, depends on abstracting non-preexisting 
concepts from the multiplicities and differences in the state of things, infusing 
being with thinking in a continuous de- and re-territorialisation. Roughly put, 
this, and Deleuze’s dependence on intuitional experience to access the real 
produce the theoretical consequence of reality turning into an expression of 
thinking. This reduction of reality to an expression of thinking might have 
been what Deleuze’s empiricism needed to establish in order to gain traction 
on the real abstractions which skip consciousness and disseminate through 
acts of exchange. The ‘will to power’ of creativity was ultimately Deleuze’s 
solution. But the ‘lure of reconciliation’ also has other dimensions in 
Deleuzoguattarian thought; one could say that the ontological model Deleuze 
uses is constructed from the onset to reconcile all being. This is the univocal 
ontology mentioned earlier, and in which “[a]ll that is can be said to be in 
exactly the same sense, all that can be said of being must be said in one and 
the same voice” (Hallward, 2003, italics in original).  
 
Expounding on the ideas Deleuze and Guattari develop in What is 
Philosophy? Hallward adds that 
if all that falls under the concept of being must be treated in the same way 
and said in the same voice, then the essential compatibility of art and science 
follows as a matter of course. (Artistic) interpretation and (scientific) 
explanation become aspects of one and the same ‘expressive’ project.  
 
And according to Hallward (2003), all of Deleuze’s work assumes this 
reduction of art and science to an expressive project. The reason for this is 
that it eliminates the epistemological grounding for their distinction, that is to 
129 
 
say “the difference between deduction and insight, between what can be 
demonstrated ‘objectively’ and what resonates ‘subjectively’, between the 
natural sciences and the human sciences, and so on”. 
 
What we have here is a counter-ontology that drops the distinctions between 
art and science, and by doing so manufactures a ‘strange reason’ that does 
the job of reconciling (and here let us recall Sohn-Rethel’s terminologies) the 
‘second nature’ of science with nature. Its job well done is to pre-emptively 
reconcile reason and nature. And we are given access to this reconciled 
expression through fabulations – intuitive experiences fashioned out of larger 
than life images. This is an example of the lure of reconciliation that Brassier 
warns of, and to rebut it he adopts Wilfrid Sellars’ synoptic model. In this 
model, reason labours to fuse two distinct and ideal conceptions of the 
human – each conception a kind of framework through which persons picture 
the world, their relationship with it, and place in it. Sellars calls these two 
distinct conceptions the manifest image and the scientific image of man-in-
the-world. And the horizon where reason is heading, so to speak, is what 
Sellars calls the stereoscopic vision or the synoptic vision in which these 
separate conceptions are to be fused in an ongoing process. This is the bare 
skeletal structure for the ‘synoptic real’ that Brassier adopts – influenced by 
Sellars’ special brand of scientific realism, a structure that, as we shall see, 
avoids the charge of ‘scientism’ through a complex elaboration of the function 
of reasoning in social life. This framework for ‘the real’ and what it affords art 
is what we will explore in the following chapter.  
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3. The Synoptic Real: Reasoning through Stereoscopy 
 
3.1 Homo Synopticus: The Manifest and Scientific Images of Human 
in the World  
 
Once the authority of science is established, it must be taken into 
consideration. We can go beyond science because of the pressures of 
necessity; however, it must be our starting point. We can affirm nothing it 
denies, deny nothing it affirms, and establish nothing which directly or 
indirectly contradicts the principles on which it depends. 
 
(Émile Durkheim, 1975: 160) 
 
 
To help establish a passage into the Sellarsian model, we can start by 
recalling Brassier’s suggestion that what rationalizing accelerationism 
required was a ‘theory of totality’, one that could shed light on the 
circumstances that shape the possibilities of epistemic intervention in relation 
to the social and political spheres. Brassier (2014) locates this totality in “the 
social realisation of cognition”, in other words, he seeks this totality in a form 
of realism that is capable of understanding the social dimension in the 
cognitive. 
 
According to McDowell (1998), Sellars’ central thesis is that “epistemic 
states” – i.e. any instance involving concepts and related to knowing or 
knowledge – cannot be understood as the realization or actualization of 
“merely natural capacities – capacities that their subjects have at birth, or 
acquire in the course of merely animal maturation”. Here, McDowell is 
presenting us with the gist of what Sellars is probably most well-known for, 
his attack on what he labelled the myth of the given. As O’Shea (2015: Kindle 
Locations 220-226) concisely puts it, the myth can be understood through 
Sellars’ assertion that the following argument is a crucial mistake: 
[S]ince not all of our knowledge can be derived by inference from prior 
knowledge ad infinitum, there must be some basic items of knowledge which 
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are simply ‘given’ in roughly the sense that they are (allegedly) known directly 
or immediately without presupposing our possession of any other knowledge. 
Such presuppositionless knowledge would constitute the given element in 
our knowledge, the rest of our knowledge being built upon that foundation.  
 
 
Toumela (1988) elaborates that the myth Sellars is concerned with entails 
that the world enables the production of knowledge (what Sellars calls 
epistemic states) without “active conceptual contribution by the knowing 
subject”. Toumela further remarks that following Sellars these supposed 
states of knowledge can be called “self-verifying” or “self-authenticating” 
states, since in complying with the myth we can “speak metaphorically of a 
mind's eye which has direct, concept-free access to universals”’ Toumela 
(1988) sums up the Sellarsian myth of the given in one sentence: it is the 
idea that we “can be engaged in non-conceptual but yet cognitive epistemic 
commerce with the world”. Sellars positions his philosophy strongly against 
such a framework of givenness, a framework he argues is common to what 
he regards as foundationalist approaches to the structure of knowledge. His 
aim was to contest foundationalism with his accounts of holism43 and 
fallibilism44. 
 
                                                     
43
 According to Mandik’s (2010) general definition, holism asserts that mental states such as 
thoughts and beliefs have their content in virtue of their relation to other mental states. The 
contents of one’s mental state concerning dogs may be constituted in their relationship to 
other mental states such as those concerning ‘mammals’, ‘domestication’, and ‘barking’. 
Thus a mental state with the content ‘dog’ is inferentially drawn from the premise 
‘domesticated barking mammals’. 
44
 The doctrine - due to the enquiry into epistemology by thinkers such as Hume, C.S. 
Peirce, J. Dewey, W. Sellars and others – that beliefs and views etc. can never be fully 
supported through rational justification in an absolutely conclusive way without a remainder 
of a doubt. Fallibilism must not be mistaken for scepticism however, while both might believe 
that there is no way to establish the absolute certainty of a truth proposition, sceptics would 
usually attempt to disqualify most truth propositions, while fallibilism, roughly speaking, 
would accept beliefs or truth propositions based on a process of reasoning not unlike 
rounding numbers in mathematics, taking the nearest possible explanation to be true until 
proven otherwise. 
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According to O’Shea, Sellars’ overall proposal is that “the whole structure of 
a conceptual scheme” eventually “meets the test of experience, and any 
belief or presupposition, whether it is an intellectual ‘first principle’ or a ‘direct 
empirical observation’, is open to rejection and replacement if an alternative 
conception and better explanation presents itself” (O’Shea, 2015: Kindle 
Locations 232-236). This framework for knowledge, in which things can be 
rejected and accepted based on better explanation, is what is referred to as 
Sellars’ explanationist epistemology, which, as O’Shea points out (2015, 
Kindle Locations 236-243), epitomizes Sellars’ “emphasis on the role of 
‘inference to the best explanation’ as the primary source of epistemic 
justification, whether such explanatory inferences are explicitly proposed in 
scientific theories or only implicitly available in our reason-giving practices in 
everyday life”. This is clearly pronounced in Sellars’ (1997: 76) often cited 
definition of knowledge: 
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of 
knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; 
we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able 
to justify what one says. 
 
. 
Rorty’s (1997) formulation of this is that “knowledge is inseparable from a 
social practice—the practice of justifying one’s assertions to one’s fellow-
humans. It is not presupposed by this practice, but comes into being along 
with it”. We might recall an earlier question here, the question of ‘what to do 
with science’, or how to place and give function to ‘the scientific’ within the 
design of a pluralistic system which art can imagine, mediate, picture, and 
contribute to. How does science come into this picture or model of ‘the 
synoptic real’ that insists on placing knowledge in the social space of 
reasons?  
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Sellars’ manifest image is often construed as representing the common 
sense understanding of the human relationship to the world. While it seems 
to operate as such in the overall structure of his philosophy and sometimes 
clearly indicates common sense thinking in his writing, it cannot be equated 
with a “pre-scientific, uncritical, naive conception”. Sellars (1963: 5-8) clearly 
states that the conceptual framework he identifies as the manifest conception 
of man-in-the-world is “itself a scientific image. It is not only disciplined and 
critical; it also makes use of those aspects of scientific method which might 
be joined together under the heading 'correlational induction'. What this 
means is that the scientific methods used within manifest thinking largely (but 
not solely) depend on the particular assumption that “what we know of 
anything is true only for us”.45(Bryant, 2014 emphasis in original) Or to put it 
otherwise, the methods used in such discourse assume that it is impossible 
to think a world in which human thought is not correlated to the 
anthropocentric narrative of humans in the world.  
 
Distinctively, and unlike Quentin Meillassoux’s attempt to dismantle 
correlationist thought, Sellars links the manifest image to what he calls “the 
perennial philosophy of man-in-the-world”. Following Sellars, this enduring or 
continually present conception, labelled ‘perennial philosophy’ has its roots in 
the Platonic tradition but has evolved and branched out to include much 
philosophical thought, greatly influencing how we encounter ourselves as 
agents in the world. It is a distorted image that continually ‘mislocates’ and 
                                                     
45
 Bryant (2014) further asserts that due to this, correlationism can be seen as kind of 
scepticism since ‘it asserts that whether or not things-in-themselves are this way is 
something we can never know because we can only ever know things as they appear to us, 
not as they are in themselves.’  
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displaces the scientific image – which broadly speaking is the image of the 
world populated and constituted by “swarms of colorless, imperceptible 
microphysical particles” (O'Shea, Kindle Location 641). But despite this 
Sellars contends that “man is essentially that being which conceives of itself 
in terms of the image which the perennial philosophy refines and endorses” 
(1963: 8, emphasis in original). The manifest image is a useful fiction and 
thus is “no mere fiction”. And unlike Spinoza, Sellars tells us that his aim is 
not to establish that the scientific image is true and that the manifest one is 
false. Sellars sees Spinoza as a thinker who also attempted to picture a 
stereoscopic view, but the concern for Sellars is that in this Spinozan view 
the manifest image appears to be dominated by the scientific one and ends 
up being depicted as a pattern of errors. Sellars’ usage of the analogy of 
‘stereoscopic vision’, whereby the manifest and scientific images are fused, 
does not imply the same fate for the manifest, but rather that, in his own 
words, “the manifest image is not overwhelmed in the synthesis” (Sellars, 
1963: 9). For Sellars, the manifest image is important because it is an 
achievement. His basic idea is to acknowledge and give form to a bi-
dimensional system or world view that is, like Deleuze’s, univocal, but unlike 
the latter does not fulfil this univocity through a restructured ontology but a 
rigorous account of the place and function of the manifest and scientific 
discourses within an overall epistemological framework. That is to say that 
within this epistemological structure there exist two philosophical models that 
are the manifest and scientific conceptions of man-in-the-world. Brassier 
(2007: 8) explains that what Sellars introduces is a comprehensive model 
which insists that philosophy should 
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resist attempts to subsume the scientific image within the manifest image. At 
the same time, Sellars enjoined philosophers to abstain from the opposite 
temptation, which would consist in trying to supplant the manifest image with 
the scientific one. For Sellars, this cannot be an option, since it would entail 
depriving ourselves of what makes us human. 
 
What this bi-dimensional system offers us is the bare minimum grounding for 
a totality schema premised on social interaction, reasoning, and cognition. It 
does this by reactivating ‘science’ as an image or conception that plays a 
particular role within a social theatre of reasoning. Wilson (2015) reminds us 
that “science is not the ‘real’ of philosophy”, and we can add that it is also not 
the ‘real’ of art. If this is the case then, why does Brassier (after Sellars) see it 
necessary to maintain an image of the world in which ‘the scientific’ is not 
placed into a conceptual playing field in which all conceptions of the world 
are absolutely equalized? Wilson (2015) explains the mechanism at work in 
this reactivation of science in Brassier’s thought when she notes that 
whilst science attempts to conceptualise the real qua real, it remains 
cognisant of the fact that these conceptualisations are never what the real 
itself is. It is precisely this acknowledgment (of the metaphysical discrepancy 
between concepts and objects, and thus, of the insufficiency of any 
conceptual schema) which forces the perpetual construction and revision of 
the latter, on behalf of the real itself. 
 
Science labours on behalf of the real, its conceptual labour depends on the 
awareness that its concepts are not things in the sense of being equal to ‘the 
real’, in clear contrast to Deleuze’s formulation. As a model of thinking, 
science conceptualizes the real by coming into being along with it. Its domain 
is the realm of causes or ‘the casual’ because it’s “coming into being along 
with the real” affords it the possibility to continuously refine its conception and 
depiction of the causes behind things. As Chodat (2008: 70) tells us, 
researchers in a laboratory obviously do not “simply stare harder and longer” 
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than the rest of us at whatever they are observing. Rather, what they excel at 
doing is developing theories designed to explain the past behavioural 
patterns of whatever they are observing (diseases, stars, or termites etc.) as 
well as predicting the future of such patterns. Herein lies the main difference 
between how the scientific image furnishes the world with concepts and its 
counterpart, the manifest image. It makes sense of the world through what 
Sellars (1963: 7) describes as “the postulation of imperceptible entities, and 
principles pertaining to them, to explain the behavior of perceptible things”. 
As Chodat (2008: 70) puts it, when scientists fashion their theories they are 
often led to 
postulate entities that are not evident to the senses endowed to us by 
evolution. We can’t lay eyes on a half-inch of gravity, and before astronomers 
had ever perceived Pluto, the planet was posited theoretically in order to 
account for perturbations in the orbit of Neptune. Moreover, such a 
postulational strategy can be used to tackle any and all ‘perceptible things’. 
 
For Sellars, the scientific image (which he often calls “theoretical discourse” 
because it postulates theoretical “imperceptible” entities) is not an auxiliary of 
the manifest image (which he often calls ‘non-theoretical discourse’ because 
it does not posit such entities). It also should not simply be considered a 
‘heuristic device’ for calculating the world and its human story. If we perceive 
science in such ways it is because we fall into the mistake of interpreting the 
scientific image based on the false perception that the difference between the 
scientific and the manifest is a substantive distinction between theoretical 
and non-theoretical existence. While in actuality we ought to understand it as 
a methodological distinction between theoretical and non-theoretical 
discourse. Both conceptions are discourses and Sellars’ rebuttal of the myth 
means that there can be no non-cognitive, non-linguistic conception of 
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conscious experience, all awareness for Sellars’ is laden with discourse 
(Crane, 2008). This serves as a reality-check presenting us with the 
conditions under which we can understand Sellars’ declaration that “in the 
dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of 
all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not”. 
 
Science’s function in the Sellarsian synoptic schema lies in the important 
distinction between causes and reasons. Here we can quote Thomas Bible, a 
fictional character (roughly based on philosopher of neuroscience Thomas 
Metzinger) in R. Scott Bakker’s novel Neuropath (2009). Bible’s lifelong 
acquaintance, neuroscientist Neil Cassidy, has discovered the neural 
correlates of consciousness; hence he has tapped into the ultimate casual 
domain of human subjective phenomena. But this discovery has turned 
Cassidy into a pathological villain-type. Human subjects under his hands 
seem to be merely puppets46 controlled by the neurological activity of their 
brains which we cannot account for in terms of reasons. Cassidy kidnaps 
people and alters their consciousness by tweaking the neural correlates and 
in the process the subjects often die. In the midst of this neurologically-
informed Frankenstein type thriller set in the near future, Thomas Bible 
(Kindle Locations 843-845) – commenting on the horrific crimes Cassidy is 
carrying out – says the following to a friend: 
Remember how I said science had scrubbed the world of purpose? For some 
reason, wherever science encounters intention or purpose in the world, it 
                                                     
46
 Gross (2011: 56) reminds us that “the ancient Greek word for marionette is neurospaston, 
‘pulled by strings,’ formed from neuron—used for sinew, tendon, nerve, the string of a bow or 
lyre—and spasma—a pulling, drawing, or convulsing, the root of ‘spasm’”. This intersection 
in the very etymology of neuroscience between freedom and control puts the novel’s 
character in a larger philosophical perspective and lends talk of cause and reason a 
dimension related to the question of freedom.  
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snuffs it out. The world as described by science is arbitrary and random. 
There’s innumerable causes for everything, but no reasons for anything. 
 
Here the dramatis persona is not merely ventilating his existential 
frustrations; rather, he is articulating what Sellars called the ‘clash of the 
manifest and scientific images’ of man-in-the-world. The world as described 
by science is purposeless, without reason and dependent on a fragmented 
overview of particular entities – such as neurons, quarks, and 
microorganisms – that seem not only disconnected from but threatening to 
the manifest world of human intentionality, rationality, meaning, free will, 
agency etc.  
 
Presumably, the neuroscientist in this novel has turned to criminality because 
he has let the scientific image rule over his actions, and his actions are 
bound to what is referred to as the domain of normativity. Normativity 
pertains to the way things ought to be as distinguished from the way things 
are (Mandik, 2010: 83), in other words, it is the question of what ought to be 
recognized in distinction to the question of what is. Science tells us what is 
through the said postulational strategies; the manifest is constructed by and 
through the normative. For Thomas Bible (perhaps the surname is not 
coincidental, since it might serve to represent a sense of ethics associated 
with religiosity) and his pitiless colleague Cassidy, this clash is referred to in 
other terms, namely as the semantic apocalypse. The claim seems to be that 
since science can describe the real, it debunks the fiction of the manifest 
image resulting in a reification of alienation between oneself (as a 
normatively constituted manifest image) and the world (as a scientifically real 
entity constituted through postulationary strategies). This alienation is 
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externalized in the extreme form of the destructive nihilism Cassidy inflicts on 
the world. Here, science is real and the manifest in its normative domain is 
false. In a strange way, this semantic apocalypse is a rupture or eruption 
much like Lyotard described his sublime pivoted on the negative axis of 
depicting “the unpresentable in presentation itself”: it asks us to ‘stop’ 
constructing and/or surrender to the fact that we do not have free will as 
commonly understood, because science has discovered who we really are. 
There is no shortage of works in the field of art that indulge us in ever 
complex forms of the sublime based on the growing database of scientific 
imagery and theories. Alternatively, we can ‘will to power’ and embrace the 
powers of the false, the intellectual trip Deleuze embarked on. 
 
But how might one acknowledge the authority of the scientific while going 
beyond it because of necessity, as Durkheim advised, or in Sellars’ more 
robust formulation: do justice to the perplexities that “spring from the attempt 
to take both man and science seriously” (Sellars, 1968: 1)? How can one still 
think in terms of intentionality, will, meaning, etc. and the real as described by 
science at one and the same time? How can one develop a constructive 
articulation of the relationship between natural science and the normative 
without succumbing to versions of the sublime or evocations of unjustifiable 
agency? An additional question, which will be explored later, is: how can we 
achieve this while thinking the reality of politics i.e. pluralism and the 
inevitability of antagonism? Sellars’ solution to the relationship between the 
natural and the normative is complex and multi-layered, but its gist is 
summed up succinctly by Jelača (2014): 
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Sellars’s response to this predicament is ingenious to say the least. The 
normative space of reasons is to be understood as causally reducible, but 
logically (conceptually) irreducible to the natural space of causes. Insofar as 
conceptual thought or the logical space of reasons has a material substrate 
from which it arises, there is nothing, in principle, preventing the natural 
sciences from exploring it. This is why, for Sellars, the normative is causally 
reducible to the natural. On the other hand, insofar as the space of reasons is 
essentially normative in character there is nothing, in principle, that the 
natural sciences can teach us about it.  
 
It is to be pointed out that Sellars’ deviation from Kant lies in supporting the 
idea that the natural sciences are capable of grasping knowledge of the real 
or the in-itself and are not merely sentenced to produce knowledge of 
appearances as in the Kantian paradigm: Sellars clearly refuses the Kantian 
stance which sides against the possibility of a knowledge exceeding 
appearances. And to reiterate, the stereoscopic view or what we can call the 
Synoptic Real is the bi-dimensional order capable of producing a holistic 
image of agents in the world by acknowledging on the one hand the rule of 
the scientific image over the “natural space of causes”, which can be 
understood as “the real order”, while on the other hand maintaining the rule 
of the manifest image over the “normative space of reasons”, which we can 
understand as “the order of knowing or the conceptual” (Jelača, 2014). In 
McDowell’s (1998) articulation, Sellars’ framework is based on drawing a line 
where “above the line are placings in the logical space of reasons’ and below 
the line are ‘characterizations that do not do that”. As McDowell explains, 
there is a temptation (this is the Myth) to presuppose that certain below-the-
line characterizations can fulfil tasks that in actuality can only be fulfilled by 
above-the-line characterizations in the space of reasons. The space of 
reasons is the socially constituted space in which the manifest image retains 
methodological primacy and practical reality. The scientific image, on the 
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other hand, can be identified as the realm of causation which has full 
ontological authority47. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
47
 This is based on a reformulation of Kant that is different to Deleuze’s. While Deleuze 
seemingly chose to reorder ontology so that concepts like things would be within time – as in 
a single duration, Sellars reworks Kant to naturalize consciousness without abolishing the 
distinction between the conceptual domain and natural causation. This philosophical 
conversation with Kant initiates Sellars’ system, this is apparent in a comment Sellars makes 
in his autobiography: “[H]ow could one appropriate Kant’s insights without sliding all the way 
into Kant’s own ‘transcendental idealism’? It wasn’t until much later that I came to see the 
solution of the puzzle lay in correctly locating the conceptual order in the causal order and 
correctly interpreting the causality involved” (cited in O’Shea, 2015: Kindle Locations 364-
365). 
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3.2 The ‘Space of Reasons’ and Some Characteristics of the 
Postagonistic Image 
 
On McDowell’s (1998) account, there is a strong correspondence between 
the Sellarsian image of a ‘logical space of reasons’ and the Kantian image of 
‘the realm of freedom.’ McDowell’s insight is that the way in which we can 
comprehend this correspondence is through the Kantian idea that ‘the 
conceptual capacities’ are most evidently employed in the exercise of 
judging. Judging is of course not the only mental operation in which 
conceptual capacities are actualized. But for McDowell, this does not prevent 
singling out judging as the “paradigmatic mode of actualization of conceptual 
capacities, the one in terms of which we should understand the very idea of 
conceptual capacities in the relevant sense”. 
 
Through its insistence on resisting any easy reconciliation between the 
manifest and the scientific, and an insistence on the: a) bi-dimensionality of 
‘the real’, b) the activation of the scientific image as a measure of what exists 
ontologically speaking, c) the refinement and enhancement of the manifest 
image along similar lines to the postulational strategies of scientific thought, 
Sellars’ model opens the door to a basic space – the logical and social space 
of reasons – in which the practice of judging can be engaged with socially 
and politically without the domination of the aesthetic. From this perspective, 
art ought to exploit the idea of this space and play an instrumental role in its 
institutionalisation, politicization, progression, and revision by materializing 
representations based on the synoptic system’s articulation of the world, 
embedding them into the representational economy of art. The efficacy of 
adopting this model of the real can at least be put to the test if art fosters it as 
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an alternative to the agonistics and transcendental empiricisms that seem to 
shape the prevalent political positions pertaining to intervention in 
contemporary art production. McDowell (1998) shows us why embracing the 
particularity of judging implies important socio-political consequences, when 
he informs us that judging or 
making up our minds what to think, is something for which we are, in 
principle, responsible something we freely do, as opposed to something that 
merely happens in our lives. Of course, a belief is not always, or even 
typically, a result of our exercising this freedom to decide what to think. But 
even when a belief is not freely adopted, it is an actualization of capacities of 
a kind, the conceptual, whose paradigmatic mode of actualization is in the 
exercise of freedom that judging is. This freedom, exemplified in responsible 
acts of judging, is essentially a matter of being answerable to criticism in the 
light of rationally relevant considerations. So the realm of freedom, at least 
the realm of the freedom of judging, can be identified with the space of 
reasons. 
 
This emphasis on judging in the synoptic model of the real is important on a 
number of accounts, not least of which is how it fares in comparison to 
Deleuze’s model. Jelača (2014) characterizes Deleuze’s philosophical 
adventure as one in which the philosopher tries “to escape the norm-bound 
world of judgment and representation”. For Jelača, the Deleuzian search for 
a transcendental empiricism or ‘an other knowledge’ is exactly this attempt to 
escape judging and representation. Nevertheless, Deleuze and Sellars share 
some similarities, most importantly their refusal of Platonism. But it is in how 
these two exceptional philosophers respond to the challenge that Deleuze 
poses, in the question “what is meant by the overthrow of Platonism?” 
(Deleuze, 1983), that we can also differentiate between them and evaluate 
our position regarding models of ‘the real’. In Platonist realist-idealist 
ontology there are universal abstract entities that constitute the only reality 
there is. These abstract entities are instantiated by particulars, ephemeral 
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perceptible things. For the Platonist, spatiotemporal objects – in a world of 
appearances and empirically present phenomena – participate in 
instantiating the universal abstractions in any particular perceptible instance. 
In other words, the particular, in one way or another, carries the universal. 
Deleuze writes that abolishing Platonism seems to mean scrapping “the 
world of essences and the world of appearances” (Deleuze, 1983). 
Platonism, Deleuze informs us, labours “for the triumph of icons over 
simulacra”. 
 
For Deleuze, the Platonic model of the real is Sameness, which he identifies 
as the sense in which Plato “speaks of Justice as nothing other than 
justness”: justice then is an iconic copy defined by its relation to a ground or 
model called justness. But for Deleuze, Plato’s system is unbearably 
hierarchical and confined to representation and the distinctions between 
essences and appearances, models and copies. These distinctions only 
operate in the world of representation; Deleuze’s ambition is “the subversion 
of this world”. And for this subversion of representation, he enlists the 
concept of ‘simulacrum’. He seems to be hinting that the Platonic tradition 
cannot account for the simulacra that populate contemporary life. The 
simulacrum is perhaps an alternate naming for the ‘real abstraction’ 
unleashed through social exchange in advanced capitalism. The simulacrum, 
Deleuze informs us, is not a “degraded copy”, on the contrary, it contains “a 
positive power which negates both original and copy” as well as “model and 
reproduction”. What is distinctive about simulacra is the loss of these 
distinctions. So Deleuze’s stated mission of overturning Platonism can only 
be achieved by elevating the simulacra, “to assert their rights over icons or 
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copies”. Although the simulacrum might not be identical to real abstraction, it 
does have the same classic accelerationist ring to it, since due to the 
operation of the simulacrum 
[s]election is no longer possible. The nonhierarchical work is a condensation 
of coexistences, a simultaneity of events. It is the triumph of the false 
claimant […] (who) cannot be said to be false in relation to a supposedly true 
model, any more than simulation can be termed an appearance, an illusion. 
Simulation is the phantasm itself, that is, the effect of the operations of the 
simulacrum as machinery, Dionysiac machine. It is a matter of the false as 
power, Pseudos, in Nietzsche's sense when he speaks of the highest power 
of the false. […] The simulacrum, in rising to the surface, causes the Same 
and the Like, the model and the copy, to fall under the power of the false 
(phantasm). It renders the notion of hierarchy impossible in relation to the 
idea of the order of participation, the fixity of distribution, and the 
determination of value.[…] Far from being a new foundation, it swallows up 
all foundations, it assures a universal collapse, but as a positive and joyous 
event … (Deleuze, 1983) 
 
Here again is the positive joyous event of desiring-production, the desiring 
machine which this time takes the name simulacrum and retains its complex 
love-hate relationship with Lacan in the form of jouissance revitalized, but 
without the parochial constitutive lack. Most importantly, however, although 
Deleuze negates Platonic dualities and establishes an anti-foundationalist 
structure, he retains the platonic distinction between the sensible (that which 
can only be sensed by the senses) and the intelligible (that which can only be 
understood by the intellect). There is one univocal world, and these 
apparently markedly different realms of the sensible and the intelligible are 
within it and within one duration but are to be understood as two aspects of 
this same world: below sit the intelligible, universal, virtual, transcendental 
ideas and above surface the sensible, singular, actual, and empirical 
individuals . And since overthrowing Platonism for Deleuze means subverting 
the world of representation, he calls for the necessity of “an other 
knowledge”, which, as Jelača (2014) informs us, is a type of knowledge 
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supposedly capable of apprehending directly the intelligible Ideas, but also of 
creating the concepts identical to the sensible individuals. These two 
dimensions of knowledge, the intuitive and the creative, are not to be 
conceived as distinct, but as […] two aspects of a single principle governing 
thought. Once again, Deleuze’s account of thought follows from his account 
of being. In line with his affirmation of the univocity of being, Deleuze 
believes that if we are to affirm the being of thought, being has to be said of 
thought in the same sense in which it is said of everything else 
 
Because of this stance on direct apprehension of the sensible coupled with 
the privileging of the creation of concepts equal to the sensible empirical 
realm of experience. And since in Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical 
framework in which science and artistic expression are both part of an 
‘expressive project’ in one ontological plane. The Deleuzoguattarian ideal of 
intervention falls into the Sellarsian myth of the given: it does this in its 
attempt to avoid Platonism. Deleuze and Guattari focused on developing 
concepts (through images, performative gestures, speech, sound etc.) which 
would act as simulacra to be sensed by the viewer. As Deleuze states, this is 
to “apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed”, this is 
because according to (Deleuze, 1994: 56–57) works of art leave “the domain 
of representation in order to become ‘experience’, transcendental empiricism 
or science of the sensible”. If we follow the Sellarsian definition of what it is to 
know, such art as ‘a science of the sensible’ or a becoming-experience does 
not correspond with a definition of knowledge, unless one is prepared to 
defend the problematic claim that direct ‘apprehension of the sensible’ is 
knowledge. It is perhaps awareness, and one could definitely argue that 
awareness is a type of knowing. But if it is, it still misses what is distinctive 
about knowledge from Sellars’ point of view, which is that everything is 
necessarily open to explanation and epistemic enquiry through postulation 
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and that this is what propels knowledge forward. We will return to how 
Sellars’ deals with the question of abstract entities and Platonism later. 
 
For now, the question we are concerned with is how an art – that in one way 
or another generates images, assumes spatial relationships in 
institutional/public spheres, runs through time (time-based media), produces 
sounds, develops texts, and articulates itself through forms of performativity – 
might contribute to the problem of “articulating action and knowledge in the 
perspective of totality” through these very same resources. And from what we 
have come to unravel, ‘the impossible real’ and ‘the artificial real’ refuse 
thinking in relation to totality, and articulate action with the ends of 
radicalizing democracy or realizing an Other-cide dependent on the senses 
and tied to a creative desiring-production. 
 
For the sake of our argument regarding models of the real and concepts of 
intervention, a major point of contestation concerning the Deleuzian model is 
that it suggests that knowledge can be achieved through direct apprehension 
in the sensible. The result of fully embracing or adopting the entire premise of 
Deleuzian science or ‘strange reason’ is that it automatically cancels out the 
possibility of a whole range of processes pertaining to the practice of judging 
– making our minds up as the realm of freedom. The implications of this are 
that the art project produced in full compliance with this model cannot carry 
the motto of a realist politics, which is to say it cannot accept antagonism as 
a strong characteristic of thinking and doing politics. This is because it 
favours direct apprehension over discourse, and attempts to bypass what we 
might call the image of discourse – any image representing forms of 
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interaction that take reasoning to be central to knowledge acquisition – in its 
transcendental empiricism which is supposed to give the viewer direct access 
to knowledge. From what has been put forth so far, an outline for a 
hypothetical scientifically-realist political image can be drawn. That is to say 
we are in a position to begin articulating what can be called the postagonistic 
image. 
 
What kind of general profile or specifications should such an image have? It 
can be claimed that this image or artwork should be realist in two converging 
ways. This twofold realism means that it should be capable of representing a 
realist understanding of politics in the sense of holding that antagonism is 
part and parcel of political narratives in the world, i.e. part of the manifest 
image and common sense discourse. Second, it should be realist in the 
sense of being able to account for a mind-independent world, i.e. the 
scientific image of humans in the world. Importantly, the suggestion is that 
antagonism in such a twofold image should not be sublimated with the aim of 
its modification towards the goal of radical democracy. This is because such 
modification implies – in Mouffe’s own vocabulary – antagonism’s ‘taming’ in 
accordance with her vision of an agonistic pluralism, thus making such 
domesticated antagonisms the pre-constituted rule for a pluralist politics. As 
an alternative to this, antagonisms can be put to work in an image of 
intersubjectivity heading toward a horizon of knowledge.   
 
Thinking in terms of postagonistics implies that antagonism springing from 
the pluralism of political world views can be capitalized on as a component of 
discursive engagement in a theatrics of reasoning. Such theatrics of 
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reasoning would present an alternative to, on the one hand, the intuitive 
sensing of what is presumed beyond discourse and reason in the 
Deleuzoguattarian model for tapping into difference and the plural, and on 
the other, the overemphasis on identities tethered to a meta-individualist 
understanding of the socio-political collective subject. Such an image would 
highlight that antagonism is not outside the space of reasons but takes its 
course within it, as the idea that pluralism and the antagonism it ensues are 
intertwined with the practice of judging. This postagonistic realist image 
would propose a picture of interactive rationalizations as reason-giving 
descriptions which have to do with providing justification rather than 
identifying causation (Chodat, 2008: 42). As Chodat observes, the latter 
sense of reason-giving as identifying causes is a problem we often encounter 
in Freudian accounts of the subject, resulting in the blurring of reasons and 
causes. Adhering to the Sellarsian synoptic model enables the image to 
pursue reasoning as the practice of justification and judging while accounting 
for the causal realm through the scientific. 
 
With this, the postagonistic image joins the contemporary conversation on 
agency indicating that its inclination is to define an “agent” as the “sort of 
entity whose behaviour is efficiently and effectively captured in such reason-
giving terms” (Chodat 2008: 42). This amounts to drawing the McDowellian 
line between reason-giving placings and causal characteristics, situating the 
former above the line and the latter below it, which is to say with Chodat 
(2008: 42) that unlike “hydrogen molecules, tectonic plates, and planetary 
bodies” an agent cannot effectively and efficiently be described by 
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nomological48 theories, since such entities move while the agent acts. 
Essentially, however, the agent’s acts or actions are not voluntaristic: this is a 
major if not the major distinction between the postagonistic image of the 
political agent subscribing to the synoptic real and its counterpart, the 
agonistic hegemonic agent. 
 
This distinction calls for some clarification. Voluntarism is a particular 
understanding of freedom. Its perspective is that freedom is the hallmark of 
an act of will practised by ‘a self’. Consequently, for the voluntarist, freedom 
cannot be associated with a self nor an act “determined by antecedent 
causes” (Brassier, 2013). According to voluntarism, the act arises out of 
nothing or ‘ex nihilo’, meaning that it cannot be determined in any sort of way 
by its material substrates, i.e. its natural physical processes. Freedom in the 
form of voluntarism is the product of the will turned into a supernatural force 
powered by a sovereign self. As a result, freedom is conceptualized as the 
quality of determinacy forged by a self. In this way, freedom is 
problematically metaphysical because it conjures up, even if it refuses to 
mention them, entities or forces that either invoke vitalism or refute the 
materialistic causes of being in the world (Brassier, 2013). 
 
Mouffe and Laclau’s version of action based on the concept of hegemony, as 
exemplified in the more compact Mouffian theory of agonism adopts an 
“absolute voluntarism” (Rustin, 1988). Following Rustin, hegemony which can 
be said to be the ‘mother theory’ for agonism contributed a paradigmatic shift 
in theory. This is because it altered the grounds for analysis moving from 
                                                     
48
 Relating to or expressing basic physical laws 
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complex structures in which ideology is but a moment, to discourses that 
paint ideology as everything and in which the idea of an external reality to 
ideology constraining social consciousness is completely denounced. Mouffe 
and Laclau’s abomination of the idea of scientific knowledge as a grounding 
to political practice, even if this grounding is partial, leads them to refute “the 
theory that mental phenomena are constrained within limits set by the 
material world” (Rustin, 1988). 
 
The distinction between discursive and non-discursive practices is also 
rejected in their vast attempt to overhaul theory and position it within the anti-
foundationalist camp. But this overhaul leads them to assert that, since any 
external reality is only accessible through its construction in discourse, this 
means that their work is to attend to forms of thought that articulate social 
practice and step away from attempts to ground politics in analyses of 
objective conditions. Another way of looking at the Mouffe-Laclau argument 
for a radical democracy based on hegemony and agonism is that the 
manifest image,and therefore, the image and representation of the political, is 
the only thing in politics that counts. But the consequence is that what is 
supposed to be the space of reasons, with its emphasis on judgement and 
justification, is understood and represented as a wholly voluntaristic space of 
freedom. This voluntaristic image of freedom seems more in sync with the 
neoliberalism that Mouffe claims agonistics plays a part in curbing than it is 
with any notion of collective subjectivity. As Rustin (1988) argues, a political 
theory concerned with the latter is “essentially neither a determinism nor 
voluntarism”. Rather, it is premised on the dual search for knowledge of the 
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“structures which constrain action and a commitment to modes of action 
which can bring freedom”’ 
 
In Rustin’s view, Laclau and Mouffe are in effect claiming that political action 
– generated through a voluntaristic understanding of freedom – eclipses 
political theory: they are rejecting the very idea of testable explanatory theory 
in its entirety. The claim is that since theories cannot account for the 
abundance of potential meaning and viewpoints in the world, then such 
theories can only be misrepresentations and ideologically driven bids to force 
the closure of what is actually the ever indeterminate situation of politics. And 
since there is no independent external reality by which such theories can be 
evaluated on a rational basis, then ‘reasoning’ ought to be taken out of the 
picture, thus demanding that democracy be structured on incessant 
contestation alone. Indeed, politics may largely be driven by irrational 
commitments and ideals, but to insist that since this is the case the entire 
political edifice ought to be built on institutionalizing such commitments and 
ideals alone, and furthermore, that such institutionalization is the only way to 
better democracy, is to already envision and predict that members of the 
species will never be capable of understanding their ‘selves’ as anything 
other than voluntarist agents.  
 
The discussion about acts and how to properly classify them while taking 
science seriously, in addition to questions regarding how to rationalize the 
notion of agency, can broadly be thought of as a response to two connected 
problems. First, modern advances in neuroscience have made it clear that 
the manifest understanding of agency as emerging from a ‘will’ bound to a 
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‘self’ is erroneous. If ‘selves’ as testable entities are not necessary for 
scientific research, then how can an act be a voluntaristic eruption due to a 
‘will’ connected to a sovereign self? This point is clarified by Metzinger (2011) 
in the following: 
 
[T]he process of generating and testing new hypotheses in empirical 
research programs investigating self-consciousness, agency, social 
cognition, etc. simply does not require the assumption of a theoretical entity 
by the name of 'the self'. Science can achieve its predictive success, 
describe and explain the available data, and integrate them into a larger 
evolutionary or neuroscientific framework without assuming that there is a 
mysterious thing called 'the self ' which is represented in self-consciousness, 
initiates actions, or engages in social cognition related to other mysterious 
individuals called 'selves'. 
 
The second problem we face regarding agents and their acts concerns the 
capacity to intervene into the capitalist relation. Broadly speaking, within the 
Marxist trajectory, it is a fairly established idea that exchange value has 
hierarchy over use value (Kauffman, 2007). This, in combination with the 
transpiring real subsumption of labour, has resulted in philosophical concepts 
of intervention which – in order to subvert, rupture, or gain traction on these 
processes – require positing a force or will-like entity that in one way or 
another breaks through the conditions construed by the capitalist relation. 
This occurs despite acknowledging as the discussion group Endnotes have 
notably done that what “we are is, at the deepest level, constituted by this 
relation, and it is a rupture with the reproduction of what we are that will 
necessarily form the horizon of our struggles” (Endnotes, cited in Brassier, 
2014). But as Brassier points out in the same essay, despite the accuracy of 
this position, the problem then becomes how to establish this “rupture with 
the reproduction of what we are’”or more accurately from where will this 
rupture emerge if we are at our deepest levels shaped by the capitalist 
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relation? Either there is some ‘inner part’ of the collective subject in this 
depiction which is untouched by the relation, or the theoretically strong 
argument about breaking with the reproduction of what we are as a necessity 
for ending the relation has the unwanted side-effect of the subject’s suicide, 
which Brassier appropriately labelled “the paradox of self-abolition”. The 
problem thus posed leads to two possible solutions, either self-abolition in the 
name of capital or the lesser of two evils, voluntarism, which scientifically 
speaking has no basis. Brassier’s analysis of Endnotes’ position is that after 
recognizing that they were heading toward the paradox of self-abolition, the 
writers posit a voluntarist-like force to escape it. 
 
Confronted with the question of how to develop a materialist-realist 
articulation of agents and their acts in light of continuing neuroscientific 
progress on the one hand, and the problem of thinking intervention while 
recognizing the deep entanglement of the contemporary subject and the 
capitalist relation on the other, Brassier looks to Sellars for insight on what an 
act is. He investigates the conditions of the possibility for an act to propel 
itself forward without the requirement of voluntarism. And this leads him to 
adopt the Sellarsian distinction between two different orders of behaviour 
which come together in the ability to act. According to Brassier (2013), the 
ability to act is composed of: 
a) pattern-governed behaviour which is prevalent in the “biological and 
physical realms”. There is no intentionality involved at this level since it is 
recognized that physical systems “realize complex patterns without intending 
them”. Patterns are propelled by bit-parts, that is to say by the components 
that constitute such a physical system, but the constitution process itself is 
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activated by something with no mind to speak of, evident for example when 
we look at the inner structure of mitochondria; 
b) rule-conforming behaviour which is associated with the acquirement of 
language and thus the capacity to form rules for and infer rules from 
language(s), hence the faculty of reason or rationality. 
 
As Brassier (2013) explains, what we understand to be an ‘act’ is the result of 
the superimposition of rule-conforming behaviour onto pattern-governed 
behaviour. The act thus defined is then the product of the complex layering of 
these two levels of behaviour, but cannot be reduced to either the layer 
governed by patterns or the one related to rules. But besides the rejection of 
voluntarism, what is Brassier’s motivation for bringing into the sphere of art, 
politics, and the economical this Sellarsian perspective on what constitutes 
an agential act? We are informed in another text that it is because he wants 
to 
maintain the exceptional status of reason and insist on the “unnatural” nature 
of our rational capacity without lapsing into a metaphysical dualism of the 
mental and the physical […] but also without attributing to it (rational 
capacity) a supernatural origin. This distinction between rule-obeying activity 
and pattern-governed behaviour disqualifies the claim that markets think or 
dynamic systems reason. Rule-following is pattern-governed but not every 
pattern incarnates a rule. (Brassier, 2015, emphasis in original) 
 
So if we follow Sellars’ synoptic view along a similar vein to Brassier, we 
reach a position in which the ‘unnatural’ nature of the rational capacity is 
espoused because science is rational on account of its capacity to postulate 
imperceptible entities in order to explain perceptible things. And while 
pattern-governed behaviour (physical/biologically constituted behaviour) 
enables this unnatural capacity, it is the social dimension of rule-following 
behaviour that propels reason and enables it to supervene on the pattern-
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governed behaviour. There is a hazy resemblance between Sohn-Rethel’s 
vision of intellectual labour – having evolved through the route of socially 
constituted exchange abstraction, his ‘second nature’ – and ‘the unnatural’ 
nature of rational capacity that Brassier posits through Sellars. Although a 
full-fledged comparative analysis is likely to be unrewarding because of the 
gulf separating the philosophical trajectories of Sellars and Sohn-Rethel, we 
can at least point out an important distinction. There is a complete absence 
of an economic or an economic exchange factor in the Sellarsian route, and 
as we might recall, the weight that Sohn-Rethel puts on the exchange 
abstraction’s hierarchy over forms of labour leads to the idea that the content 
of thought, philosophical and/or scientific, is shaped by this exchange. This 
articulation mirrors what the unconscious is in various post-1968 continental 
philosophies, the exchange abstraction is the thought previous to and 
external to the thought, the already existent set of desires which are 
constituted through flows of exchange. The important misstep in Sohn-
Rethel’s formulation is to think that manual labour is somehow the natural 
form of labour, while imagining that cutting out the exchange abstraction 
leads to a science and an intellectual labour that are in sync with nature and 
thus do not stimulate alienation. 
 
If this were the case, as has been already pointed out, socialist projects that 
suppressed the exchange abstraction and were dependent on mass 
industrialised forms of manual labour would meet the requirement of a non-
alienated mode of community led by a brand of scientific thought which is not 
related to the exchange abstraction or the commodity form. Instead, 
alienation registers as an unavoidable dimension of such projects. With 
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Sellars, and even more so with Brassier, we get the idea that 
science/intellectual labour and alienation are not only necessary bedfellows, 
but that intellectual labour is driven by alienation. And this runs in the 
opposite direction of Realabstraktion-based philosophies, because in the 
paradigm of the synoptic real it is conscious agents who, in the quest for 
knowledge and perhaps their desire to solve the problem of alienation, 
necessarily posit alienating assertions to be corrected in a reason-giving 
community. Thus to sift and separate abstraction and alienation seems a task 
that philosophy – and art in the broadest sense of manufacturing and 
mediating images – ought to rethink along the lines of Sellars’ (1975) famous 
suggestion that the ideal aim of intellectual labour, which is to say 
philosophizing, is to 
become reflectively at home in the full complexity of the multi-dimensional 
conceptual system in terms of which we suffer, think, and act. […] 
‘[R]eflectively’, because there is a sense in which, by the sheer fact of leading 
an unexamined, but conventionally satisfying life, we are at home in this 
complexity. It is not until we have eaten the apple with which the serpent 
philosopher tempts us, that we begin to stumble on the familiar and to feel 
that haunting sense of alienation which is treasured by each new generation 
as its unique possession. This alienation, this gap between oneself and one's 
world, can only be resolved by eating the apple to the core; for after the first 
bite there is no return to innocence. There are many anodynes, but only one 
cure. We may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize. 
 
In connection with this, we can understand why for Brassier (2014b) 
intervention must not be understood in relation to circular definitions of real 
abstraction, in which the reality of abstraction is explained in terms of its 
tendency to be casually effective while at the same time interpreting causal 
efficacy as anything capable of making a difference in reality. For Brassier – 
because of how alienation is intertwined with knowledge – this is clearly a 
deficient ‘all too easy’ way of making sense of intervention in relation to the 
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reality of abstraction. Once we become of aware of this intertwinement, there 
is nothing we can bring up as decisive proof of the separability of the 
concrete and the abstract. And for Brassier, this was the main point behind 
the myth of the given that Sellars argued against. Once one is able to 
recognize that there is no (epistemological) given, one can begin to 
understand that ‘nothing is either abstract or concrete in itself’. 
 
Nothing in immediate experience helps us to make a distinction between the 
abstract and the concrete, since what appears immediately concrete is 
constituted through forms of abstraction. What this amounts to is an 
understanding of alienation as the gap between oneself and one's world, a 
“constitutive fissure of self-estrangement” whereby sensations (below the line 
characteristics) are conditioned by conception (above the line placings in the 
space of reasons). If we take this to be true, then alienation is an elemental 
dimension of rational agency and thus a necessary condition of freedom. To 
be rational, says Brassier (2014b), is to “have always already been expelled 
from the state of nature”. And for Brassier, this is the point at which the 
Sellarsian perspective intersects with the Promethean facet of the Marxian 
legacy in that this sense of alienation can be “understood as an enabling 
condition for the achievement of collective self-mastery and refashioning”. 
 
This is especially relevant since the likelihood of rewinding the story of a 
humanly forged pact between the concrete and the abstract and returning to 
some kind of “originary state of organic immediacy” is non-existent. So what 
we can mainly take from this is that the interventionist outlook espoused by 
Brassier and, before him, by Sellars, is distinguishable from the 
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interventionist ideals we previously discussed because it recognizes that 
alienation is enabling of knowledge, and thus the idea that intervention is 
some kind of insertion which would interrupt or disrupt a political or social 
context is far from its conception. While the Mouffe-Laclau ideal is to 
intervene in the gap between universals and particulars, the gap in this model 
is between oneself and the world, between the rule-conforming behaviours 
and the pattern-governed behaviours that together constitute an act. This 
outlook is also at odds with the fabulatory abstractions or transcendental 
empiricisms of Deleuze and Guattari because of their emphasis on real 
abstraction as a circular trajectory and the significance of the sensible as 
some sort of knowledge in their paradigm. 
 
The concern for Brassier is double-sided: how to avoid the various shades of 
voluntarism which seep into much contemporary theory when thinking 
intervention while at the same time thinking how to squelch the tendency to 
construct capitalism as an autonomous self-moving machine that has a mind 
of its own, independent of “the little human subjects who compose it”. What is 
specific about various notions concerned with the reality of abstraction across 
history is that they treat the money-form – whatever shape, material, or digital 
manifestation it may have – as a ‘nominal’ element, an outward expression or 
‘name’ for a latent abstract labour (Bellofiore, 2004: 193). What Sohn-Rethel 
in effect does, is make the state or quality of being nominal the precedent 
and prime characteristic of the capitalist relation. This characteristic of 
nominality is the main overlap between Sellars and Sohn-Rethel. Sellars’ 
nominalism – which will be touched upon below – has the advantage of 
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having rational agents behind its abstractions, as it were, rather than Sohn-
Rethels ‘social acts of exchange’ without a consciousness.  
 
Furthermore, Brassier (2014) argues for a Sellarsian reading of Kantian 
spontaneity, whereby an act is constituted through the embrace of “an 
intersubjectively instituted rule” as opposed to erupting undetermined and out 
of nothing. Freedom accordingly is not simply read as the absence of 
external factors determining the subject; on the contrary, it is understood as 
the subject’s rational self-determination by taking up a universally applicable 
rule. Such rule-related behaviour is the hallmark of Sellarsian nominalism, 
which Brassier likes to deploy as “a weapon of materialist analysis that 
demystifies the idealist hypostatisation of abstraction”. Brassier’s close 
reading of Sellars’ particular articulation of the faculty of reason, with its rich 
and complex naturalist, normative, nominalist, functionalist and scientifically 
realist dimensionality, is accentuated and augmented by his continental 
nihilism. The nihilistic aura of Brassier’s writing brings out what is already 
there in Sellars’ perspective – more understated than latent – about 
rationality as a concoction of alienation and knowledge. And in the process 
the Sellarsian perspective is transformed into a new kind of post-Freudian 
death drive, a conscious rationalistic one. 
 
This connection can be made by returning to Brassier’s (2003) statement that 
philosophical thought, which is to say, intellectual labour “is a psychic 
disturbance brought about by the traumatic trace of the inorganic, a 
symptomatic manifestation of the death-drive”. This statement perhaps 
represents a different period in Brassier’s thought, but it captures its nihilistic 
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dimension, helping us pinpoint the type of ‘voice’ he adds to the Sellarsian 
outlook. The metaphorical image here is of thought as a disturbance, some 
sort of menacing intellectual hunger to figure out how things hang together49 
impelled by what may be inorganic components inseparable to the human 
agent. These seemingly inorganic elements are returned to, time and time 
again, by rational capacity, like a recurring dream unremittingly returning to 
the traumatic experience that had triggered it until the dreamer’s death. 
 
This image of thought driving its agent to death reminds us of the curious 
case of the Camponotini ants that are transformed into slave-ants by the 
fungus Ophiocordyceps unilateralis, turning them into unilateral agents and 
driving them to act in a precise and organized fashion, eventually making 
them take their own lives. But although the human agent might be subject to 
such deep bleakness of nature, the said community of ants cannot reason, 
which is to say, they cannot develop concepts to explain the hijacking of their 
community members’ very being and decide whether or not something ought 
to be done about it. To be able to do so, an agent would need to be able to 
step back from “the fact that it is inclined in a certain direction by the 
circumstance” (McDowell, 2004). The resulting act, with its inorganic 
reasoning aligned with the scientific below the line image, embodies an 
element of freedom. For the human agent, reasoning as a rationalistic death 
drive is the insistence on further conscious disturbance of the casual realm – 
which is not in the space of reasons – through conceptual postulations that 
                                                     
49
 According to Sellars, the “aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how 
things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible 
sense of the term” (1963: 1). 
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stand in need for justification and judging in a community. This sketches out 
the somewhat darker side of intellectual labour that we can detect in 
Brassier, a side he picks up on in Sellars and emphasises as part of the 
mechanics of rationality. Hence, to be a rational agent is to understand the 
anomaly of reason, its inorganicness, the ineliminability of its negative drive, 
and to abstain from branding things such as capital, markets, and dynamic 
systems with the seals of thought and reason, because 
 
not everything thinks: rationality is a metaphysical exception. But it’s the 
exception constituted by the rule that discriminates the exception from the 
rule. So the ‘farther horizon’ toward which rationality propels itself is one that 
reason must construct: it is not pre-given and it is fundamentally incompatible 
with the brand of metaphysical eschatology for which the ultimate horizon is 
the reconciliation of mind and matter or reason and nature. Reason is 
inconsolable and non-conciliatory. Rational inquiry is propelled by cognitive 
interests that are generated anew by breaking with past modes of 
understanding. In this regard, reason is the ‘restlessness of the negative.’ It 
progresses by refusing the lure of being reconciled to the irreconcilable. The 
farther horizon toward which it progresses is the universal understood as the 
determinate negation of parochial, context-specific modes of understanding. 
(Brassier, 2015, emphasis in original) 
 
Let us pit an image of politics based on this restless negative drive of 
reasoning against the image of a voluntaristic politics that agonism claims is 
the only feasible politically oriented realism. The postagonistic image is an 
attempt to reimagine this picture of politics by articulating a possible 
framework, a network of attitudes and ideas through which an anti-
foundationalist approach to politics and its representation in art practice does 
not collapse into such voluntarism. Postagonistics navigates the field of 
politics, its uncertainties and its conflicts by following the synoptic model of 
the real. It simultaneously activates the discursive scientific image as the 
natural space of causes, and places politics and its discourse in the manifest 
normative space of reasons.  
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Postagonistics is anti-foundationalist despite holding that science can have 
access to the real because, according to Sellars (1997:75), science “is 
rational, not because it has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting 
enterprise which can put any claim in jeopardy, though not all at once”. This 
is the strenuous task of science, through its postulational strategy in which it 
postulates imperceptible entities in order to explain perceptible things, it 
challenges common sense perceptions forcing them to reposition and 
correct. The power of the postagonistic image derives from its asking the 
question: what if pluralism is recast as a ‘democratic design’ (to use Mouffe’s 
phrasing) that is anti-foundationalist, yet is rational in the very same sense 
Sellars’ claims that science is? This question implies a pluralism which is 
rational because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in 
jeopardy, though not all at once. 
 
Jeopardy is not a word which we come across often in contemporary theory. 
Its root is the old French jeu parti, meaning a divided game and used when, 
in games such as chess, opponents arrive at a crossroads situation in which 
the game could go either way and both opponents have potentially equal 
chances of winning or losing. More accurately, it is a state of absolute 
uncertainty that the opponents ride out to reach the conclusion of the game. 
Hence, what Sellars seems to be saying, is that a rational endeavour, as 
science is, is rational on account of its capacity to follow through its 
reasoning (postulation of imperceptibles to explain the perceptible) to the 
end, irrelevant of whether the outcome sits positively or negatively with the 
common-sense understanding we have of ourselves in the world. This is how 
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a science evolves, i.e. corrects itself and its knowledge of the world. The last 
part of the sentence, “though not all at once”, alludes to the fact that such an 
enterprise is indebted to the manifest realm through its dependency on 
language, constituting the building blocks of its methodology, but as Brassier 
(2007: 7, emphasis in original) explains: 
[T]he fact that the manifest image enjoys a methodological primacy as the 
originary framework from which the scientific image developed in no way 
legitimates attempts to ascribe a substantive primacy to it. In other words, 
even if the scientific image remains methodologically dependent upon the 
manifest image, this in no way undermines its substantive autonomy vis-à-vis 
the latter. 
 
I want to use the close reading of this sentence by Sellars as the basis for 
proposing a working concept. I follow Mieke Bal (2002: 99) in understanding 
a working concept as both a concept to work with and a concept that works 
to identify emergent or possible patterns: it is neither fixed and thoroughly 
theorized nor as slippery in definition as singular words may be. 
 
The working concept I want to deploy is that of an inaesthetics of jeopardy. 
To bring this concept across, let us describe it in relation to a hypothetical 
artwork which can be sketched out as some sort of epic narrative. First, the 
term inaesthetics is due to Badiou who coins the term to describe an art 
which denies “oneself the temptation to rely on the reflection/object relation” 
(Badiou, 2005: xxxiii). This particular idea of inaesthetics bears some 
resemblance to Brassier’s insistence on bringing together theoretical 
representation and social action to the point of spontaneity, whereby thinking 
(philosophical thought) matches up with acting epistemologically, 
ontologically, and politically, rather than matching up with contemplation as a 
form philosophical reflection. We can borrow Badiou’s term ‘inaesthetics’ to 
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express this idea under one word, because to achieve this spontaneity one 
has to imagine an art that is not dictated by the age-old relation between 
objects and their supposed capacity to instigate reflective thinking. But this 
does not mean that making art objects, or as I would prefer to call them - 
images, should be abandoned for other forms of ‘art’. 
 
Such an inaesthetical approach may mean that, for example, in a video 
(installed in an exhibition space), the dependency of art on the 
reflection/object relation is replaced by the idea of constructing a model 
world50 with functioning model agents. Furthermore, this model world with its 
model agents, its semiotics, and its intersubjective reasoning would follow the 
Sellarsian stereoscopic framework; the result would be one of representing or 
working toward a spontaneity in which the manifest aligns with the scientific. 
This entails that the work would be analogous to the concept of “critique 
understood as an institution in itself”. Therefore, even if it is an art object, it 
barely lends itself to contemplation, since it cannot be accessed in the way 
Deleuze and Guattari describe accessing an artwork through intuitions or 
“apprehensions in the sensible” in order to extract precepts. Rather, it 
becomes a dynamic site for reasoning in its own right, a site in which 
intersubjective reasoning between model agents in a model world takes 
place and evolves. Taking this a step further, what is distinctive about the 
agents’ reasoning process is the application of the idea that rationality entails 
some form of jeopardy, that reasoning is rational because it is able to 
                                                     
50
 To clarify, the sense in which I am using the word model is neither ‘replica’ nor ‘utopian’ 
but ‘reality simulation’, as for example the manner in which video games and the characters 
within them are simulated. I am certainly not implying, however, that such a model is 
necessarily conceptually, aesthetically, or visually related to video games, but only formally 
in terms of capturing the general character of what it means to be a simulated model reality. 
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jeopardize our common sense understanding of the world and not because it 
has any pre-linguistic, pre-discursive, or pre-cognitive foundations. 
 
With this, we are able to think past the unshruggable image of parliament and 
construct an image that is determinate. The type of discourse associated with 
the sublimation of passions and antagonisms is replaced with an intense 
depiction of a space of reasoning in which a plethora of different model 
subjects are determinate and are asking for and giving reasons, justifying 
their positions and judging. These theatrics of reasoning are unfolding and 
the models are putting into jeopardy the topic of discourse, whatever it may 
be. Because of this, as viewers we are not given the moment of 
indeterminacy that Malik (2015) has articulated as the dominant idea that art 
should “leave space” for the viewer to complete the work, which as he points 
out makes contemporary practice a “correlation”. That is to say, not only does 
contemporary art, according to Malik, not resist the temptation of the 
reflection/object relation, but it structures its whole economy and rationale 
around it. Importantly, such a model of inaesthetics also does not shut the 
viewer out in its attempt to adhere to a scientific realism, because the 
inaesthetics of jeopardy follow the Sellarsian schema through which we are 
able to reach an active image of politics in practice that is politically 
(manifestly) real and scientifically real at the same time.  
 
So by combining the inaesthetical approach of developing representations of 
model worlds as sites of reasoning and the Sellarsian principle of linking 
reason to jeopardy, with its specific nuance coming to us from the functional 
characteristics of games, we reach the working concept or framework of an 
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inaesthetics of jeopardy. Through such an inaesthetical framework, the 
postagonistic image is capable of representing the regional or local which 
plays a constitutive role in the antagonistic passionate narratives humans use 
on a daily basis to develop their politics – in other words, it ticks the box of a 
political realism based on pluralism. This is because the postagonist realizes 
– to put it in Brassier’s words – that science “does not need to deny the 
significance of our evident psychological need for narrative”. However, what 
science does do is demote this manifest narrative dimension of the human 
“from its previously foundational metaphysical status to that of an 
epistemically derivative ‘useful fiction’”51 (Brassier, cited in Wales, 2012). 
 
As strange as it may first appear, this demotion leads to the reinforcement of 
the dialectic. Because the agents in the postagonist image are bi-dimensional 
models who are cognizant of their bi-dimensional status (as manifest and 
scientific images) in a bi-dimensional model world, the agents gain the 
affordance of ‘epistemic responsibility’, the capacity to give reasons, ask for 
reasons, to judge, to justify, and revise their beliefs in light of new evidence. 
They are freed from the search for meaning in a world science tells us is 
meaningless and has no reason to be thus and so. It is because of this that 
                                                     
51
 Here, it might be useful to bring up Macherey’s articulation of what fiction is and is not: 
“Fiction, not to be confused with illusion, is the substitute for, if not the equivalent of, 
knowledge. […] Fiction is determinate illusion, and the essence of the literary text is to 
establish these determinations. […] Fiction is not truer than illusion; indeed, it cannot usurp 
the place of knowledge. But it can set illusion in motion by penetrating its insufficiency, by 
transforming our relationship to ideology. (By its nature, ideology is always elsewhere, it can 
never be located; consequently, it cannot be totally subdued, diminished or dispelled.) 
Fiction deceives us in so far as it is feigned; but this is not a primary act of deception, 
because it is aimed at one even more profound, exposing it, helping to release us from it” 
(Macherey, 1978: 64). Our hypothetical example for a postagonistic image is a video which 
features model agents reasoning with each other: this means that the image is also text-
based and that the text is pivotal in working towards an eventual horizon of synthesis 
between the fictional-manifest and real-scientific images.   
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this simulated model community can embark on an interactive search for 
truth. It is because the scientific realm of the casual has been reactivated and 
is not always already reconciled or muted. And because this communal 
space of reasons is not autonomous from the scientific realm of causes, the 
agents are challenged to give conceptual form to what arrives into their field 
of existence without reason. Instead of counting on intuitions or 
‘apprehensions in the sensible’ to give them access to what supposedly can 
only be sensed, this model community follows McDowell’s advice on 
intuitions when he writes: 
Intuitions ought to be points at which what Sellars has called "the logical 
space of reasons" is impinged on by what lies outside it. What is 
preconceptually given has to be outside the space of reasons, since it is not 
in conceptual shape and therefore not capable of standing in rational 
relations to anything. (McDowell, 1998 b: 280)  
 
The model community uses this methodology of impingement from the 
outside relentlessly as the ultimate resolution against the sublime, which is 
always around the corner. It is the inaesthetics of jeopardy against the 
aesthetics of the sublime: the more the community’s reasoning space is 
impinged upon, the more they know, and the more they know, the more they 
put their common sense image into jeopardy, and the more this manifest 
image is in a state of jeopardy, the more it can be made to fuse with the 
scientific image to reach the condition of spontaneity combining thinking and 
acting called the stereoscopic view, which is to say the synoptic real. 
Although the aesthetics of the sublime and the inaesthetics of jeopardy are 
both hinged on persistent negation, the sublime is in pursuit of radical 
openness as an end in itself, while the jeopardying approach is in pursuit of a 
distant horizon that it has committed itself to construct. Openness for 
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jeopardying is a trait, a characteristic due to it being structured on reasoning 
and the negation that emanates from that practice, it is not an end. The 
sublime wants to present the unrepresentable in a presentation, to stop it for 
a moment, to ask is it happening? It is as if images (in the wide and varying 
formations they come in, such as: installations, art objects, videos, 
performances, fictional companies etc.) in art’s representational economy 
gravitate to the sublime when thinking all things capital. 
It is no news that the power of capital is sat on the perch that nature used to 
inhabit when it comes to sublime aesthetics: capitalism as the self-moving 
and ungovernable Acéphale etc. Hard-won research into complex fields such 
as derivatives markets, financialization, algorithms and other financial 
technologies turns into mere filler in the practice of image-making if the 
sublime tendency is not resisted and counter-models are not developed. 
Sublime images, especially those produced after the 2007-2008 financial 
crash, seem steadfast in suggesting that our “greatest endeavours (to 
conquer space52) are minuscule compared to the tempest caused by out of 
control financial products” (Conio, 2015). The unrepresentable in such 
presentations is what we are unable to fully cognize about contemporary 
capital, its transformational capacities and its sheer scale. It shows up as a 
bittersweet and general differend, one made softer by the technological 
progress that capitalism has made possible. 
Rather than accede to this tendency, the inaesthetics of jeopardy approach 
steers clear from such unrepresentable territories by adopting the 
                                                     
52
 As in outer space, planets, galaxies etc.  
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methodology of impingement, the model agents labour to put everything into 
conceptual shape in their attempt to construct a shared horizon. What is 
important to foreground about the inaesthetics of jeopardy is that ‘the real’ is 
always in an eventual science that can only be reached when the current 
discrepancy between manifest and scientific images is collapsed through 
reasoning. The work of jeopardying is that of establishing the image of a kind 
of constructive writing with others or a constructive ‘reasoning-out-loud’ with 
others. It is in establishing this image and putting it into circulation within art’s 
representational economy that we can begin to imagine a world without a gap 
between our manifest and scientific images, a gap that is the root of the 
sublime and its aesthetics. We can draw a line of comparison between Sohn-
Rethel’s science-to-come, which longed for a science without the exchange 
abstraction based on direct production to reach a state of nature without 
alienation, and the image of Sellars’ eventual science, which can only be 
reached through collectively putting things into jeopardy and thus accepting 
that alienation is intrinsic to knowledge. If this gap between manifest and 
scientific images is to be closed and a state of spontaneity between thinking 
and acting reached, alienation ought to be understood as a factor already 
integrated into the processes of knowledge and not simply a side effect of 
capitalist expansion. 
This is why in composing the image of postagonistics we are not reconciling 
the manifest image – the image which includes politics and its constitutive 
antagonisms – with the scientific, but joining it up with the scientific in order to 
develop a lucid rendering of the possible process and the structure for 
“striving towards an intersubjectively accepted ideal of knowledge” (de Vries, 
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2005: 280). The total image, the overall view, is that of a model community 
which enriches the scientific with its differences and is enriched by its joining 
to the scientific. Sellars (1964: 40) himself seems to sum up the importance 
of imagination or the making of such images in the following paragraph:   
[T]he conceptual framework of persons is not something that needs to be 
reconciled with the scientific image, but rather something to be joined to it. 
Thus, to complete the scientific image we need to enrich it not with more 
ways of saying what is the case, but with the language of community and 
individual intentions, so that by construing the actions we intend to do and 
the circumstances in which we intend to do them in scientific terms, we 
directly relate the world as conceived by scientific theory to our purposes, 
and make it our world and no longer an alien appendage to the world in 
which we do our living. We can, of course, as matters now stand, realize this 
direct incorporation of the scientific image into our way of life only in 
imagination. But to do so is, if only in imagination, to transcend the dualism of 
the manifest and scientific images of man-in-the-world. 
 
In postagonistics, the ‘lure of reconciliation’ is resisted to make room for the 
reimagining of an intersubjectively constituted ideal of knowledge. Working 
with the information and language that constitutes present everyday politics 
means working with material in which intentions are not always clear: 
misinformation is always being injected into the media stream, violence is 
never far away, and the balance of power is necessarily being played out. 
But because we can deploy the previously described methods of 
impingement and jeopardying, we can set such ‘politically realist’ material in 
motion when developing our postagonist image: the self-correcting enterprise 
that Sellars describes is the whole model world portrayed in the image. Thus, 
antagonism, which Mouffe rightly suggests as constitutive of politics, is not 
only maintained but also put to work by joining it to the scientific realm. This 
is an image in which reasoning is “the practice of collective freedom” 
(Trafford, 2016).  
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By virtue of this, the postagonistic image is indebted to the practice of judging 
discussed earlier. Granting the practice of judging this kind of rational agency 
is strongly connected to Sellars’ nominalism, the way he addresses the 
question of abstract entities (his answer to Deleuze’s question: what is meant 
by the overthrow of Platonism?) and his views on the reference relation 
between words and things, the idea that words reference things. The very 
notion of reference relations is problematized by Sellars. Of course, one can 
make a distinction between words and what they stand for, but “there can be 
no science in which such a relation figures, and so the relation is utterly 
mysterious from a naturalistic point of view” (Crane, 2008). Like all realists, 
Sellars accepts “a world independent of thought”, and it is this world, in which 
entities exist in a register that has nothing to do with our language – which is 
to say the register of colourless matter, neurons, wavelengths, and quarks 
etc. –, that pushes him to look for a relational bond other than reference to 
explain how we achieve our complex semantics. Sellars’ replaces reference 
with inference as the central notion on which semantics are based. 
Reference here also calls our attention to what is referred to as the 
representationalist account of meaning, which, as Peregrin (2012) explains, 
is the idea that “we are confronted with things (or other entities) and 
somehow make our words stand for them”. The representationalist paradigm 
assumes that there are essential words in a language “in so far as they 
represent” something and other words that play a supporting role in the 
composition of complex representations (Peregrin, 2012). 
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An inferentialist non-representationalist account such as Sellars’ proposes an 
alternative to this paradigm. Its central idea can be identified in an important 
precursor to Sellars’ work, the later writings of Wittgenstein, in which the 
latter argued that we are not only limited to two alternatives namely that 
“either an expression represents something or it is meaningless” (Peregrin, 
2012, emphasis in original). There is a third overlooked possibility which is 
that “the signs can be used as in a game” (Wittgenstein, 1958: 4). Although 
Wittgenstein did go further with this possibility of language as a game, Sellars 
and thinkers influenced by his work such as Robert Brandom greatly 
advanced and cemented the idea. This was accomplished through their 
varying discourses on inferentialism which, all things considered, is an 
attempt to think meaning through language rules where language is 
understood as a game. In this case, thinking language as a game is not a 
form of scepticism, as might be implied at first glance.  
 
With Suits (1967) we can give a formalist definition to the concept of ‘game’ 
and claim that games are “goal-directed activities in which inefficient means 
are intentionally (or rationally) chosen”. Consciously choosing to run the 
entire circle of a track to reach the finish line in a race while the shorter route 
of cutting across the field is available is inefficient, yet conditions the game. 
Inefficiency takes on a different meaning when considered against the 
backdrop of Sellars’ model. The manifest realm of practical reality articulated 
through its language games is inefficient in relation to the scientific image, yet 
this very inefficiency is in part responsible for its efficacy, it is an inefficiency 
that is rule-based and thus becomes a form of efficiency. It should not be 
understood as a limiting factor, but as an enabling one. In a game of poker, 
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for example, Suits (1967) explains, certain rules must be followed, rules that 
tell us what we can and what we cannot do with cards and money, which 
happen to be the main elements used in this game. Winning a game of poker 
is a matter of contestants increasing their financial gains by using the means 
they are entitled to under the rules of the game, although “mere obedience to 
the rules does not by itself insure victory”. Hence, trying to win a game of 
poker can be described as “attempting to gain money by using the most 
efficient means available, where only those means permitted by the rules are 
available”. 
 
More important is the fact that some games have additional properties that 
have made them a staple in inferentialist accounts of language. Chess is the 
prime example. In chess there is no clear-cut way to describe the goal of the 
game without mentioning the rules, whether implicitly or explicitly. As Ridge 
(2015) explains, this is due to it being a game in which “the pieces and the 
moves can be understood functionally”’ This is to say that the bishop, for 
example, is understood as that piece which is able to move only diagonally 
on a sixty-four squared board: it is defined by that function within the game, 
in other words by its use-value. What we experience of the bishop while 
playing, the fact that it is made of ivory, wood, or digital pixels or that we 
might make it move on a giant garden sized board in public or on a digital 
tablet screen while lying in bed, makes no difference. Furthermore, it is even 
questionable whether a physical or virtual bishop is required to constitute a 
bishop – as in the case of blindfold chess. Simply put, one primarily 
understands the bishop not as an abstract concept as such, but by and 
through its conceptual role, its use is tethered to the rules of chess. I can 
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infer its meaning through its conceptual role in the game, and in relation to 
other elements/signs (the queen, knight, pawns, and the board), which is to 
say its meaning can be defined by the inferential rules that direct its use.  
 
So, if we supplant chess pieces with words, we can think of the inferentialist 
model as one which “identifies meanings neither with regularities of usage, 
nor with underlying dispositions, but rather with ‘rules’ of usage” (Peregrin, 
2009). Generally speaking, the rules make the meaning. This is the basic 
backdrop for the rule-conforming behaviour we mentioned earlier. The 
inferentialist approach to the meaning of language expressions argues that 
“rather than take reference, or denotations of expressions, to establish 
meaning, it is certain rules of inference (and inferences themselves) that do 
this job” (Trafford, 2017: 21). Unlike many philosophers adhering to scientific 
naturalism, Sellars does not attempt to comprehend reference in relation to 
“naturalistically acceptable relations, like causation” (Crane, 2008). In other 
words, on account of the Sellarsian model, the world does not cause our 
minds to form certain representations; this is highlighted in Sellars’ 
observation that the rejection of the myth of the given amounts to a rejection 
of the notion that “the categorial structure of the world – if it has a categorial 
structure – imposes itself on the mind as a seal imposes an image on melted 
wax” (Sellars, 1981: 11).  
 
This might leave us with the impression that talk about ‘reference’ or indeed 
‘truth’ is impermissible if this model were taken to be the blueprint for how 
language works. But in fact this misses what is most important about the 
idea, which is that when we talk of ‘truth’ or ‘reference’, they ‘should not be 
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considered to be epistemically or explanatorily prior” (Trafford, 2017: 22, 
emphasis in original). We are now in a position to fleetingly touch upon 
Sellars’ nominalism, which he uses to correct the Platonist ideal of abstract 
entities as realities that are external to inferential relations in a community. 
The example Deleuze used was that justice in Platonism is the iconic copy in 
time and space of an abstract eternal non spatio-temporal justness. Thus, in 
Platonism, reaching a ‘sameness’ or a ‘being identical’ of the abstract 
timeless entity is the set horizon or end one is labouring towards. As we saw, 
Deleuze thought past this by positing the proliferation of simulacra, which are 
not copies of an original abstraction but powerful entities themselves, ‘real 
abstractions’ which negate the very idea of original and copy that Platonism 
stands on. 
 
Following O’Shea (2015, Kindle Locations: 1995 – 2255), Sellars takes a 
different turn which is not an outright dismantling of Platonism. The principle 
is based on what we understood of the functionalism of a chess piece, the 
idea that we could infer what it stood for from the rules of the game to which 
it belonged. In natural languages, there are always abstract singular terms 
such as ‘triangularity’. Platonism insists that the function of such terms is to 
give a name to eternal abstract entities that do not exist in time and space; 
such an abstract ideal of triangularity is expressed through the abstract 
singular term triangularity and instantiated in perceptible triangular objects. 
Sellars’ move is to suggest that the function of abstract singular terms such 
as ‘triangularity’ is metalinguistic, meaning that they refer to other examples 
of the same type or role in different language forms. So such abstract 
singular terms serve “to pick out linguistic types or roles that may be played 
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by or ‘realized in’ many linguistic materials or ‘pieces’” (O’Shea, 2015: Kindle 
Locations: 2109, emphasis mine). The behaviour of dreieckigs in German 
roughly parallels the behaviour of triangulars in the rule-governed linguistic 
economy of the English language. Thus – using Sellars’ articulate adoption of 
symbols to make this point clear – the •triangular• is realized in German by 
*dreieckig*. This means that the singular term ‘triangularity’ relates to the role 
played by •triangular•s in a similar way to how ‘the bishop’ relates to the role 
played by bishops. So what this means is that abstract entities are 
functionalist-nominalist entities that are inferentially articulated through the 
rule-governed behaviour of languages53. This functionalist-nominalist 
inferentialism, according to Sellars, is what enables conceptual function and 
thus conceptual change. And according to Brassier (2014b), conceptual 
function should be distinguished from representational function, which for 
most part is a ‘mapping function’ that is at some level directly conditioned by 
our biology. Our representational system has the task of mapping and thus 
navigating the world. Therefore, as O’Shea (2015, Kindle Locations: 2220) 
states, what the Sellarsian account of nominalism points to is that the 
“function of abstract entities is to carve at the joints of representational 
systems, and the primary (empirical) function of the latter systems is to 
picture or map the structure of reality”. What Sellars’ nominalism provides is 
a noncircular framework where conceptual function (the conceptual order) is 
to an extent disassociated from representational function and thus capable of 
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 Brassier (2014) explains that what makes Sellars’ analysis valuable from a materialist 
point of view is “that it treats abstract entities as hypostatised linguistic functions. It shows 
how conceptual form is anchored in linguistic function and grounds linguistic function in 
social practice”. Although Sellars has no clear theory for social practice, “his work has the 
signal merit of telling us what abstract entities really are”. And for Brassier, this presents “an 
important step towards explaining how capital’s apparently self-moving abstractions are in 
fact motored by the activities and practices of human beings”. 
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self-revision, adaptability, and carving at the joints of the representational 
function (the real order – scientific image). Of course, this structure has 
already been articulated in the more ‘poetic’ term of an ‘inaesthetics of 
jeopardy’ and depicted as the ‘unnatural nature’ of rational capacity. As 
Brassier (2014b) points out, one way to understand the prospect of achieving 
a “stereoscopic synthesis” of the manifest and scientific images is to think 
about it in terms of achieving the integration of “conceptual function with 
representational mapping”. This would signal a promethean accomplishment 
whereby cognitive mapping is not merely a critique of capitalist reality and its 
institutions, but an undertaking in which there is no disjunction between 
theory and political practice, a spontaneity that may actually enable 
intervention on the real abstractions that dominate capitalism’s landscape. 
 
We have described how Sellars’ ‘synoptic real’ – with its particular articulation 
for the functioning of the scientific image – can contribute to the development 
of a non-sceptical, anti-foundationalist, pluralist and non-sublime image. 
Finally, we should put this articulation of how science works to the advantage 
of politics in the construction of the image up against more dominant models 
of ‘science usage’ in the development of images. Sohn-Rethel claimed, as 
we saw earlier, that capitalism’s principle of economic exchange was 
responsible for the properties in science that he regarded as bourgeois and 
identified those properties as being 1) the “second nature” of science’s basic 
categories and this second nature’s alienation from the qualities of first 
nature, 2) the non-holistic character of science, since it is “compelled to 
single out objects as isolates”, and 3) science’s need for intellectual 
exploitation. We saw how the dominance of similar ideas about the 
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hegemony of exchange led Lyotard to conceptualize his sublime based on 
the question of ‘is it happening?’ and his concept of the differend – an early 
prototype of sorts for Mouffian agonism. And we also explained how 
Deleuzoguattarian philosophy was formulated as the political unconscious of 
real abstraction and how second-order nature and first-order nature were 
philosophically structured into a continuum in which empirically 
transcendental abstractions could be launched as interventions through 
desiring-production. 
 
These philosophical concepts of intervention all share the characteristic of 
structuring their ontological frameworks with the view to circumventing the 
properties of science and Platonism, i.e. “the perennial philosophy”, 
specifically those properties identified by Sohn-Rethel as due to the real 
abstraction of economic exchange. Whether the practice of these forms of 
political being is located in a politics of radical democracy inseparable from 
identity-dispute or in the difference inherent to the chaos of nature and 
distinguishable from such emphasis on identity – these philosophies share 
the common factor of invoking or articulating forms of agency in which 
processes of reasoning are skipped by making passions and sentiments the 
overriding force in politics. Alternatively, agency could be located in a 
‘strange reason’ supposedly exempt from social-conceptual commerce, 
which is to say, discursive reason-giving practices. With this, difference is 
always elevated as a force in itself. 
 
In such case, difference acts as a guarantor against the hegemony of real 
abstractions that side-step consciousness. It is supposed to be the disruptor 
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of capitalism’s smooth homogenization of life. But perhaps a major motive for 
such intricate difference-based philosophies is that science – for all its 
alienating bourgeois properties – must either be altogether brushed aside or 
conquered philosophically by making philosophy and philosophical 
intervention its equal. Sellars, on the other hand, shows us how to work with 
science and how to join our manifest image to the scientific. Regardless of 
the motives behind these philosophies, in following these onto-political 
schemas in which the reduction or excision of ‘the scientific’ is taken as a 
measure against the abstractive forces of capital, we make our practices 
susceptible to producing or reiterating the sublime and/or what Beech (2014) 
calls “weak science”. This in addition to depriving our practices from the 
functional role ‘the scientific’ can play in a socially oriented ‘perspective of 
totality’. 
 
The expanded field of art can be considered a space where such ‘weak 
science’ dwells and amalgamates into what Beech (2014) has identified as a 
kind of “spontaneous philosophy of artists”. It is important to note that the 
question posed here is: how should we place ‘the scientific’ and define its 
functional role within a politics that uses the resources of art? It is not how 
can we make a more scientific art? This differentiation is important. The 
Sellarsian line of thinking answers the first question. As for the second 
question, it is largely responsible for forms of practice that depend on the 
fetishization of the archetypal space of scientific experimentation: the 
laboratory where experiments in physics, biology and related fields are 
carried out. Such practices function by analogy with ‘real scientific 
laboratories’, transforming the public site into an aestheticized laboratory on 
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display for this or that experiment. An example of this type of practice is the 
so called ‘victimless jacket’54 project. In it, the public is made to encounter a 
miniature but growing ‘alive’ jacket in an aesthetically pleasing lab-
environment. This jacket is made of the living stem-cells of mice that have 
been produced without actually harming the animals. Although such practices 
carry the potential of bringing questions regarding scientific experiments into 
public debate, they tend to fall into the category of spectacle and fail to 
convince us why putting such obviously crude yet beautified experiments on 
public display amounts to much more than inciting sublime angst for the sake 
of its consumption. Stories of the jacket’s growth gone wild, bursting out of its 
‘installation’ and being ‘euthanized’ by a curator, end up producing 
caricatures of scientific experimentation. This perhaps is the consequence of 
not asking the correct question when it comes to ‘the scientific’ and its 
relationship to art practice.  
 
It is with this in mind, that we can look to Beech (2014) for a portrayal of how 
and why art has been using science. According to Beech, in its endeavour to 
escape the ‘dead end’ of institutional critique, art has increasingly attempted 
to claim “some sort of science through and with the image”. We come across 
numerous variations of this claim to science which most frequently includes 
“an appeal to the aesthetics of science in the name of materialism, often with 
an ultimate attempt to think past the humanist-inspired role of the author”, 
while also attempting to solve or surpass representation. 
 
                                                     
54 
See Doctorow (2008) and Sandhana (2004).  
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For Beech, this artistic claim towards scientificity has “problematically 
reproduced a self-annihilating culture of art […] based in resentment of the 
mediating faculty of the image”. This specific resort to the scientific or, as 
Beech describes it,  the look and feel of the scientific, is basically an attempt 
to bypass resolving questions surrounding the relationship between 
mediation – which art is always part of, or implicated in – and ‘the real’. 
Beech calls our attention to practices which affirm an embrace of 
‘materialism’ by prioritizing ‘method over form’ (perhaps implicitly, ‘form’ here 
is closer in meaning to image and representation). In what follows we get a 
glimpse of what these practices which Beech identifies with ‘weak science’ 
might be, namely 
 
the empirical research project, the phenomenal experience, the ‘you just had 
to be there’ moment where artworks turn towards (supposedly) ‘unmediated’ 
and pure experience as the measure of art’s newfound delivery of the real. 
Much performance art is testament to this correlation between the real, the 
unmediated image, and the claim for a politicized practice, as is the 
employment of the aesthetics of immediacy in documentary-inspired art. 
(Beech, 2014) 
 
The ‘weak science’ to which art makes recourse is brought into the picture to 
escape the burden of the problem of mediation that, metaphorically speaking, 
art puts on its shoulders. The task art sets itself in such instances is 
“progress towards the achievement of what it thinks of as a more pure form”. 
Beech equates the pursuit of this presumably ‘purer form’ with taking to “the 
empirical”, which is seen as “the real path to a more true and more real 
reality, as if to leave behind the confines of art as category-form”. 
 
Beech’s somewhat brief but useful rendition of the predominant forms of 
‘science usage’ in contemporary practice demonstrates how, at the 
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unconscious level at least, science is either constructed as a longed for 
science-to-come in which the exchange abstraction is surpassed, or as a 
science of ‘strange reason’ in which we are supposed to access a realm of 
knowledge or the real order, through our intuitions and direct sensory 
experiences of the artwork or image. Mouffe’s post-metaphysical agonistics 
have also played a role in construing what ‘science’ is to art. This is 
manifested in a certain wholesale elimination of metaphysical and even 
epistemological dimensions from the image and art practices. In such works, 
as in the theory of agonism itself, there is a certain reduction of politics to 
ontology and an overdependence on the ideal of radical democracy. 
Together, these two characteristics condemn the image to serve as a 
depiction of the constitutive axiom of agonistics: that antagonism is 
ineradicable and that realism should start and end at that point. Attempting to 
produce a scientific image through the agonistic route simply means to 
produce images and projects that convey this axiom as a form of realism. 
Sellars’ synoptic real, with its particular function for the scientific, allows us to 
overcome the limits of the Mouffian axiom and reintroduce the metaphysical 
and epistemological aspects needed for the construction of images that take 
both science and politics seriously, thus enabling a realism which is realist on 
account of both politics and science. 
 
When working with a medium such as video we understand that the ‘realism’ 
we can attain is an effect or a set of effects constructed by this medium. As 
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M. Sohn-Rethel55 (2015: 6) argues in the case of film, realism “is not a given 
reflection of the world but rather a construction that must, often laboriously, 
be worked at”. Sohn-Rethel (2015: 7, italics in original) writes that film texts 
“can be constructed to convince us that they are vehicles of truth – or better 
particular truths – whether philosophical ones about the world or truths 
subsumed within the narrative or character interplay”. This constructability of 
realism (in video) pertaining to the medium’s imagery and textual content, 
and the medium’s plasticity as a vehicle for the production of realism, can be 
used to bring our jeopardying model-community into shape,and make its 
outlook, methods of knowledge acquisition and politics part of the wider 
representational economy. This is a first step towards using the scientific 
image in the reimagination of pluralist politics, a reimagination which seems 
increasingly pertinent. As demonstrated, art certainly can contribute to this 
reimagination. 
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 Martin Sohn-Rethel (1947–2016) was a film scholar who, among other books, also 
translated Alfred Sohn-Rethel’s (his father) Intellectual and Manual Labour. ‘M.Sohn-Rethel’ 
is used to make the distinction 
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4. Agonism or Postagonistics? 
 
4.1 Transformational Shortcomings: Antagonism, Agonism, and 
Intervention 
 
One of the mysteries of Mouffian agonism is exactly how the shift in 
understanding this or that person or group as an adversarial opponent after 
taking them to be an absolute enemy comes to happen. As previously 
mentioned, to supply some basis for this transformation Mouffe brings in the 
help of Thomas Kuhn’s theory on the incommensurability of conceptual 
schemes in the evolution of science. For Kuhn, contesting conceptual 
schemes result in different scientific paradigms. But as we have seen, a 
revolutionary scientific ‘reality’ can only be reached by an all or nothing ‘leap 
of faith’ into a completely new conceptual scheme. For Kuhn, accepting a 
new conceptual scheme is reflected in accepting some group or person as an 
adversary rather than a full-blown enemy, as Mouffe implies. In both cases, it 
is a matter of conversion, in much the same way as some people convert 
from one religion to another. We can relate, on some level, to how this notion 
of faith emerges in Kuhn’s attempt to explain why, for example, a paradigm 
such as that of the Copernican heliocentric model took so long to be 
instituted as the predominant norm, while speculation and evidence of its 
validity had been mounting for centuries and across continents. But when it is 
grafted onto politics, it seems to make considerably less sense. Moreover, 
the incommensurability of conceptual schemes has been seriously called into 
question by thinkers influenced by Sellars such as Donald Davidson. Taking 
the basic Sellarsian (Sellars, 1997: 117) idea that attempts “to break out of 
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discourse to an arche56 beyond discourse” are misguided, Davidson (1973–
1974) suggests that what Kuhn cements with his theory of incommensurable 
conceptual schemes is the concept of an “un-interpreted reality” or a “theory-
neutral reality”. 
 
This un-interpreted reality is what conceptual schemes fight to achieve 
through elimination and conversion in Kuhn’s worldview of science. 
According to Sellars, the postulation of entities that science depends on 
means that reality is not theory-neutral. But as we have explained, the 
jeopardying of science means that it is able to reach a degree of objective 
truth until proven otherwise. So doing away with the concept of an un-
interpreted reality does not mean doing away with truth. For Davidson, Kuhn 
needs recourse to some sense of theory-neutral reality to put his contest of 
conceptual schemes into action, and this would create what he calls “the 
dogma of a dualism of scheme and reality”. The result of this dualism is that 
we are left with a world consisting of different worlds that are marked by their 
“conceptual relativity”. Hence, truth under such a general conception is 
always understood as “relative to a scheme”. Davidson suggests that we 
ought to drop our dependence on any idea of a reality unburdened by  
discourse and theory, as well as dropping the duality of conceptual scheme 
and reality. Importantly, if we follow Sellars, when we give up our 
“dependence on the concept of an un-interpreted reality” and its resultant 
“dualism of scheme and reality”, we are not aborting objective truth, but 
insisting that any such quest be carried out in what Sellars identified as the 
space of reasons. Davidson’s formulation, however, stands out on its own 
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 A primordial reality, a beginning or origin. 
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because it directly addresses the question of interpretation and translation 
between conceptual schemes. This is expressed in the following paragraph:   
 
Neither a fixed stock of meanings, nor a theory-neutral reality, can provide, 
then, a ground for comparison of conceptual schemes. It would be a mistake 
to look further for such a ground if by that we mean something conceived as 
common to incommensurable schemes. In abandoning this search, we 
abandon the attempt to make sense of the metaphor of a single space within 
which each scheme has a position and provides a point of view. I turn now to 
the more modest approach: the idea of partial rather than total failure of 
translation. This introduces the possibility of making changes and contrasts in 
conceptual schemes intelligible by reference to the common part. What we 
need is a theory of translation or interpretation that makes no assumptions 
about shared meanings, concepts or beliefs. 
 
On Davidson’s account, the “space of reasons” cannot be compared to a 
single space where schemes contest, battling out their particular viewpoints 
until one particular scheme wins. This “single space” image is what Kuhn’s 
theory conjures up and what Mouffe projects into politics – with parliament 
somehow always inhabiting our imagination of what that space looks like. 
Rather, the space of reasons is premised on the “common part” with which 
we can enter into any process of reasoning (translation or interpretation of 
concepts) without making assumptions “about shared meanings, concepts or 
beliefs”. And this common part is exactly what the protagonists in Mouffe’s 
understanding of antagonism are deprived of. A rigorous account of the many 
issues related to this theoretical removal of the common part, which is to say 
the rubbing out of the space of reasons in Mouffe’s agonistics has been 
developed by Erman (2009). To better understand we must go all the way 
down to Mouffe’s (2000, 13) initial distinction between two antagonisms. 
What she calls “antagonism proper” is supposedly a real or originary 
antagonism (although Mouffe does not label it as such). This is the sort of 
arche-antagonism on which the theory is structured. It is an antagonism 
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“which takes place between enemies, that is, persons who have no common 
symbolic space”. The second antagonism is the one transformed into 
agonism through the sharing of a common symbolic space, and the will of the 
antagonists turned agonists to become adversaries. Erman makes the point 
that, because Mouffe’s goal is the elaboration of a radical democratic theory 
and because she begins from the position of the enemyhood of disputing 
subjects, her theory requires the rejection of antagonism between subjects as 
it is. This leads to a positing of “some ethico-political principles” that the 
disputants have to accept if their antagonism is to be transformed into a 
democratic agonism, but these principles are, in Mouffe’s rendering, vague if 
not obscure. Such principles are alluded to when Mouffe (2000, 102) states 
that an adversary is a “legitimate enemy” with whom we share a dedication to 
a minimal common ground based on the ethico-political principles of liberal 
democracy. 
 
Liberty and equality are flagged as common principles that all disputants 
should adhere to. According to Mouffe, however, the disagreement with our 
“friendly enemies” on what these principles mean and on the nature and 
extent of their implementation is what keeps liberal democracy in full swing. 
And it is such disagreement, due to the arche-antagonism, that, for Mouffe, 
cannot be resolved by deliberation or rational consensus. Of course, the 
principles of liberty and equality function as empty signifiers, but the issue is 
that an adherence to such principles requires some kind of consensus in the 
first place, and this is what Mouffe tries to bypass. Agonism is only possible 
through this bypass and Erman articulates what the implications of this are. 
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What Erman is able to unpack is the complex enmeshment57 of difference, 
antagonism, particularity and individuality into the single concept of agonism 
that serves Mouffe’s purpose of instituting a radical democratic project; 
agonism is an enmeshed concept. The postagonistic approach, as has been 
already hinted in the previous section, attempts to address such 
enmeshment when structuring the image and as a result opens up to a 
rethinking of pluralism. As Erman (2009) reminds us, antagonism for Mouffe 
is not simply difference but concrete difference between us and them. It is the 
Other instantiated as a concrete enemy. Additionally, however, this difference 
is also abstract in the sense that it is not purely descriptive. If it were to be 
purely descriptive, then such a difference would be relativized and its 
absolutism as an axiom for politics would not hold. Finally, Mouffe’s 
antagonism is ontological and not normative, an antagonism before ‘the 
ought’, as Erman puts it. That is to say that for Mouffe, antagonism is 
ontologically given, even though it is only manifested socially or appears in 
the meeting between disputants. In Erman’s view, if such a strong claim to 
ontological givenness – what I have called an arche-antagonism – is to be 
taken seriously, then 
Mouffe would have to draw on empirical evidence to make plausible that 
human beings start out by viewing each other as enemies to be destroyed, 
e.g., similar to how philosophers use psychological data to make the case 
that humans strive for recognition. However, as Mouffe is well aware, if she 
                                                     
57
 I define an enmeshed concept as a concept based on the diffusion of boundaries and lack 
of differentiation between the distinct concepts that are combined to bring it into shape. The 
term here is a retooling of Salvador Minuchin’s concept of enmeshment developed in his 
book Families and Family Therapy (1974, Harvard). By this I am referring only to the 
structural properties of concepts such as agonism, since Minuchin’s enmeshment refers to 
family relations and occurs when boundaries between family members’ ‘egos’ are blurred, 
thus contributing to a certain over-closure that is disenabling for its members. By analogy, 
the individual concepts making up the enmeshed concept, in this case agonism, have been 
subjected to such extensive diffusion and blurring. I do not mean to use the term in any 
psychological sense. 
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were to do so, she would soon discover that this is not how human beings 
predominantly perceive of each other. 
 
For Erman (2009, all emphasises in original), the way Mouffe folds 
antagonism into difference and vice versa obscures “the fact that, while 
difference is descriptive, antagonism is normative. […] [D]ifference is 
primarily a descriptive concept standing ‘by itself’, similar to ‘water’ and ‘blue’. 
Antagonism, by contrast, is an evaluative concept, similar to ‘happy’ and 
‘courage’”. Mouffe moves freely in and out of difference and antagonism, 
collapsing the descriptive into the normative and vice versa. And this for 
Erman causes a further complication. This is the confusion of particularity, 
i.e. something implied by difference in general and individuality, i.e. a 
‘normative’ difference such as antagonism is. This entanglement between the 
particular and the individual according Erman (2009) means that Mouffe does 
not acknowledge the Hegelian wisdom that individuality “requires specific 
attitudes among the subjects involved”. Here, Erman is of course referring to 
Hegel’s concept of right. 
 
This is the idea that the “modern individualist concept of subjectivity must be 
completed in an intersubjectively constituted general will. That is, the general 
will constituted in mutual recognition is a condition and presupposition of 
subjective freedom” (Williams, 1997: 117). The subjects of Mouffe’s 
agonistics are, as we have described previously, subjects of a voluntarism 
that erupts ‘out of nothing’ due to the fact that their antagonism is 
ontologically prior to any discourse. But the freedom based on intersubjective 
recognition in the Hegelian tradition would mean that a right contributing to a 
certain subjectivity can be asserted only if it may be asserted by all. This 
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implies a correlation between rights and duties constituted through a non-
heteronomous concrete universal subject or general will that is open to 
further normative considerations, revision, and fine-tuning (Williams, 1997: 
117). Accordingly, Erman (2009) asks a simple but important question: 
“[H]ow is it possible for antagonism proper to be a conflict between us and 
them (or me and the Other) without any ‘common symbolic space’, to use 
Mouffe’s words?” Does not the fact that a conflict is underway imply that 
there is some common understanding on what is at stake and that there is an 
intersubjective linguistic context that the antagonists share? 
  
The protagonists in such a scenario are able to identify the antagonistic 
conflict because they share a ‘common part’ which at the very least is 
constituted through some common presumptions about each other’s 
subjectivity. But because Mouffe starts from a specific mode of enemyhood, 
antagonism is deprived of its significance as a dimension of normative 
discourse present in common understanding. If the distinction between friend 
and enemy is not understood as contingent and dependent on the state of 
affairs in a political context or certain historical circumstances, it is then the 
intentional enforcement of the idea that there is absolutely no common 
understanding whatsoever between antagonists. The suggestion that 
postagonistics adopts, in Erman’s words, is that counter Mouffe there can be 
“no conflict without deliberation, i.e. without speech-acts oriented 
performatively towards validity-claims”. 
 
To acknowledge political realism in this case does not mean at all, as Mouffe 
(2005, 16) claims, that “the political belongs to our ontological condition”, 
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rather that it is contingent and that antagonism is “an ever present possibility” 
(Mouffe, 2005: 16 – 17), not on account of its ontological makeup but 
because it is a component of reasoning. This reading of antagonism is what 
the postagonistic image takes to be the correct one, antagonism is not 
ontologically prior to conflictual situations – it comes into being in discourse 
of which it is a part. Persons disagree on the importance of different values 
and matters pertaining to who is right and who is wrong. But as Erman (2009) 
seems to point out, this is the juncture between antagonism and reason. In 
the case of such conflictual scenarios, it is clear that in their shared 
comprehension of such scenarios as conflictual the antagonists 
have already entered into the Sellarsian ‘space of reasons’. This is a 
normative space which cannot be reduced to an empirical description of 
causal relations. Agents are not solely caused to act by their strongest desire 
in a Humean sense. Rather, they ‘take up’ a desire (or some other pro-
attitude) as a reason for action. And this endorsement of motivation requires 
a capacity for (self-)reflection through which their desires are coupled 
together with some conception they have of themselves. Moreover, the 
space of reasons is a social space, since this capacity for reflectivity takes 
place in a social setting – reasons are essentially public. 
 
 
The problem we stumble upon on endorsing Mouffe’s interpretation of 
antagonism as ontological is that the transformation process becomes hinged 
on some sort of moral choice that is undertaken without explanation or 
grounding. This is why it is referred to as a matter of conversion or faith. If 
political realism is a question of avoiding the “priority of the moral over the 
political” (Sleat, 2014) then there is a sense in which, because of the 
ontological nature of Mouffe’s antagonism, her project falls short of the 
political realism she demands. Since the antagonists in the Mouffian picture 
do not share an intersubjective space, the only way they can come to accept 
the common ethico-political principles they need to embrace for their 
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transformation from antagonists to agonists is by subscribing to them in a 
personal subjective world which is intrapersonal (taking place within a 
person’s mind). Additionally, while the Mouffian picture structures the 
moment of antagonist to agonist transformation as an intrapersonal 
conversion rooted in an unexplained ontological habitual orientation, it goes 
in the opposite direction in understanding conflicts as always interpersonal 
(taking place due to the relationships or communication between persons or 
different groups of persons) (Erman, 2009). 
 
As has already been articulated, Mouffe’s picture of antagonism is one based 
on a relationship of conflict between an ego and a concrete Other, or a 
we/they distinction or in another variation an us/them relationship. Because 
of the arche-antagonism in Mouffe’s picture, as soon as the (collective-) ego 
meets the Other, the antagonistic conflict is manifested. And the only 
possibility for utilizing such antagonism to the advantage of the wider 
community depends on intrapersonal thinking in the individual’s mind (or a 
private collective decision by a specific group) which paves the way for the 
conversion to agonism. This means that the “identity of the subjects involved 
is a premise of their agency” (Erman, 2009). But identity and such 
intrapersonal structures assigned with the task of conversion cannot be a 
premise of agency. Rather, as Erman points out, identity and the 
intrapersonal can only be a product of agency. This is to reassert and 
reiterate the ‘unnatural nature’ of reasoning and to point out that antagonism 
is not a given ontological fact, but a factor in the process by which 
individuality is constituted socially. It is only in this sense that antagonism is 
ineradicable, not, as Mouffe would have it, because it has ontological 
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foundation, but because it plays a crucial role in the constitution of collective 
and individual freedom. 
 
Moreover, agency is not simply an interpersonal exercise of self-
determination but importantly it is also a cognitive exercise of self-
interpretation (Erman, 2009). These two dimensions cannot exist without 
each other since they are co-dependent. Here, once again, we can recall 
Gilbert’s (2013) well defined articulation of the subjectivity at play in Mouffe’s 
political outlook as that of a post-Hobbesian ontological individualism in 
which the individual is the irreducible unit of human experience. And the 
social or the community is but a demarcation existing as some sort of 
preventative boundary in relation to the free actions of individuals. Gilbert 
called this meta-individualism and it is clear how such an understanding of 
subjectivity leads to a construal of antagonisms as external to society, and as 
constituting society’s limits. This is how Mouffe and Laclau understand 
antagonism leading to the thesis that antagonism marks the impossibility of 
society ever fully constituting itself (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 125). The idea 
of experiencing antagonism as a limit is exactly what the postagonistic image 
attempts to reconstruct, because, unlike Laclau and Mouffe (1985, 125), the 
postagonistic image does not regard the presence of the Other as one which 
prevents ‘me from being totally myself.’ 
 
Rather, with Erman, postagonistics sees such a presence as the way to 
become totally oneself – if such a possibility even exists; it is more 
convincing that it would emerge “through the recognition by others, not 
through their absence”. Antagonism is not the experience of the limit of the 
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social, as Mouffe and Laclau claim: rather, it is, much more straightforwardly, 
a social experience entwined in and around ‘the space of reasons’. To further 
our argument, and pinpoint what a postagonistics concerned with thinking 
and making images ought to reconsider on the basis of an analysis of the 
deficiencies of the agonistic approach to pluralism, it is perhaps interesting to 
examine agonism in the context of international power relations. Specifically, 
we turn our attention to Chandler’s (2010) engagement with the concept of 
‘civil society’ as the policy paradigm of international peacebuilding 
interventions in societies recovering from conflicts or still undergoing post-
colonial restructuring. Building on Foucault’s work on the concept of civil 
society, Chandler argues that this concept is central to international 
peacebuilding, because not only does it produce new policies and frame 
intervention by one state (or an alliance of states) into the policies of another, 
but it also functions as a discursive framework that enables the production of 
meaning. In other words, it is a “policy paradigm through which the problems 
(and solutions) of peacebuilding intervention are interpreted” (Chandler, 
2010). In light of this, Chandler argues that civil society ought to be 
understood as the third chapter in a series of policy paradigms that have 
intersected and overlapped to shape the conceptual apparatus through which 
“Western engagement and intervention in the colonial and post-colonial state 
has been negotiated and reflected”. 
 
The first paradigm was race, in “which the hierarchical division of the world 
was given a natural basis”. As this paradigm came under increasing scientific 
and political scrutiny, a second framework overtook it, namely culture, which 
as a paradigm provided a basis for interpreting the divide between the West 
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and the post-colonial world on a moral and psychological basis; this 
culturalist paradigm was also extended to other parts of the world perceived 
as essentially different than ‘the West’ in their way of practicing politics and 
social relationships. What the cultural paradigm provided was a ‘moral divide’ 
between states/societies in the West which were considered to be at least 
formally alike post-colonial states/societies. The suggestion was that the 
political subject of the latter was “less capable of acting in a rational or 
autonomous manner”. According to Chandler, what the civil society paradigm 
fails to do is surpass this dynamic inherited from the culturalist framework. 
On Chandler’s account, it seems that the civil society paradigm wants to 
have its cake and eat it too. This is because it wants to act as a justification 
for essentialized differences, while at the same time understanding the 
irrational or poor social, economic, and political outcomes it is sometimes 
linked with as a result of “rational choices made by autonomous subjects”. 
The difference, then, is that the civil society outlook views post-colonial or 
post-conflict societies from the vantage point of “self-governing individuals”. 
This is the opposite of the viewpoint of individuals subjugated by 
“collectivities of race, nation or religion” that the older paradigms of race and 
culture identified with. For Chandler, this is perhaps why the paradigm of civil 
society appears more progressive on first estimation. 
 
But the issue is of course that the shift to ‘individualism’ in this paradigm 
(mirroring the meta-individualism discussed earlier) allows for a reshaping of 
the problem of policy intervention in hitherto unrecognizable ways. By 
emphasising the individual’s autonomy and the rationality of the subject the 
peacebuilding intervention is able to present its interventionism as an “act of 
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empowerment or of capacity-building” while at the same time disassociating 
itself from the superiority complexes and racial as well as cultural distinctions 
of colonial rhetoric. Still, exactly where and how does the idea of agonistic 
pluralism fit into this picture of civil society and international policy 
intervention? Chandler (2010) notes that the civil society paradigm is 
concerned with “influencing individual behaviour choices” as a form of 
intervention and that this is preconditioned by an inbuilt assumption, namely 
the moral and cultural divide between the post-colonial subject and the liberal 
democratic subject of Western democracies. 
 
The distinction entails that the rationalist premises used in relation to the 
liberal democratic subject should be disregarded when considering 
peacebuilding interventions. A traditional liberal democratic subject would 
argue that rational deliberation can help resolve social conflicts. In contrast, 
the very idea of peacebuilding is hinged on the supposed realpolitik of not 
assuming that conflicts can be mended by political processes that are 
autonomous in nature. Thus, it looks to the domain of policy intervention 
through civil society so that it may influence institutional structures and 
frameworks with view to containing conflicts. Such a proactive interventionist 
approach to civil society believes that “external intervention” is imperative to 
“challenge or disrupt irrational or counterproductive forms of political 
identification through the process of multiplying frames of political 
identification”. 
 
The civil society policy paradigm is important to the notion of peacebuilding 
because it is an interpretive framework where different political and social 
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collectivities can be considered “as products of irrational mind-sets shaped 
by the past” while maintaining that such mind-sets can be transformed 
through non-deliberative intervention (Chandler, 2010). And central to the 
theoretical grounding of civil society as the domain of international policy 
intervention is the critique of liberal rationalist approaches. These critiques 
emerge out of concerns rooted in an analysis of the workings of Western 
democratic systems and their struggles with overcoming “particularist and 
conflicting identities” while adhering to a framework based on rationalist 
assumptions. Here, the leading and most significant critique is that of 
agonism with its variations (Honig, Connolly, and Mouffe are mentioned) that 
take differences and conflict to be irresolvable through liberal democracy. For 
Chandler (2010), the most important point to consider about how agonistic 
critiques of rationalist/deliberative democracy figure into the concept of civil 
society is that 
civil society becomes problematized as a sphere of irreconcilable difference 
at the same time as it becomes transformed into a sphere of policy 
intervention. Transferred to the sphere of international intervention, in the 
peacebuilding policy framework, a whole set of policy practices open up, 
based upon the thesis that through engaging with and transforming uncivil 
post-colonial or post-conflict societies, irrational antagonistic conflict can be 
transformed into rational agonistic contestation. Through institutionalist 
practices, external intervention is held to be able to build or constitute civil 
societies as a basis upon which the problems of societal development, 
inclusion and security can be resolved. 
 
It is necessary to highlight that, from one’s own perspective, pondering on 
such criticism of the civil society paradigm is definitely not a rebuke of the 
mostly socially conscious hard work of civil society. The efforts of civil society 
in post-colonial and post-conflict contexts are often marked by institutional 
fragility and work against the grain of authoritarian regimes using various 
nationalisms and identity-driven politics to tarnish these endeavours with the 
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label of corrupt ‘foreign intervention’. Rather, it is to suggest that the 
‘democratic design’ of the civil society paradigm of policy intervention is 
formulated on complex and often hidden (because they are philosophically 
dense) contradictions that are rooted in an ontological understanding of 
difference. Agonistic political thought, according to Chandler, has contributed 
to the theoretical outlook of this paradigm. Art – understood as a wide and 
diverse field for thinking and constructing images and a field in which the 
methodologies of image making can be analysed and developed – is in a 
position to advance theories and methodologies for image making that can 
think pluralism and political realism differently by simultaneously digging into 
the often contradictory premises of the ‘democratic designs’ we use and 
proposing alternatives through their ‘picturing’. 
 
The postagonistic image, the basic characteristics of which we articulated in 
the previous chapter, is admittedly a first attempt at such a picturing. The 
contradictions of modern agonism are the topic of Ince’s (2016) analysis of 
the concept. For Ince, like Erman, agonism’s problems seem to arise from 
the transformative process: antagonism > agonism. However, Ince 
formulates this from a different perspective, claiming that the idea of a 
“violence-free agon is the most questionable and fragile aspect of agonistic 
politics”. This is because, for Ince, there is a philosophical contradiction 
between fundamentally defending the agonal while at the same time striving 
to eliminate violence. In Ince’s own words: 
Agonists, on the one hand, attribute a core founding meaning to power and 
conflict relations, but on the other hand, in order to eliminate the violent 
forms/contents that these relations may involve they refer to a reasoning 
which is essentially in conflict with their original onto-politic assumptions. 
 
200 
 
Furthermore, the insistence on ascribing such high political stakes 
(radicalizing democracy, counter-hegemonizing neo-liberalism etc.) to an 
anti-consensus form of politics means that the norms of a ‘minimal common 
reason’ are constantly undermined. As Ince (2016) informs us, it is in fact 
impossible to establish a democracy without such norms, and to suggest 
otherwise is to express a sceptical outlook on the democratic project, which 
is the complete opposite of what agonists like Mouffe entertain, since, as Ince 
puts it, for agonists “liberal democracy is the main heritage to care for”. So, 
according to Ince, there is a kind of strange disavowal of the dimension of 
rationalist consensus in agonal pluralism since it is itself “heavily indebted to 
the rationalization process”. This indebtedness is a factor that Khan (2013) is 
able to address by mapping out the similarities between Mouffian agonism 
and Habermasian discourse, claiming that Mouffe exaggerates the divide 
between her “political prescriptions” and the Habermasian outlook. Contra 
Mouffe, Khan proves that Habermas’ stance on no occasion suggests the 
elimination of conflict but merely draws the distinction between legitimate and 
illegitimate expressions of conflict, quite similar to what Mouffe performs in 
her transformation of antagonism into agonism. Instead of diffusing 
antagonism and sublimating it into agonism, Habermas stresses its 
metamorphosis into “normatively regulated strategic action” (Khan, 2013). 
Habermas’ deliberative democracy in its discursive dimension shares some 
common ground with our postagonistic image – indeed, Habermas 
occasionally brings Sellars’ manifest and scientific images as well as other 
Sellarsian accounts into his writings. However, if we are to follow Brassier’s 
(2011) analysis, the Habermasian image of an “argumentation community” 
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still misses the point of the Sellarsian encounter with the manifest and 
scientific images and the possibility of the stereoscopic synthesis. As 
previously noted in our discussion of the jeopardying community – the 
Sellarsian inspired image of a postagonistic pluralistic community – what 
working collectively toward this synthesis implies is the possibility of 
achieving an eventual integration of conceptual function with representational 
mapping as well as the possibility of putting any claim into jeopardy (although 
not all at once).  
 
Constructing the image of such a community in action – implanting the image 
of this model community’s intersubjective process of reasoning in the 
economy of art – is a way of claiming a stake in the possibility of such a 
stereoscopic synthesis for diverse members of the human species. Sellars’ 
functional-nominalism with its focus on inferentialism allows him to root “the 
intentionality of the mental in socially instantiated practice”. While maintaining 
that intentionality is irreducibly normative, the fact that such intentionality is 
always embodied linguistically affords us the possibility of investigating “when 
or how this normative dimension might have arisen in the course of our 
evolutionary and social history” (Brassier, 2011). On Brassier’s account, 
Habermas acknowledges the distinction between normative and natural – 
which is also the distinction between reasons and causes – along the same 
lines as Sellars. According to Brassier, however, Habermas is unable to 
follow through the Sellarsian model and propose a positive and intricate 
relationship between the conceptual domain and the causal domain. For 
Brassier, Habermas conflates naturalism with empiricism and takes the 
Sellarsian clash of images as an excuse for escaping a fully scientifically 
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realist account of ‘mind’. This is to say that mind and hence normative 
conceptual order possesses “neurobiological as well as socio-historical 
conditions of emergence”. In Brassier’s view, Habermas’ position leads to his 
disacknowledgment – on conceptual grounds – of scientific attempts that 
strive to explain the transition from the sub-personal neurobiological scientific 
image to the personal linguistic and cultured manifest image. Brassier 
suggests that Habermas’ disdain for such attempts is due to what might be 
called ‘the threat of depersonalization’, an imagined limit that, when crossed, 
would leave persons unable to recognize themselves as persons any longer. 
Perhaps this can be linked to a general concern about how neuroscientific 
research may change our views about freedom, agency, and moral 
responsibility for the worse through its tendency to explain how our brains 
cause behaviour. Roskies (2006) has described this as the underlying 
anxiety that 
those things that once seemed to be forever beyond the reach of science 
might soon succumb to it: neuroscience will lead us to see the ‘universe 
within’ as just part and parcel of the law-bound machine that is the universe 
without. 
 
But as Roskies argues, viewing and researching ourselves as biological 
mechanisms should not weaken the notion of ourselves as free and 
responsible agents, since some causal notion is required for any attributions 
of responsibility to makes sense in the first place. In ordinary life, our 
judgments about responsibility are mostly “contextualized, emotionally-
charged, concrete scenarios”. Concerns about how a neural correlate view of 
the human brain might lead to damaging effects regarding responsibility are 
probably misplaced.  
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Roskies’ position is that it is perhaps “the perception of the existence of a 
problem that is itself the problem”. This is because ‘free will’ is important on 
account of what comes along with it, namely moral responsibility. The 
underlying worry or even horror (expressed in Bakker’s novel Neuropath as 
the semantic apocalypse) is that societal frameworks will begin to collapse if, 
through such research, people are encouraged to believe that freedom is an 
illusion, and with it, moral responsibility. The issue, as Roskies puts it, is “not 
whether or not neuroscience actually challenges human freedom, but 
whether or not we think it does”. Accordingly, for Brassier (2011), Habermas 
seems determined to “ward off the naturalistic dissolution of the normative”. 
He accomplishes this by recoding the Sellarsian distinction between the 
manifest and scientific images into a dualism of theory and practice. Brassier 
suggests that the Habermasian dualism of theory and practice is misguided 
because in this picture scientific theory is entirely delimited by discursive 
practice. The idea is that science is rooted in language as a “pre-scientific 
practice” and, because of this chronological precedence, scientific theorizing 
is reducible to such pre-scientific language. Habermas’ dualism of theory and 
practice leads to scientific theory playing the role of the objectifying tool in a 
dualism of epistemic perspectives where participatory practice (in a 
community) takes on the discursive role. Brassier claims that, put this way, 
Habermasian epistemic dualism amounts to inadvertently suggesting “that 
nothing we learn about ourselves from the perspective of scientific theory 
could force us to revise the content of our subjective or ‘participatory’ self-
understanding”. If this is the case then it is at odds with the inaesthetics of 
jeopardy and the impingement on the space of reasons deployed as a 
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discursive process by the model agents in the model world of the 
postagonistic image. 
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4.2 Transformation through Reasoning and Dialogue 
 
It is perhaps necessary to briefly touch upon why postagonistics might be 
important in developing an alternative frame of reference to the 
predominantly Mouffian understanding of agonistics taken up by artistic 
practices looking to diversify and open up public spaces to pluralism. Here 
the work of James Trafford on ‘reasoning through difference’ and Johanna 
Seibt’s work on the much-maligned notion of ‘dialogue’ are of particular value 
in helping us think through the image of a so-called new ‘we’, that is to say a 
notion of community committed to both pluralism and reasoning. Trafford 
(2016) models out the preliminary framework for a socially embedded 
process of reasoning with roots in both the Sellarsian fallabilist-inferentialist 
method for understanding ‘abstract entities’ and the Foucauldian discourse 
analysis view on structural power relations, the result is a kind of pluralism 
which can put norms into jeopardy collectively (although not all at once). 
Trafford’s contribution is in addressing the question of what we have been 
calling, after Mouffe, ‘democratic design’, by bringing reasoning back into the 
picture through the forging of an alliance between these two traditions. 
Trafford states that the question of pluralism/difference is highlighted when 
we think power as networked – expanded across and happening – in our 
social interactions on a daily basis. This is the general Foucauldian 
understanding of power as a thing which circulates and is embodied primarily 
in actions. Referring to the work of Iris Young, the implication to be taken 
from the Foucauldian perspective is that power is productive and ought to be 
understood as a “function of dynamic processes of interaction” (Young cited 
in Trafford, 2016). 
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Furthermore, such power is acted out within a complex grid of social 
processes that often reinforce systematic structural oppression and deep 
social asymmetry. Constraints in such structural processes are material and 
economical but are also due to “background norms of cultural assumptions, 
decisions, and institutions”. This leads to a cycle of reinforcement of the said 
structural processes through legal systems and ‘habit’ which has the 
consequent effect of making them appear to be objective and fixed as givens. 
Interactions occur under the always present constraints of prior relations of 
interaction between people/groups/constituencies which are often reinforced 
through occurrent interactions. This is to underline a certain invisibility of 
structural processes, thus it is imperative that the interactions between 
individuals are not the only dimension to be considered but additionally “the 
complex ways in which these interactions are sculpted from the outset” 
(Trafford, 2016). According to this view, power permeates all social relations 
and interactions and not only ‘the sovereign state’. The true picture of power 
in Foucault’s depiction is one of “immanent, rather than externally imposed, 
power”. Earlier, we came into contact with the transformative dimension of 
the concept of ‘civil society’ and how it has become the normative scaffolding 
for policy interventions across nation-state borders and ‘peacebuilding’ 
frameworks. The structural approach indicates that we cannot think power in 
a properly transformative way (when for example considering the impact of 
embedded structural processes such as ‘civil society’) through an either or 
position concerning universal claims, that is to say, universal subjectivity 
(associated with Habermas), or inversely, the denial of any recourse to the 
universal or even normative claims (associated with Mouffe). 
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If the structural understanding of power is correct, then Habermas’ account of 
the requirements for constructing ideal situations in which political speech 
acts fold into a deliberative democracy offers no apparent way of gaining 
traction on the cyclical imbalances of power. The result is a kind of 
homogeneity which is rooted in a specific context, yet manages to conceal its 
entanglement with the specifics of that context. Conversely, while Mouffian 
agonism comprehends that a total freeing of ourselves from power is an 
idealist illusion better left out of politics and thus appears to be in sync with 
the structural understanding of politics, it stakes transformation on an 
enmeshed concept of agonism. From the onset it emphasises difference, 
individuality, and particularities as the given partisan condition of our being. 
As Erman has pointed out, this leads to an understanding of agency as a 
function of identity rather than the social recognition of identity as the 
cumulative effect of agency. Trafford (2016) makes the point that this might 
lead to impasses in which the structural power relations end up being 
sustained through agonistic pluralism because ultimately Mouffe “reduces the 
political to power”. Because of her absolute privileging of a ‘radical 
democratic’ project discussed earlier, politics is seen as the successful 
attainment of power and the critical aspect emphasised is how to establish 
forms of power that do not undermine democratic values. 
 
Such reduction of politics into power bans recourse to universal claims 
altogether and ends up institutionalizing incommensurability and thus it is not 
clear how such a project might be transformative since we are prohibited 
from ‘adopting and building transformative ways of modifying’ the structural 
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processes which contribute to the imbalances in the first place. For Trafford 
(2016), what is required then is an account of “reasoning together” which 
might – and here I use Mouffe’s language – mobilize common affect, but not 
through the kind of strategic blanket discarding of rationalism Mouffian 
political logic is associated with. Mouffe identifies what is at stake as the 
“construction of a people” capable of presenting itself as a progressive 
answer to certain forms of reactionary politics that are on the rise as a result 
of neoliberal hegemony58. Deleuze’s concept of fabulation, as mentioned 
earlier, attempted to construct ‘a people to come’ by bypassing conversation 
all together (Other-cide) and composing images that could achieve this 
imaginary, directly through the senses. 
 
Agonistics also thinks the construction of a people can be achieved through a 
kind of short-cut to reasoning (conflictual-consensus) which attempts to 
motivate through the institutionalization of the incommensurable. 
Postagonistics resists both these inclinations, although they seem to lend 
themselves more readily to art practices – one by virtue of its aesthetical 
potential, the other because of its political realism. For the postagonistic 
image, there is nothing that can provide a way out of reasoning if the 
construction of a people is a goal. As Trafford’s work suggests, such a 
construction would require a vision of reasoning-together “which is capable of 
making claims that are irreducible to current structures of power, yet also not 
immune from them”. Reducing politics to power only is a form of entrapment. 
 
                                                     
58
 See Mouffe, 2016.  
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Robert Brandom has been at the forefront of the idea that “thought and talk 
give us a perspectival grip on a nonperspectival world” (Brandom, 1994: 
594). The nonperspectival world is, of course, the Sellarsian domain of the 
causal or the scientific image. Our different perspectives and even 
disagreements, according to Brandom, are the basis for traction on this 
domain. Brandom argues that if we look at conversation as a model, it is 
clear that discursive practice and the “very possibility of common conceptual 
norms, the norms by which we bind ourselves, in using a word”, words as 
different and as far apart as ‘copper’ and ‘freedom’, depends on differences 
in perspective. Such perspectivality is due to the unavoidable contingency 
that shapes the differences in commitments of various interlocutors in a 
conversation, the varying trajectories through social and physical worlds the 
agents follow. Thus the possibility of instituting common norms is related to 
the capacity “to navigate across those differences in perspective, 
corresponding to differences in commitment” (Brandom in Pritzlaff/Brandom, 
2008). This idea of perspectivality is imperative for thinking past the 
limitations of agonistic pluralism or the Habermasian deliberative model 
because, as Trafford (2016) states, interlocutors first need to understand 
their relationships “through the lens of perspective” before they can even 
begin to think of a relationship of “shared understanding” which does not fall 
into the trap of attempting to absorb the specificities and particularities of 
their perspectives into a single subject. The Mouffian outlook privileges 
differences as always concrete and immediate before our interactions, which 
means that differences are exercised upstream of our interactions. But 
accounting for perspectivality while forging room for thinking the structural 
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processes that configure the social landscape points towards the much more 
difficult task of designing models for interaction that allow difference to 
operate downstream of our interactions. On Trafford’s account, thinking our 
interactions and the prospect of a shared understanding should not end with 
one of the variations on the theme of ‘mutual comprehension’ which is a 
staple of many theoretical frameworks attempting to work towards a shared 
understanding59. Rather, Trafford suggests, we should be more interested in 
the ways in which the construction of a shared understanding registers as a 
process that ultimately never leaves our perspectives unchanged and how 
such a process might help provide an account of shared understanding 
capable of “surpassing the current perspectives” of the involved interlocutors. 
 
This emphasis on the processual dimension of conversation finds strong 
support in Seibt’s (2015) reading of how the concept of dialogue ought to be 
understood. Taking intercultural dialogue as an example, Seibt looks at its 
“epistemic status” in relation to studies from the fields of cognitive science 
and communication. Seibt suggests that the understanding that intercultural 
dialogue generates is of a specific category, it entails a type of knowledge 
which is neither a theoretical “knowing-that” nor a practical “knowing-how”. 
Thus, for Seibt (2015), such dialogue obviously reflects the Sellarsian 
intersubjective space of reasons in a particular way since the understanding 
it produces can be classified more accurately as orientation. Orientation, as 
Seibt (2015) informs us, is most recognizable to us in its spatial form. An 
example would be leaving a familiar building through an exit we have never 
                                                     
59
 ‘Asymmetric reciprocity’ (Iris Young) and Seyla Benhabib’s more symmetrical idea of 
dialogue. which requires interlocutors to imagine themselves in each other’s shoes, are 
discussed in a mostly positive tone but eventually decided against by Trafford (2016).  
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used before: our practical routine is suddenly subjected to the interference of 
the mental operation of orientation in which we become more alert and 
exposed until we figure out our position in relation to the surroundings and 
move on. Because this process is short-lived and does not require 
“conscious self-positioning on a memorized spatial map”, it is not recognized 
as a unique mental operation. But it can become much more pronounced in 
unfamiliar terrains, turning into a complex cognitive interaction with the 
surrounding environment (Seibt/Nørskov, 2012). 
 
As such, orientation “is neither propositional knowledge nor inference nor the 
formation of an intention for action”: it is a mental operation in its own right 
(Seibt, 2015). Grafting this conception of orientation – as a particular type of 
mental operation – onto the idea of dialogue, Seibt is able to mark out what is 
distinctive about dialogue. This is that dialogue is not undertaken with the 
point of accomplishing certain results or producing this or that immediate 
effect, but with the aim of cultivating the space of reasons, or, as she puts it, 
“creating a joined horizon of understanding, in order to enable continued 
meaningful communication”. As she points out, dialogue is distinct on 
account of it being a kind of conversational engagement “without extraneous 
purpose or product”. It is not based on the extraction of information, the 
development of a plan for action, or overcoming an opponent. 
 
In this sense, dialogue is a type of communicative action performed without 
an independent product; it has an aim but no purpose. In other words, it does 
not attempt “to achieve anything beyond the facilitation of communication”. 
The suggestion then, is that dialogue presents us with a state of 
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intersubjective cognition evident as a process, as well as the outline for how 
social and political significances are experienced as processes of cognitive 
orientation during conversational encounters. So, what is specific about 
intercultural dialogue as opposed to everyday dialogue between interlocutors 
who do not interact under the pretext of (cultural) pluralism? Seibt (2015) 
suggests that dialogue, and specifically intercultural dialogue, is         
an opportunity to experience the process of cognition in ‘slow-motion’ - 
cognition is always social meaning-making, the contextual working up of 
meanings, rather than the processing of ready-made symbolic 
representations. In everyday conversations, where meanings are 
communicational tools to achieve certain goals, the generation of 
contextualized meanings happens too fast to enter our awareness. In 
intercultural dialogue, however, our routinized valuations are challenged; we 
are forced to re-experience the dynamic origins of valuations in the searching 
activity of orientation and to recalibrate our field of significances. 
 
The image here is akin to an MRI (Magnetic Resonance Imaging) brain scan 
in which instances of cognitive orientation register as brain activity on 
experiencing the social stimulation of (intercultural) dialogue and are 
indicated by different colours and colour intensities. Although Seibt mentions 
no such image, the fact that her account manages to indirectly evoke it is 
testament to the depth of her Sellarsian background. The bottom line is that, 
understood this way, the intersubjectivity of dialogue makes a solid case for 
comprehending ourselves as agents shaped through pluralistic conversations 
and adjusting the processes through which we converse accordingly in order 
to enable transformations in understanding, if such transformation is what we 
seek. The basic idea is that the link between the natural interactivity of 
cognition (apparent in processes of orientation) and “the experienced 
process of creating significances during dialogue opens up the route towards 
a processual conception of values” (Seibt, 2015). 
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Here we return to Trafford’s (2016) emphasis on the idea of ‘shared 
understanding’ as a process. Such a process would enable interlocutors to 
exceed the limitations of the perspectives they enter into the conversation 
with. This is what Trafford calls “transformative understanding”. And his 
interest lies in how – under the condition of structural power and its 
processes – agents might come to understand such structures and each 
other in “ways that surpass or transcend the specific constraints acting upon 
them”. Inherent to the idea that cognitive orientation is a mental operation 
that comes into being through our interactions is an interventionist paradigm 
which insists that intervention cannot simply be understood as disruption, but 
rather as the construction of shared understanding on different and new 
terms. This is understanding as that which is constructed in the “inter” of 
agent interaction (Trafford, 2016) and not as a “democratic design” set up as 
a dialogic interface between “concrete others” already established 
beforehand. In the realization of this, dialogue can be comprehended as 
transformative and entailing the process through which new common 
perspectives can be constructed out of the ones we bring into a conversation. 
This is to think past the dichotomy of “difference and impartiality” and 
examine how the “I” entering into a dialogue can undergo transformation by 
interacting constructively in the “space of reasons” shared by different 
interlocutors (Trafford, 2016). And the minimal requirement for this process to 
proceed is that each agent considers his or her perspective as a contingent 
position liable to shifts and changes through interaction, taking care to be 
responsive to the speech acts of others in the dialogue. 
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What is more important than the oppositional nature of perspectives is – as 
Trafford informs us – the realization that “our perspective is merely 
perspectival, such that new perspectives may be forged”. The approach 
mapped out here through Trafford and Seibt intersects with the ambitions of 
our ‘jeopardying community’ and shares its general framework, but perhaps 
the minor nihilistic strain in the original outlook developed by Sellars (and 
pushed further by Brassier) has been somewhat suppressed. In any case, 
the emphasis here is on the ‘radical intersubjectivity’ that the image of this 
community portrays as a possibility. And as Trafford makes clear, this 
baseline framework suggests that ongoing and dynamic processes of 
interaction enable the overcoming of individual perspectives and the 
accomplishment of an eventual shared understanding which is neither forged 
by imposing commonalities nor by exploiting incommensurability. In 
Trafford’s (2016) own wording, this is to say that 
[i]nstead, our orientation would be to construct perspectives that are radically 
intersubjective in that they are irreducible to any perspective that exists prior 
to our interactions. This, shared, perspective would be genuinely new, and 
both irreducible to, and transformative of, our individual perspectives. 
 
Already existing social norms influence and mould agents’ interactions in any 
dialogue, but these norms should be considered ductile and subject to 
continuous reshaping through dialogic interaction rather than be seen as 
communal agreements or implicit rules. At the same time, however, an 
understanding of structural power makes clear how uneven the metaphorical 
game-board is on which our language games take place. Possibilities for 
action and interaction cannot simply overwrite the structural constraints 
already contributing to the formation of slanted inclinations within the social 
landscape. So in thinking of power and how it manifests itself through our 
215 
 
actions, we are reminded that our interactions are influenced by the structure 
of social norms concerning what might be normal and abnormal, reasonable 
and unreasonable, etc. As Trafford (2016) notes, this is to indicate that the 
“space of possible interactions” is like a an uneven landscape in which some 
behaviours are probabilistically more possible while others might be shut out 
or are at least made “much more difficult for certain agents”. This 
corresponds with Brandom’s (2000: 176) suggestion that the characteristics 
and acceptability of the claims we make in a conversation are regulated by 
“shared norms that antecedently govern the concepts one deploys in making 
such a claim”. For Brandom, such “shared norms” ought to be considered 
“tools” (van Goor, 2014: 78). They are the tools through which new 
vocabularies may be forged. 
 
For Brandom, such new vocabularies evolve as an everyday phenomenon, 
and as van Goor (2014: 78) points out, he considers them the “result of a 
continuous, piecemeal process in which every language user participates”. 
This is the Brandominian view on vocabulary which maintains that using a 
vocabulary “is to change it” and that this changeability through usage is 
precisely “what distinguishes vocabularies from other tools” (Brandom, 2000: 
177). Trafford’s (2016) account of reasoning builds on this particular 
dimension of Brandom’s project. Simply put, this is the proposition that the 
norms of reasoning are like rules “only insofar as they are generated by the 
practices of language games themselves”. The language games we play are 
socially embedded. And thus the Sellarsian ‘space of reasons’ is signalled by 
conversational interactions that are at once constrained by the discursive 
norms we use as tools while also enriching and revising those same norms. 
216 
 
 
As such, norms gain life through our interactions, and this implies that they 
can be changed through interaction (Trafford, 2016). This is perhaps another 
way of emphasising Davidson’s previously mentioned point that changes to 
concepts are made possible through reference to what he called ‘the 
common part’. For Brandom, this translates into an emphasis on how 
linguistic expression is understandable to a public to the degree that it follows 
on from shared norms, and is considered informative to the degree that it is 
able to add to the normative domain which it utilizes (van Goor, 2014: 79). 
This is exemplified by Brandom’s oft-cited statement:  
 
Every use of a vocabulary, every application of a concept in making a claim, 
both is answerable to norms implicit in communal practice – its public 
dimension, apart from which it cannot mean anything (though it can cause 
something) - and transforms those norms by its novelty – its private 
dimension apart from which it does not formulate a belief, plan or purpose 
worth expressing. (Brandom, 2000: 179) 
 
This paints a picture of a ‘sapient’ community practicing its freedom based on 
its acknowledgement of norm-governed usage of vocabulary and concept 
application in the public performance of communication, while understanding 
that those same norms are transformable due to the meeting of perspectives. 
As Wanderer (2008: 14) explains, Brandom makes the distinction between 
two different ways of acknowledging norms. The first is acknowledging a 
norm by being subject to it, which amounts to obeying it in practice. In this 
regard, happenings in nature involve implicitly acknowledging norms such 
that, for example, acids ought to have the effect of turning litmus paper red 
under certain conditions, and in doing so, it moves us to think of such a 
happening as acknowledging that norm. 
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In contrast, the second type of acknowledging norms does not imply being a 
subject to those norms nor obedience. Rather, it is acknowledging a norm by 
being sensitive to it, grasping it and understanding it. This is to say that “one 
acknowledges a norm by taking a normative attitude towards it”. Owing to 
this distinction, only the second type – acknowledgement by being sensitive 
to the norm – allows for the possibility of error. (Brandom, 1994: 30–31). An 
acid cannot be said to be bound to the norm just mentioned and not turn the 
litmus paper red – if this were to happen, it would mean that the acid is 
obeying a different norm in that particular instance. It is only when 
“acknowledgement of the norm involves adopting an attitude towards a 
performance’ that it can be considered possible for that norm ‘to be binding 
and yet to be disobeyed in practice” (Wanderer, 2008: 14). And it is in this 
sense that we are able to treat communicative performances as bound to the 
normative in the first place. So a general feature of Brandom’s model is 
taking normative attitudes towards such communicative performances by 
being sensitive to the norms governing them. Brandom makes the distinction 
between performing and assessing performances. And on his account, what 
constitutes the “basic building-block” of social practice is the relation between 
a performer (the subject of normative statuses) and his or her audience 
(those who take normative attitudes towards his or her performances) (1994: 
508). This is what Brandom calls the ‘I-Thou’ approach to social practice, and 
as Wanderer (2008: 17) notes, for Brandom the concept of “a community, a 
We, is built out of this basic interactive I-Thou relationship”. 
 
In light of this, Brandom’s formal model for reasoning is an ‘I-Thou’ game of 
giving and asking for reasons. In playing Brandom’s version of the game, the 
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interacting agents have no recourse to some original chess piece (as in the 
case of the bishop from our earlier example). Rather, the agents are 
supposed to infer the implicit rules from the language interactions 
themselves. This is a sophisticated model whose intricacies are not 
necessary for our current purpose. However, it is worth noting the emphasis 
Brandom places on assertions in relation to inferences. Assertion is a speech 
act performed in utterances of a declarative nature, a common definition is 
that it is a speech act in which propositions are announced as true or claimed 
to be so. According to Brandom (2015: 168-169), the two notions of asserting 
and inferring are essentially linked. This is because for Brandom, an 
assertion is something that can both serve as a reason and “stand in need of 
a reason”, thus meeting the requirements of declarative sentences within the 
inferential language game of reasoning. 
 
MacFarlane (2011) traces the various approaches to the notion of assertion 
and suggests that Brandom’s approach is primarily rooted in the idea of 
‘assertion as commitment’ due to C.S. Peirce’s position on the matter 
expressed in the statement “to assert a proposition is to make oneself 
responsible for its truth” (Peirce, cited in MacFarlane, 2011). And as 
MacFarlane notes, this position – which he finds in the work of a list of other 
analytical and pragmatic philosophers, including his own – defines assertion 
in terms of its intrinsic effects, while understanding those effects to be: the 
alteration of normative statuses and the accretion of new commitments or 
obligations. A performance, Brandom (2000b: 189) tells us, can only count 
“as having the significance of an assertion if it is within the context of a set of 
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social practices with the structure of […] a game of giving and asking for 
reasons”. 
 
I want to emphasise the significance of the general and broader notion of a 
‘game of giving and asking for reasons’ (or gogar for short) in the 
development of the postagonistic image. Whilst inferentialism – structured 
around discursive practices such as the gogar – is derived from an analysis 
of day to day reasoning between interlocutors, we are hard-pressed to find 
images that adopt it as a model for developing a politics rooted in both 
pluralism and scientific realism. At first estimation, it appears that the demand 
for such a form of realist pluralism might be asking for too much. But as I 
have aimed to show, taking the ‘synoptic real’ route leads us to the possibility 
of constructing images that escape the demand of sameness or uniformity 
but do not fetishize difference as the solution for all our political problems. My 
simple suggestion is that if images can play a part in the development of 
‘designs’ that do not reproduce the limitations of parliamentarianism, but 
rather take up models of possible ‘transformational understanding’, then 
more curatorial attention should be paid to instigating and laying the 
groundwork for such image-making practices. Such images would point to 
the irreducibility of the eventual ‘we’ (established through reasoning and 
adopting a gogar) to the initial ‘I’ that enters into a conversation. They would 
function as dynamic blueprints in action for processes of transformational 
reasoning and highlight the orientational dimension of dialogue. 
 
Continuing with our example of a hypothetical video-installation, the images 
presented to us would portray a holistic model made possible by the 
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reasoning-out-loud of model interlocutors working to put each other’s 
utterances and notions of truth through the process of a gogar. What is 
important in how this image unfolds is not the result or ‘ending’, but the 
process itself, how it labours towards a shared perspective which is 
transformative of the individual perspectives of each model interlocutor and 
irreducible to them. This is to say that such a blueprint for intersubjective 
interaction, tethered to a structural understanding of power, would 
acknowledge that the supposed concrete otherness of all participating 
interlocutors is perhaps not so concrete after all, and subject to 
transformation through the process of reasoning itself. This is possible if the 
model agents in our hypothetical image take normative attitudes towards 
each other’s communicative performances by being sensitive to the norms 
governing them. The collective ‘putting into jeopardy’ of norms which 
transpires within such a postagonistic moving image implies that the 
participating agents have come to accept the uncertainty that comes with 
asserting as a form of commitment and playing a game of giving and asking 
for reasons. This uncertainty in its neurobiological register is ‘cognitive 
orientation’. For the image, it forms the basis for how the text – i.e. the 
dialogue the model-interlocutors partake in – advances towards a collective 
subject which is not an assemblage of individual perspectives but a new 
shared one. 
 
The point here is that Mouffe’s understanding of others as concrete, her 
dependency on the us them relationship, her notion of a ‘conflictual 
consensus’, and her avowal of incommensurability all form the basis for her 
design of a democratic operation which provides a clear and simplified 
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framework that addresses the question of ‘how to organize pluralism’. By 
positing these elements as necessarily prior to any political conversation 
what is reproduced time and time again is a kind of restrictive framework that 
is ill-equipped for altering the structural processes or norms that have shaped 
it. Yet, this framework continues to suggest that taking up these elements as 
rules will help radicalize and open up power to transformation. What it 
ultimately provides is an organizational model set up to save liberal 
democracy in its present and contingent ‘European’ form60. As organizational 
theorist Karl Weick (1979: 6) explains, organizational concepts usually serve 
“to narrow the range of possibilities” and organizational actions are primarily 
centred on reducing uncertainty, or as he puts it, “are directed toward the 
establishment of a workable level of certainty”. 
 
By designing a model for pluralism grounded on distinctions such as us/them, 
constitutive outsides, enemy/adversary, antagonism/agonism etc. Mouffe not 
only narrows the range of possibilities but provides a workable level of 
certainty and fixity. And this is perhaps a major reason for the art field’s 
investment in agonistic pluralism as an assumed alternative to already 
existing forms of democracy. But this organizational model, as I have been 
implying, is unlikely to lead us out of the current quandary of democracy. 
Dialogue, reasoning, and the design of models that have a place for both 
political and scientific realism seem to be at least more promising starting 
positions.  
                                                     
60
 The emphasis on liberal pluralist democracy being European and contingent is iterated on 
numerous occasions by Mouffe. See for example Mouffe, 2016, especially her response to 
questions put forth by members of the audience.  
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Conclusion 
 
We can perhaps recall Foucault’s (1971: 41) metaphor of ‘surfaces of 
emergence’ by which he meant the “specific discursive and institutional sites 
in which objects first emerge or are re-configured” (Hannah, 2007). Mapping 
the ‘surfaces of emergence’ of Mouffian agonism led to an understanding of 
how theories invested in constructing ‘a people’ have emerged out of 
different discourses on ‘the real’ (the impossible the artificial). Quite literally, 
much political theory is a matter of embodying or voicing the ‘real’ that it has 
adopted. This mapping of the ‘surfaces of emergence’ of political theory – in 
the sense of grasping ‘the real’ that pushes these theories forward – seems 
important for a number of reasons: it helps situate our art practices in relation 
to a kind of genealogy of ‘the real’, and it identifies the historical discursive 
contexts from which these constructs of ‘the real’ have emerged and thus 
exposes what their limitations might be. 
 
On this view, every ‘real’ has or can have a correlate in political theory and 
thus engage with a construction of ‘a people’. Taking this into account, the 
synoptic real seems to be lacking such a correlate, at least in any widely 
recognizable sense. And perhaps this is no coincidence, since it is both 
challenging and challengable for the following reasons: 
 
 It suggests that if an intervention into the politics of abstraction is to 
culminate in some form of emancipation, then it cannot be based on 
‘concrete others’ and the institutionalization of incommensurability 
between agents. These aspects have by now become normalized and 
transforming them poses a challenge. 
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 It indicates that such intervention into the politics of abstraction must 
not be understood in relation to circular definitions of real abstraction, 
in which the reality of abstraction is explained in terms of its tendency 
to be casually effective, while at the same time interpreting causal 
efficacy as anything capable of making a difference in reality (Brassier, 
2014b). 
 Contra this, it suggests that intervention lies in intersubjective acts of 
reasoning while at one and the same time taking science seriously, 
two dimensions that in practice can be difficult to fuse.  
 Potentially, it can mount a challenge to forms of pluralism that have 
refused reason or rationalism wholesale because in theory it is more 
open to the variety of perspectives than these forms while at one and 
the same time upholding the scientific image. 
 It suggests a model that can help us move away from the ever-
increasing ontologization of politics. 
 
Moreover, and by way of conclusion, I want to recall ‘the sites’ we explored 
together on our journey from agonism to postagonistics. With Lyotard, we 
entered the courtroom and we sympathized with his ‘generic wronged 
worker’, but discovered that Lyotard’s differend was symptomatic of the post-
1968 idea that the “despotism of real subsumption renders ideology critique 
redundant” (Brassier, 2014), and that this led to the idea that interventions 
should be founded on differends because they exclude “cognitive 
verification”. They cannot be verified because they are either not accepted by 
or refuse to submit to a regime which establishes testimonial law and 
litigation according to its own idiom of exchange run on the subsumption of 
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labour power. We left Lyotard’s courtroom with the differend in hand and 
entered Mouffe’s parliament. There, we saw how the differend was 
transformed into a full-blown political project that would attempt to radicalize 
democracy.  
 
This ensued through the same mechanism of excluding ‘cognitive verification’ 
– by maximizing the passions and concreteness of ‘others’ to evade such 
verification –, enriched with a more complex armamentarium grounded in 
Laclau and Lacan, but also Schmitt and others. We then went to the park and 
the museum and learned that such a strategy might be used to occupy 
institutions and public spaces. With the radical openness of the empty 
signifier, democracy was supposed to transform the museum into an 
institution representing the people. We then booked a trip to an island with 
Deleuze and Tournier and tried to commit Other-cide, which could be 
described as an inverted form of sensus communis. As Shaviro (2002) notes, 
this particular relationship to the sensus communis is based on the 
cultivation and sharing of the highest possible degree of singularity, rather 
than as something generalizable into a ‘community’. Aesthetic Ideas are what 
Deleuze elsewhere calls Powers of the False. They are modes of the virtual, 
as projected by the imagination. 
 
Furthermore, we moved away from the island and the powers of the false to 
enter into the Sellarsian ‘space of reasons’. In this space, we decoupled 
antagonism from Mouffe’s ‘enmeshed concept’ of agonism and opted for a 
different position. As pointed out earlier by Brandom, the possibility of 
common conceptual norms – the norms by which we bind ourselves in using 
words such as ‘freedom’ – depends on differences in perspectives and even 
on disagreements. And this emphasis on perspectivality – rooted in 
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Sellarsian anti-foundationalism – paved the way for processes of cognitive 
orientation and interaction which would permit an ‘eventual shared 
understanding’ achieved neither by imposing commonalities nor by exploiting 
incommensurability. In turn, we arrived at what Trafford called ‘radical 
intersubjectivity’, which, unlike agonal democracy, is committed to the 
construction of new shared perspectives irreducible to, and transformative of, 
our individual perspectives. Hence, in taking up such an intersubjective 
approach we are leaving agonistics – at least in the sense laid bare in this 
project – behind and constructing a postagonistic perspective. 
 
As such, postagonistics – as developed over the course of this dissertation – 
is an attempt to think how we can construct ‘a people’ tethered neither to a 
project of radicalizing democracy nor to a dependency on the ‘powers of the 
false’. Rather, the emphasis is on the anti-foundationalist and self-correcting 
enterprise of knowledge through the game of giving and asking for reasons. I 
have used the inaesthetics of jeopardy to explain the methodology 
postagonistics uses. The inaesthetics of jeopardy is a model in which ‘the 
real’ is always in an eventual science that can only be reached when the 
current discrepancy between manifest and scientific images is collapsed 
through reasoning. This runs counter to both the impossible real and the 
artificial real, and has been labelled the synoptic real. This initial methodology 
(elaborated in more detail in Chapter 3) was further augmented through the 
work of Trafford on reasoning and Seibt on (intercultural) dialogue. An 
argument might be levelled at reasoning and the inaesthetics of jeopardy that 
they appear to be more in sync with idealism than realism. Here, I support 
Brassier’s (2015) claim that 
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[t]he term idealism merits strategic resuscitation as a way of reasserting the 
autonomy of the conceptual and combating the virulent anti-rationalism of 
certain contemporary strains of 'realism' and 'materialism'. 'Idealism' as a 
claim about the autonomy of the conceptual need not entail a 'realism of the 
idea' … 
 
The Sellarsian synoptic real is indisputably a form of ‘realism’, but it is one 
which enables the reasserting of the autonomy of the conceptual or the 
‘unnatural nature’ of reason to fully take its course. In relation to how 
reasoning is discussed in this project, I have suggested that the ongoing 
debate on ‘democracy and art’, which is also a question related to the notion 
of a public sphere, can begin to shift its terms of engagement. The move 
from participation to implication to occupation in order to arrive at reasoning 
requires a certain preparedness and reorientation. Although on occasion 
dialogue certainly does take place in some institutional frameworks, the point 
is that, generally speaking, there is certain ‘cluttering of the real’ that the 
expanded field of art has become accustomed to, and to an extent this 
delimits the possibilities of reasoning. Now, I want to return to ‘sites’ to briefly 
visit the final stop of our journey, the site of the image.  
 
In Chapter 3, the working concept of an inaesthetics of jeopardy was 
developed both to clarify the synoptic real and to suggest that images too can 
be thought of as sites for reasoning. I adopted Badiou’s term ‘inaesthetics’, 
which denotes resistance to the dependence on the reflection/object relation, 
and discussed how this model suggested a certain determinacy as opposed 
to the indeterminacy of contemporary art described by Malik. However, I did 
not fully articulate what was meant by ‘site’. In a short essay critical of site-
specific art projects, Poole (2015) develops the idea of what he calls an 
‘artwork proper’. According to Poole such an art work must be 
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a hypothesis; it is the happening of the ‘setting down’ of itself as its own site 
under, or at the base of, a given subject’s presumed location; in the shape of 
a speculative proposition … (emphasis added) 
 
Following on from this, although it may be argued that reasoning already 
takes place in everyday situations, the idea of the image as a site for 
reasoning is not meant to suggest the image as a mirror for everyday 
reasoning, by which I mean the type of reasoning one does when, for 
example, buying a coffee. Rather, the picture is one of reasoning as a 
discourse that is dependent on postulation and assertion and bound to 
intersubjectivity. This is of course what, after Sellars, I have called 
jeopardying. What is at stake is the politicization of jeopardying as a model 
for pluralism. Thus, when we work with images, a certain theatricalization of 
jeopardying is perhaps required to elucidate the effects of following Sellarsian 
anti-foundationalism all the way through from a political perspective. And it is 
in this way that the inaesthetics of jeopardy ‘sets itself down as its own site’ 
and speculatively proposes the image of a community, the jeopardying 
community.  
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